Saturday, October 01, 2005
Lenovo Evolves With Its I.B.M. PC Unit in Tow - New York Times
September 30, 2005
Lenovo Evolves With Its I.B.M. PC Unit in Tow
By STEVE LOHR
Lenovo's purchase of I.B.M.'s personal computer business was unquestionably a bold move and a striking symbol of China's economic globalization. But the challenge facing the combined company is to find a way to prosper in the fiercely competitive PC business, a sector where I.B.M. consistently lost money over the years.
Now, five months after the deal closed, the Lenovo and I.B.M. operations are being combined in earnest as the company tries to chart a path to success. With a management realignment, announced today, Lenovo hopes to advance its strategy.
Crucial elements in the plan, described by Lenovo executives in interviews this week, include a focus on notebook PC's, exploiting the fast-growing markets of China and India, and a move into the American consumer market early next year with Lenovo-branded machines.
So far, Lenovo has managed to avoid the steep fall in sales that have battered some computer companies after a merger. But the growth pace for Lenovo, the world's third-largest PC maker, has trailed Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Acer, a fast-rising No. 4 in the industry.
"Lenovo hasn't demonstrated an ability to get new growth yet," said Roger Kay, president of Endpoint Technologies Associates, a research firm.
Until now, the Lenovo and I.B.M. operations have been run somewhat independently. But the combined company will be led by global teams in areas like product development, sales, the supply chain of procurement, manufacturing and logistics. So the product team, for example, will be responsible for designing notebook and desktop computers sold under the ThinkPad, ThinkCentre and Lenovo brands worldwide.
Growth prospects may be brightest in China and India. But Lenovo executives say they believe that there are also attractive opportunities in America - opportunities that went untapped by I.B.M. because of its business culture and strategy.
I.B.M.'s strength is in catering to large corporations. "But I.B.M. is not focused on really small companies - with, say, 50 workers or less - or on individuals," said Stephen M. Ward Jr., Lenovo's chief executive and former head of I.B.M.'s PC business. "It's not a consumer company."
Early next year, Mr. Ward said, the company will begin introducing Lenovo-branded products in the United States. He did not disclose details, but industry analysts say Lenovo products in China or under development that would be strong candidates include a white laptop with a 13.3-inch screen and translucent keys (similar to Apple's iBook), expected to be priced at about $1,000; a desktop machine designed to handle video, music and Internet telephone service; and powerful, colorful notebooks and desktops for gamers.
Within weeks, Lenovo will introduce ThinkCentre desktops, aggressively priced, with small-business customers in mind. The machines will cost less than $400 without a monitor, but include advanced security and backup features developed by I.B.M., according to analysts who have been shown the desktops in advance.
The ThinkPad and ThinkCentre brands, Mr. Ward said, will be pitched mainly to business and professionals, while Lenovo will be the global consumer brand with more entertainment and media capabilities. The company has the right to use the I.B.M. logo on products for five years. But market research has shown the Lenovo name is gaining recognition outside China, helped, no doubt, by the 15,000 articles published since the Lenovo-I.B.M. deal was announced last December.
"We're on a track to establish the Lenovo brand more quickly than we had anticipated," Mr. Ward said.
To succeed, the new Lenovo, Mr. Ward said, must combine operational excellence and innovation. The new Z-series ThinkPad notebooks, introduced last week, offer a glimpse of both values, with prices starting at $800, and yet they are wide-screen models loaded with features that have been praised by reviewers.
After a merger announcement, computer makers often see a decline in sales as customers hold off orders until the strategy of the combined company is clear. Lenovo, analysts say, has done a solid job of navigating the postmerger uncertainty.
Growth in shipments of the merged company slipped to 6.9 percent in the first quarter of 2005, compared with growth of about 15 percent in the second half of 2004, combining sales of both companies, according to IDC, a research firm.
But Lenovo's growth rate picked up slightly, to 8.2 percent, in the second quarter of 2005, the most recent quarterly statistics.
By contrast, the combined PC sales of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq fell immediately after the companies merged, and so did the sales of Gateway and E-Machines after they merged, Loren Loverde, an analyst at IDC, noted.
The new management team at Lenovo seems to relish the challenge, and they see mostly opportunity. The company has also been able to attract senior executives eager to join the hybrid multinational.
Steven J. Bandrowczak started this week as chief information officer, coming from DHL Express. Wu Yibing, the chief strategy officer, came from McKinsey & Company. Steve V. Petracca, vice president for business development, had been the chief executive of BuilderDepot.com, an Internet store for home improvement supplies. Kevin Burns, the chief integration officer, came from Texas Pacific Group, one of three private equity firms that invested $350 million in Lenovo last spring. Deepak Advani, chief marketing officer, used to be the country manager for I.B.M. in India.
William Matson, the senior vice president for human resources, joined from I.B.M., though from the company's big services group. Lenovo, according to Mr. Matson, may well be a leading example of a new breed of truly global companies, with talent plucked from around the world and senior managers often living in different countries.
The model, he said, is very different from the traditional multinational that becomes powerful in its home market and then ventures out to set up colonial-style outposts around the world.
"Lenovo will be written about as a Harvard Business School case," Mr. Matson said, "and studied in business schools everywhere, whether we are successful or not."
Inside Lenovo, it seems, the learning is well under way. "Thinking globally is new for all of us in the former Lenovo operation," said Liu Jun, the chief operating officer. "That's exciting, all the new possibilities."
Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
Lenovo Evolves With Its I.B.M. PC Unit in Tow
By STEVE LOHR
Lenovo's purchase of I.B.M.'s personal computer business was unquestionably a bold move and a striking symbol of China's economic globalization. But the challenge facing the combined company is to find a way to prosper in the fiercely competitive PC business, a sector where I.B.M. consistently lost money over the years.
Now, five months after the deal closed, the Lenovo and I.B.M. operations are being combined in earnest as the company tries to chart a path to success. With a management realignment, announced today, Lenovo hopes to advance its strategy.
Crucial elements in the plan, described by Lenovo executives in interviews this week, include a focus on notebook PC's, exploiting the fast-growing markets of China and India, and a move into the American consumer market early next year with Lenovo-branded machines.
So far, Lenovo has managed to avoid the steep fall in sales that have battered some computer companies after a merger. But the growth pace for Lenovo, the world's third-largest PC maker, has trailed Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Acer, a fast-rising No. 4 in the industry.
"Lenovo hasn't demonstrated an ability to get new growth yet," said Roger Kay, president of Endpoint Technologies Associates, a research firm.
Until now, the Lenovo and I.B.M. operations have been run somewhat independently. But the combined company will be led by global teams in areas like product development, sales, the supply chain of procurement, manufacturing and logistics. So the product team, for example, will be responsible for designing notebook and desktop computers sold under the ThinkPad, ThinkCentre and Lenovo brands worldwide.
Growth prospects may be brightest in China and India. But Lenovo executives say they believe that there are also attractive opportunities in America - opportunities that went untapped by I.B.M. because of its business culture and strategy.
I.B.M.'s strength is in catering to large corporations. "But I.B.M. is not focused on really small companies - with, say, 50 workers or less - or on individuals," said Stephen M. Ward Jr., Lenovo's chief executive and former head of I.B.M.'s PC business. "It's not a consumer company."
Early next year, Mr. Ward said, the company will begin introducing Lenovo-branded products in the United States. He did not disclose details, but industry analysts say Lenovo products in China or under development that would be strong candidates include a white laptop with a 13.3-inch screen and translucent keys (similar to Apple's iBook), expected to be priced at about $1,000; a desktop machine designed to handle video, music and Internet telephone service; and powerful, colorful notebooks and desktops for gamers.
Within weeks, Lenovo will introduce ThinkCentre desktops, aggressively priced, with small-business customers in mind. The machines will cost less than $400 without a monitor, but include advanced security and backup features developed by I.B.M., according to analysts who have been shown the desktops in advance.
The ThinkPad and ThinkCentre brands, Mr. Ward said, will be pitched mainly to business and professionals, while Lenovo will be the global consumer brand with more entertainment and media capabilities. The company has the right to use the I.B.M. logo on products for five years. But market research has shown the Lenovo name is gaining recognition outside China, helped, no doubt, by the 15,000 articles published since the Lenovo-I.B.M. deal was announced last December.
"We're on a track to establish the Lenovo brand more quickly than we had anticipated," Mr. Ward said.
To succeed, the new Lenovo, Mr. Ward said, must combine operational excellence and innovation. The new Z-series ThinkPad notebooks, introduced last week, offer a glimpse of both values, with prices starting at $800, and yet they are wide-screen models loaded with features that have been praised by reviewers.
After a merger announcement, computer makers often see a decline in sales as customers hold off orders until the strategy of the combined company is clear. Lenovo, analysts say, has done a solid job of navigating the postmerger uncertainty.
Growth in shipments of the merged company slipped to 6.9 percent in the first quarter of 2005, compared with growth of about 15 percent in the second half of 2004, combining sales of both companies, according to IDC, a research firm.
But Lenovo's growth rate picked up slightly, to 8.2 percent, in the second quarter of 2005, the most recent quarterly statistics.
By contrast, the combined PC sales of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq fell immediately after the companies merged, and so did the sales of Gateway and E-Machines after they merged, Loren Loverde, an analyst at IDC, noted.
The new management team at Lenovo seems to relish the challenge, and they see mostly opportunity. The company has also been able to attract senior executives eager to join the hybrid multinational.
Steven J. Bandrowczak started this week as chief information officer, coming from DHL Express. Wu Yibing, the chief strategy officer, came from McKinsey & Company. Steve V. Petracca, vice president for business development, had been the chief executive of BuilderDepot.com, an Internet store for home improvement supplies. Kevin Burns, the chief integration officer, came from Texas Pacific Group, one of three private equity firms that invested $350 million in Lenovo last spring. Deepak Advani, chief marketing officer, used to be the country manager for I.B.M. in India.
William Matson, the senior vice president for human resources, joined from I.B.M., though from the company's big services group. Lenovo, according to Mr. Matson, may well be a leading example of a new breed of truly global companies, with talent plucked from around the world and senior managers often living in different countries.
The model, he said, is very different from the traditional multinational that becomes powerful in its home market and then ventures out to set up colonial-style outposts around the world.
"Lenovo will be written about as a Harvard Business School case," Mr. Matson said, "and studied in business schools everywhere, whether we are successful or not."
Inside Lenovo, it seems, the learning is well under way. "Thinking globally is new for all of us in the former Lenovo operation," said Liu Jun, the chief operating officer. "That's exciting, all the new possibilities."
Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
Monday, September 05, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited
Financial Times (London, England)
August 27, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1
SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS; Pg. 9
LENGTH: 1097 words
HEADLINE: A weaver of controversies MAN IN THE NEWS PETER MANDELSON: The embattled EU trade chief is determined to show he is a figure of substance, writes George Parker
BYLINE: By GEORGE PARKER
BODY:
Peter Mandelson left for his summer break in Italy in high spirits, the hero of Europe's shrinking garments industry after persuading China to limit its textile exports.
The European Union trade chief returns to work on Monday pilloried by retailers for ÂÂdisrupting their purchasing cycle, denying shoppers cheap jeans and T-shirts and stripping the shelves of Christmas bra-and-knicker sets.
Mr Mandelson has become intimately acquainted with the fine line between political success and low farce during a turbulent 20-year career at the heart of British and, now, European Union politics. Twice forced to resign from the British cabinet after becoming embroiled in scandals, Mr Mandelson was last November given a third political life by Tony Blair, the man he calls "my friend".
Today the 51-year-old former Labour MP is Britain's sole EU commissioner, presiding over the world's biggest trading bloc. "It is incomparable to anything I have ever done before," Mr Mandelson says. His friends say it is his chance to become a serious player on the world stage. But if Mr Blair thought Mr Mandelson would leave controversy behind by swapping the Westminster hothouse for talks on blousequotas in Brussels he was wrong.
In less than a year in Brussels he has fallen out in spectacular fashion with his opposite number in Washington, clashed with colleagues at the European Commission and is now trying to deconstruct Europe's pullover mountain. A faceless Eurocrat Mr Mandelson is not. One friend, the author Robert Harris, once said that, with his love of the high life and high society, he is "too colourful, exotic and clever for his own good". The question posed by Mr Mandelson's critics is whether the former "King of Spin" has the aptitude or the patience to make a success of perhaps the biggest job of his life.
Peter Mandelson was born into a comfortable Labour-supportingfamily in London in 1953, the grandson of the cabinet minister Herbert Morrison. But the social democratic party he helped to fashion in the 1980s and 1990s marked a decisive break from the Labour party of Morrison's generation. Today he is viewed in France as a raving "neo-liberal".
Mr Mandelson, as Labour's media chief, helped to lay the ground for Mr Blair's election as party leader in 1994. The party loosened its ties with the trade unions and embraced the private sector and the EU. Under Mr Mandelson, Labour's image softened from Red Flag socialism to Red Rose New Labour. Along with Mr Blair and Gordon Brown - Mr Blair's presumed successor and now Mr Mandelson's arch-enemy - he is credited with masterminding the party's return to power in 1997.
Mr Mandelson's ruthless control of the New Labour "message" and proximity to Mr Blair earned him the nickname "Prince of Darkness" from Labour MPs and the media. Nobody doubted his ability to burnish the image of the party and prime minister, but Mr Mandelson was careless of his own reputation. His two stints in the cabinet were measured in months. He resigned as trade secretary in 1998 over an undisclosed home loan from a ministerial colleague; his spell as Northern Ireland secretary ended in 2001 when he failed to squash claims that he helped an Indian businessmen with a British passport application after the man had given money to the Millennium Dome project. He was cleared of wrongdoing.
Mr Mandelson clung to hopes of a third return in a Blair cabinet but finally accepted the end of his British political career when he moved to Brussels last year. His reputation for political image-making and spin followed him, an aspect of his political past exploited by Robert Zoellick, the former US trade representative. The two men fell out as they attempted to resolve the aircraft subsidy row between Boeing and Airbus, with Mr Zoellick slamming down the telephone and opening up the biggest EU-US trade dispute in years. Mr Zoellick claimed Mr Mandelson had not been frank about his negotiating position on public subsidies to Airbus. "You don't have to spin," he said. Mr Mandelson says Mr Zoellick later apologised, but the strains to US-EU trade relations are still evident.
His critics inside the Commission question how Mr Mandelson, a liberal Brit, could have ended up with a worse relationship with the US than his predecessor, Pascal Lamy, a French socialist. "I think he probably over-estimated his capacity to deliver on the US-EU relationship because he was a Brit," said one. "He now realises that the relationship is an economic one, above all."
Mr Mandelson's supporters claim their man is the victim of an intractable battle between Airbus and Boeing for world market share, the stakes raised during the US election. "It's not really a trade dispute at all," says one. Mr Mandelson admits he takes a more political approach to trade negotiations than Mr Lamy - a career bureaucrat - but says spin, or "media relations" as he calls it, plays only a tiny part in his new world.
Sir Michael Scholar, Mr Mandelson's senior civil servant at the UK's department of trade and industry, dismisses any suggestion that the trade commissioner hates detail. He says the minister engaged with experts and listened to advice. "When he left after five months there was an enormous sense of disappointment. He was . . . very clear about what he wanted and pretty successful at getting it done."
Although Mr Mandelson describes his Brussels job as "fascinating", he is often frustrated at trying to create a trade policy acceptable to EU countries ranging from free-trade Sweden to protectionist France. He has yet to win unqualified support within his own department and Jose Manuel Barroso, the Commission president, clashed with him after Mr Mandelson resisted new textile quotas on China. He speaks of the "extreme public fears and political pressures" that forced him to back down - notably from the "textilians" of France and Italy.
He admits the problems for retailers are "a serious glitch" but regards the deal with China as a triumph. But the bigger tests for Mr Mandelson will come in the next few months - trying to stop the Airbus-Boeing dispute from escalating and working with the US to unlock the Doha world trade round.
With Europe gripped by low growth, high unemployment and fears about the economic rise of China, Mr Mandelson admits it is not the easiest time to push a free trade agenda. But those British punters who placed bets last year on him being driven out of his job by now will be disappointed that he is still in place and that he fully intends to use his five-year term to prove he is a man of substance, not spin.
LOAD-DATE: August 26, 2005
Financial Times (London, England)
August 27, 2005 Saturday
London Edition 1
SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS; Pg. 9
LENGTH: 1097 words
HEADLINE: A weaver of controversies MAN IN THE NEWS PETER MANDELSON: The embattled EU trade chief is determined to show he is a figure of substance, writes George Parker
BYLINE: By GEORGE PARKER
BODY:
Peter Mandelson left for his summer break in Italy in high spirits, the hero of Europe's shrinking garments industry after persuading China to limit its textile exports.
The European Union trade chief returns to work on Monday pilloried by retailers for ÂÂdisrupting their purchasing cycle, denying shoppers cheap jeans and T-shirts and stripping the shelves of Christmas bra-and-knicker sets.
Mr Mandelson has become intimately acquainted with the fine line between political success and low farce during a turbulent 20-year career at the heart of British and, now, European Union politics. Twice forced to resign from the British cabinet after becoming embroiled in scandals, Mr Mandelson was last November given a third political life by Tony Blair, the man he calls "my friend".
Today the 51-year-old former Labour MP is Britain's sole EU commissioner, presiding over the world's biggest trading bloc. "It is incomparable to anything I have ever done before," Mr Mandelson says. His friends say it is his chance to become a serious player on the world stage. But if Mr Blair thought Mr Mandelson would leave controversy behind by swapping the Westminster hothouse for talks on blousequotas in Brussels he was wrong.
In less than a year in Brussels he has fallen out in spectacular fashion with his opposite number in Washington, clashed with colleagues at the European Commission and is now trying to deconstruct Europe's pullover mountain. A faceless Eurocrat Mr Mandelson is not. One friend, the author Robert Harris, once said that, with his love of the high life and high society, he is "too colourful, exotic and clever for his own good". The question posed by Mr Mandelson's critics is whether the former "King of Spin" has the aptitude or the patience to make a success of perhaps the biggest job of his life.
Peter Mandelson was born into a comfortable Labour-supportingfamily in London in 1953, the grandson of the cabinet minister Herbert Morrison. But the social democratic party he helped to fashion in the 1980s and 1990s marked a decisive break from the Labour party of Morrison's generation. Today he is viewed in France as a raving "neo-liberal".
Mr Mandelson, as Labour's media chief, helped to lay the ground for Mr Blair's election as party leader in 1994. The party loosened its ties with the trade unions and embraced the private sector and the EU. Under Mr Mandelson, Labour's image softened from Red Flag socialism to Red Rose New Labour. Along with Mr Blair and Gordon Brown - Mr Blair's presumed successor and now Mr Mandelson's arch-enemy - he is credited with masterminding the party's return to power in 1997.
Mr Mandelson's ruthless control of the New Labour "message" and proximity to Mr Blair earned him the nickname "Prince of Darkness" from Labour MPs and the media. Nobody doubted his ability to burnish the image of the party and prime minister, but Mr Mandelson was careless of his own reputation. His two stints in the cabinet were measured in months. He resigned as trade secretary in 1998 over an undisclosed home loan from a ministerial colleague; his spell as Northern Ireland secretary ended in 2001 when he failed to squash claims that he helped an Indian businessmen with a British passport application after the man had given money to the Millennium Dome project. He was cleared of wrongdoing.
Mr Mandelson clung to hopes of a third return in a Blair cabinet but finally accepted the end of his British political career when he moved to Brussels last year. His reputation for political image-making and spin followed him, an aspect of his political past exploited by Robert Zoellick, the former US trade representative. The two men fell out as they attempted to resolve the aircraft subsidy row between Boeing and Airbus, with Mr Zoellick slamming down the telephone and opening up the biggest EU-US trade dispute in years. Mr Zoellick claimed Mr Mandelson had not been frank about his negotiating position on public subsidies to Airbus. "You don't have to spin," he said. Mr Mandelson says Mr Zoellick later apologised, but the strains to US-EU trade relations are still evident.
His critics inside the Commission question how Mr Mandelson, a liberal Brit, could have ended up with a worse relationship with the US than his predecessor, Pascal Lamy, a French socialist. "I think he probably over-estimated his capacity to deliver on the US-EU relationship because he was a Brit," said one. "He now realises that the relationship is an economic one, above all."
Mr Mandelson's supporters claim their man is the victim of an intractable battle between Airbus and Boeing for world market share, the stakes raised during the US election. "It's not really a trade dispute at all," says one. Mr Mandelson admits he takes a more political approach to trade negotiations than Mr Lamy - a career bureaucrat - but says spin, or "media relations" as he calls it, plays only a tiny part in his new world.
Sir Michael Scholar, Mr Mandelson's senior civil servant at the UK's department of trade and industry, dismisses any suggestion that the trade commissioner hates detail. He says the minister engaged with experts and listened to advice. "When he left after five months there was an enormous sense of disappointment. He was . . . very clear about what he wanted and pretty successful at getting it done."
Although Mr Mandelson describes his Brussels job as "fascinating", he is often frustrated at trying to create a trade policy acceptable to EU countries ranging from free-trade Sweden to protectionist France. He has yet to win unqualified support within his own department and Jose Manuel Barroso, the Commission president, clashed with him after Mr Mandelson resisted new textile quotas on China. He speaks of the "extreme public fears and political pressures" that forced him to back down - notably from the "textilians" of France and Italy.
He admits the problems for retailers are "a serious glitch" but regards the deal with China as a triumph. But the bigger tests for Mr Mandelson will come in the next few months - trying to stop the Airbus-Boeing dispute from escalating and working with the US to unlock the Doha world trade round.
With Europe gripped by low growth, high unemployment and fears about the economic rise of China, Mr Mandelson admits it is not the easiest time to push a free trade agenda. But those British punters who placed bets last year on him being driven out of his job by now will be disappointed that he is still in place and that he fully intends to use his five-year term to prove he is a man of substance, not spin.
LOAD-DATE: August 26, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Financial Times (London, England)
August 29, 2005 Monday
USA Edition 1
SECTION: ASIA-PACIFIC; Pg. 3
LENGTH: 424 words
HEADLINE: Indian security concerns threaten Huawei
BYLINE: By KHOZEM MERCHANT
DATELINE: MUMBAI
BODY:
Indian security concerns threaten to derail plans by Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications company, to increase its investment in its Indian affiliate in Bangalore, according to confidential documents obtained by the Financial Times.
A meeting of powerful Indian civil servants was informed last month that "Huawei's operations in India had come to the adverse notice of India's security agencies, who have expressed reservations regarding (its) links with the Chinese military, their clandestine operations in Iraq, and close ties with the Pakistani army".
The suspicions of India's intelligence services have emerged two months after Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore, India's IT capital, and spoke of "greater co-operation, not competition" between China's hardware and India's software capabilities.
The meeting of Indian policy-makers was considering a proposal by Huawei to invest Rs2.64bn (Euros 50m) Dollars 60m) in its Indian unit, which develops software from a large site in Bangalore.
According to the documents, Huawei was keen to expand its presence into areas where 100 per cent foreign direct investment is now permitted, such as turnkey projects in infrastructure, technology and telecoms.
But a senior representative from India's intelligence bureau recommended the proposal should be rejected because "we do not possess the capability or the technical expertise for building an adequate safeguard to address the security concerns in the sensitive area of telecommunications".
The ministry of external affairs, however, had no specific objection from the "political angle" against Huawei's investment in India, the meeting heard.
B K Chaturvedi, the cabinet secretary who chaired the meeting, highlighted the possible negative impact of imposing restrictions on Chinese companies.
"Restricting the Chinese investment in this sector in our country on the grounds of security would not be a proper step, as it would adversely affect the fate of Indian companies based in China," the document records.
Anxieties run deep within the Indian policy-making establishment despite evidence of warmer relations between China and India over technology, say people in the Dollars 17.2bn IT-services industry.
One result of Mr Wen's tour of India's IT and scientific research establishment was last month's announcement of a contract between several Chinese state agencies, Tata Consultancy Services, India's largest IT company, and Microsoft , the world's biggest software company, to develop China's offshore technology services industry.
LOAD-DATE: August 28, 2005
August 29, 2005 Monday
USA Edition 1
SECTION: ASIA-PACIFIC; Pg. 3
LENGTH: 424 words
HEADLINE: Indian security concerns threaten Huawei
BYLINE: By KHOZEM MERCHANT
DATELINE: MUMBAI
BODY:
Indian security concerns threaten to derail plans by Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications company, to increase its investment in its Indian affiliate in Bangalore, according to confidential documents obtained by the Financial Times.
A meeting of powerful Indian civil servants was informed last month that "Huawei's operations in India had come to the adverse notice of India's security agencies, who have expressed reservations regarding (its) links with the Chinese military, their clandestine operations in Iraq, and close ties with the Pakistani army".
The suspicions of India's intelligence services have emerged two months after Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore, India's IT capital, and spoke of "greater co-operation, not competition" between China's hardware and India's software capabilities.
The meeting of Indian policy-makers was considering a proposal by Huawei to invest Rs2.64bn (Euros 50m) Dollars 60m) in its Indian unit, which develops software from a large site in Bangalore.
According to the documents, Huawei was keen to expand its presence into areas where 100 per cent foreign direct investment is now permitted, such as turnkey projects in infrastructure, technology and telecoms.
But a senior representative from India's intelligence bureau recommended the proposal should be rejected because "we do not possess the capability or the technical expertise for building an adequate safeguard to address the security concerns in the sensitive area of telecommunications".
The ministry of external affairs, however, had no specific objection from the "political angle" against Huawei's investment in India, the meeting heard.
B K Chaturvedi, the cabinet secretary who chaired the meeting, highlighted the possible negative impact of imposing restrictions on Chinese companies.
"Restricting the Chinese investment in this sector in our country on the grounds of security would not be a proper step, as it would adversely affect the fate of Indian companies based in China," the document records.
Anxieties run deep within the Indian policy-making establishment despite evidence of warmer relations between China and India over technology, say people in the Dollars 17.2bn IT-services industry.
One result of Mr Wen's tour of India's IT and scientific research establishment was last month's announcement of a contract between several Chinese state agencies, Tata Consultancy Services, India's largest IT company, and Microsoft , the world's biggest software company, to develop China's offshore technology services industry.
LOAD-DATE: August 28, 2005
Saturday, August 20, 2005
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China - New York Times
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China - New York TimesAugust 18, 2005
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Aug. 17 - Sudden shortages of gasoline and diesel in Southeastern China are reigniting a debate here: Is pressure from state companies, coupled with freely available information on oil prices, driving China to accept market forces faster than it may have wanted?
Dozens of service stations in Southeastern China, notably in cities near Hong Kong, abruptly ran out of fuel this week just as officials in Beijing were debating requests from domestic oil companies to charge more for diesel and gasoline. The shortages have produced long lines of angry motorists at service stations and have disrupted some freight shipments, as trucks do not have the diesel to make trips.
Some in China and abroad say the state oil companies created the shortages to increase prices. China regulates retail fuel prices, adjusting them no more than once a month. But the government has not raised them nearly as quickly as world oil prices have risen, hoping to keep inflation in check. This has left refiners with negligible profit margins, and even losses, as they convert oil into gasoline and diesel.
Sinopec, the state-controlled oil company that dominates the refining of fuel in China, especially in Southeastern China, said late Wednesday that the shortages were a result of people stockpiling fuel now that they have enough information to bet on the direction of oil prices.
Asked if a shortage had been deliberately created, Evan Jia, a spokesman for Sinopec, said, "We try our best to supply the marketplace."
People in China today have much greater access to information about world prices than ever before, and as they see high world oil prices, they are topping off fuel tanks in expectation that China will soon raise domestic prices, Mr. Jia said.
"They buy inventory for their own tank in the hope the price will be changing," Mr. Jia said. "People think the trend in China should be toward a price increase."
While there are no good figures on the private storage capacity for fuel in China, oil experts say it is probably considerable as years of electricity shortages have prompted factories across the country to install backup diesel generators with large fuel tanks. Chinese factories appear to have run down their fuel tanks in the second quarter, when previously torrid diesel sales slowed to a crawl, and may be refilling their tanks now.
A typhoon and a tropical storm have also disrupted tanker deliveries to Southeastern China in the last two weeks, Mr. Jia said.
Sinopec is a conglomerate of nearly 10,000 formerly separate oil production, refining and distribution entities, previously under the direct control of local, provincial and central government agencies and still somewhat influenced by them.
"Refineries do not want to process the crude. We try our best," Mr. Jia said.
But the timing of the latest shortages, coinciding with an active debate in the government-controlled news media over whether China should liberalize retail energy prices, has made many energy analysts suspicious of these rationales.
Sam Dale, an Asian oil analyst in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a newsletter-publishing company based in New York, said oil companies appeared to be putting pressure on the Chinese government to free retail prices, by running their refineries below capacity and holding back supplies from the market. "It's an artificial shortage," he said.
Jeff Brown, an oil demand analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris, said retail prices had not been high enough in China to cover refiners' costs for many months. He said it was mysterious that the shortages appear to be worse now than under similar conditions in April.
Chinese refiners' razor-thin margins have not changed much in recent months, Mr. Brown noted. The margins narrowed last winter and have remained narrow because rising world oil prices in dollars have been offset by more slowly rising retail prices in China and last month's 2 percent increase in the value of China's currency.
Mr. Jia said Sinopec service stations would be fully stocked by Thursday in cities near here that have been experiencing shortages.
Sinopec's refineries are operating at 89 to 90 percent of capacity, compared with past rates as high as 97 to 98 percent, Mr. Jia said. There is a shortfall mainly because some refineries are closed for maintenance, but some refinery managers are also reluctant to produce at full tilt when retail prices are low, he added.
Sinopec's closest domestic rival in refining, PetroChina, is more active in Northern China.
PetroChina officials had no comment on Wednesday.
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Aug. 17 - Sudden shortages of gasoline and diesel in Southeastern China are reigniting a debate here: Is pressure from state companies, coupled with freely available information on oil prices, driving China to accept market forces faster than it may have wanted?
Dozens of service stations in Southeastern China, notably in cities near Hong Kong, abruptly ran out of fuel this week just as officials in Beijing were debating requests from domestic oil companies to charge more for diesel and gasoline. The shortages have produced long lines of angry motorists at service stations and have disrupted some freight shipments, as trucks do not have the diesel to make trips.
Some in China and abroad say the state oil companies created the shortages to increase prices. China regulates retail fuel prices, adjusting them no more than once a month. But the government has not raised them nearly as quickly as world oil prices have risen, hoping to keep inflation in check. This has left refiners with negligible profit margins, and even losses, as they convert oil into gasoline and diesel.
Sinopec, the state-controlled oil company that dominates the refining of fuel in China, especially in Southeastern China, said late Wednesday that the shortages were a result of people stockpiling fuel now that they have enough information to bet on the direction of oil prices.
Asked if a shortage had been deliberately created, Evan Jia, a spokesman for Sinopec, said, "We try our best to supply the marketplace."
People in China today have much greater access to information about world prices than ever before, and as they see high world oil prices, they are topping off fuel tanks in expectation that China will soon raise domestic prices, Mr. Jia said.
"They buy inventory for their own tank in the hope the price will be changing," Mr. Jia said. "People think the trend in China should be toward a price increase."
While there are no good figures on the private storage capacity for fuel in China, oil experts say it is probably considerable as years of electricity shortages have prompted factories across the country to install backup diesel generators with large fuel tanks. Chinese factories appear to have run down their fuel tanks in the second quarter, when previously torrid diesel sales slowed to a crawl, and may be refilling their tanks now.
A typhoon and a tropical storm have also disrupted tanker deliveries to Southeastern China in the last two weeks, Mr. Jia said.
Sinopec is a conglomerate of nearly 10,000 formerly separate oil production, refining and distribution entities, previously under the direct control of local, provincial and central government agencies and still somewhat influenced by them.
"Refineries do not want to process the crude. We try our best," Mr. Jia said.
But the timing of the latest shortages, coinciding with an active debate in the government-controlled news media over whether China should liberalize retail energy prices, has made many energy analysts suspicious of these rationales.
Sam Dale, an Asian oil analyst in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a newsletter-publishing company based in New York, said oil companies appeared to be putting pressure on the Chinese government to free retail prices, by running their refineries below capacity and holding back supplies from the market. "It's an artificial shortage," he said.
Jeff Brown, an oil demand analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris, said retail prices had not been high enough in China to cover refiners' costs for many months. He said it was mysterious that the shortages appear to be worse now than under similar conditions in April.
Chinese refiners' razor-thin margins have not changed much in recent months, Mr. Brown noted. The margins narrowed last winter and have remained narrow because rising world oil prices in dollars have been offset by more slowly rising retail prices in China and last month's 2 percent increase in the value of China's currency.
Mr. Jia said Sinopec service stations would be fully stocked by Thursday in cities near here that have been experiencing shortages.
Sinopec's refineries are operating at 89 to 90 percent of capacity, compared with past rates as high as 97 to 98 percent, Mr. Jia said. There is a shortfall mainly because some refineries are closed for maintenance, but some refinery managers are also reluctant to produce at full tilt when retail prices are low, he added.
Sinopec's closest domestic rival in refining, PetroChina, is more active in Northern China.
PetroChina officials had no comment on Wednesday.
China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan - New York Times
August 16, 2005
China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Tuesday, Aug. 16 - Chinese and Indian state-owned oil companies are trying to buy a Canadian company with oil fields in Kazakhstan, in the most direct competition yet for energy between Asia's most populous countries.
A joint venture of the China National Petroleum Corporation, China's biggest oil company, and PetroChina, its publicly traded subsidiary, offered roughly $3.2 billion late Monday for PetroKazakhstan, a person close to the negotiations said. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, India's main state-owned oil company, has already reportedly submitted a bid of $3.6 billion in cooperation with the steel maker Mittal Group.
PetroKazakhstan, whose shares are traded in Toronto, issued a statement from its headquarters in Calgary, Alberta, after the close of trading that it had received proposals to acquire the entire company. The company announced in late June that it had been approached by suitors, and investment bankers had identified the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation as being interested.
While the Chinese bid appeared to be lower than the Indian bid, Chevron's successful pursuit of Unocal this summer despite a higher bid from Cnooc Ltd. of China has shown that the higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy.
The China National Petroleum Corporation already has substantial oil investments of its own in Kazakhstan, and has been trying to build a pipeline to carry the oil to China. The Chinese government has been actively courting Kazakhstan as well, partly because Beijing officials want to make sure that no Muslim insurgency develops in heavily Muslim areas of Xinjiang Province near the Kazakh border.
PetroKazakhstan has been locked in bitter disputes with the Kazakh government over its flaring of natural gas and other issues, disputes that China's alliance with Kazakhstan might be able to smooth over.
An Indian buyer of PetroKazakhstan would face a more difficult challenge in exporting oil from Kazakhstan, which does not share a border with India. Oil experts said that an Indian buyer might need to export the oil through Russia, further increasing Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia at a time when Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic, has been trying to develop a broader array of international relationships.
"That's probably behind the cheaper bid from the Chinese," said Sam Dale, an oil industry expert in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a New York-based newsletter publishing group.
The rival attempts to buy PetroKazakhstan underline the inherent competition between China and India for oil, even though both countries' senior officials have called repeatedly this year for cooperation.
The two countries together hold 37 percent of the world's population. India's oil imports rose 11 percent last year while China's soared 33 percent, although part of China's increase last year reflected stockpiling, and the pace of Chinese imports has started to slow this year.
Western oil executives have complained that they may find it hard to buy oil fields at commercially viable prices if bidding soars because of the involvement of state-owned oil companies that may be driven by military and strategic objectives as well as a need for profits.China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan - New York Times
China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Tuesday, Aug. 16 - Chinese and Indian state-owned oil companies are trying to buy a Canadian company with oil fields in Kazakhstan, in the most direct competition yet for energy between Asia's most populous countries.
A joint venture of the China National Petroleum Corporation, China's biggest oil company, and PetroChina, its publicly traded subsidiary, offered roughly $3.2 billion late Monday for PetroKazakhstan, a person close to the negotiations said. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, India's main state-owned oil company, has already reportedly submitted a bid of $3.6 billion in cooperation with the steel maker Mittal Group.
PetroKazakhstan, whose shares are traded in Toronto, issued a statement from its headquarters in Calgary, Alberta, after the close of trading that it had received proposals to acquire the entire company. The company announced in late June that it had been approached by suitors, and investment bankers had identified the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation as being interested.
While the Chinese bid appeared to be lower than the Indian bid, Chevron's successful pursuit of Unocal this summer despite a higher bid from Cnooc Ltd. of China has shown that the higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy.
The China National Petroleum Corporation already has substantial oil investments of its own in Kazakhstan, and has been trying to build a pipeline to carry the oil to China. The Chinese government has been actively courting Kazakhstan as well, partly because Beijing officials want to make sure that no Muslim insurgency develops in heavily Muslim areas of Xinjiang Province near the Kazakh border.
PetroKazakhstan has been locked in bitter disputes with the Kazakh government over its flaring of natural gas and other issues, disputes that China's alliance with Kazakhstan might be able to smooth over.
An Indian buyer of PetroKazakhstan would face a more difficult challenge in exporting oil from Kazakhstan, which does not share a border with India. Oil experts said that an Indian buyer might need to export the oil through Russia, further increasing Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia at a time when Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic, has been trying to develop a broader array of international relationships.
"That's probably behind the cheaper bid from the Chinese," said Sam Dale, an oil industry expert in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a New York-based newsletter publishing group.
The rival attempts to buy PetroKazakhstan underline the inherent competition between China and India for oil, even though both countries' senior officials have called repeatedly this year for cooperation.
The two countries together hold 37 percent of the world's population. India's oil imports rose 11 percent last year while China's soared 33 percent, although part of China's increase last year reflected stockpiling, and the pace of Chinese imports has started to slow this year.
Western oil executives have complained that they may find it hard to buy oil fields at commercially viable prices if bidding soars because of the involvement of state-owned oil companies that may be driven by military and strategic objectives as well as a need for profits.China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan - New York Times
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover - New York Times
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover - New York TimesAugust 16, 2005
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover
By IAN AUSTEN
OTTAWA, Aug. 15 - The purchase of just under 20 percent of Falconbridge, Canada's largest mining company, by the Swiss coal producer Xstrata on Monday led to immediate speculation that it would move to take control of the company.
Xstrata has agreed to pay Brascan, a Canadian investment company, 2.05 billion Canadian dollars ($1.71 billion) for a 19.9 percent holding in Falconbridge, which is based in Toronto, putting it just under a Canadian legal threshold requiring a bid for all outstanding shares.
"I think it's a fairly good guess that they aren't buying this to hold a 20 percent stake," said Greg Barnes, a base metals analyst with Canaccord Capital in Toronto. "This deal effectively blocks anyone else out."
In a conference call with analysts, Xstrata's chief executive, Mick Davis, fueled the speculation about future moves.
"We don't intend to be a long-term investor with a minority interest in the company," Mr. Davis said. However, when asked directly by an analyst if investors should expect a larger play for Falconbridge, he declined to answer.
The share sale marks the end of a sometimes difficult effort by Brascan, which is based in Toronto, to leave mining and concentrate its investments in other sectors, particularly commercial real estate and electric power generation.
Last year, Brascan put its main mining asset, then known as Noranda, up for auction. It reached a preliminary deal with the China Minmetals Corporation in late September. But the Chinese government's control of Minmetals prompted a political outcry in Canada, and the deal fell apart.
Other would-be bidders, including Xstrata, had declined to bid on Noranda because it did not fully own Falconbridge, a leading Canadian nickel producer.
To resolve that issue, Brascan engineered a complex merger between Falconbridge and Noranda that was completed in June. Brascan's holdings in the merged company was 20 percent, compared with its 42 percent stake in Noranda, the larger of the two companies.
The share sale to Xstrata valued Falconbridge at 28 Canadian dollars ($23.40) a share, slightly less than Friday's closing price on the Toronto Stock Exchange. If Xstrata makes an offer for other Falconbridge shares over the next nine months at a higher price, it will pay Brascan the difference.
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover
By IAN AUSTEN
OTTAWA, Aug. 15 - The purchase of just under 20 percent of Falconbridge, Canada's largest mining company, by the Swiss coal producer Xstrata on Monday led to immediate speculation that it would move to take control of the company.
Xstrata has agreed to pay Brascan, a Canadian investment company, 2.05 billion Canadian dollars ($1.71 billion) for a 19.9 percent holding in Falconbridge, which is based in Toronto, putting it just under a Canadian legal threshold requiring a bid for all outstanding shares.
"I think it's a fairly good guess that they aren't buying this to hold a 20 percent stake," said Greg Barnes, a base metals analyst with Canaccord Capital in Toronto. "This deal effectively blocks anyone else out."
In a conference call with analysts, Xstrata's chief executive, Mick Davis, fueled the speculation about future moves.
"We don't intend to be a long-term investor with a minority interest in the company," Mr. Davis said. However, when asked directly by an analyst if investors should expect a larger play for Falconbridge, he declined to answer.
The share sale marks the end of a sometimes difficult effort by Brascan, which is based in Toronto, to leave mining and concentrate its investments in other sectors, particularly commercial real estate and electric power generation.
Last year, Brascan put its main mining asset, then known as Noranda, up for auction. It reached a preliminary deal with the China Minmetals Corporation in late September. But the Chinese government's control of Minmetals prompted a political outcry in Canada, and the deal fell apart.
Other would-be bidders, including Xstrata, had declined to bid on Noranda because it did not fully own Falconbridge, a leading Canadian nickel producer.
To resolve that issue, Brascan engineered a complex merger between Falconbridge and Noranda that was completed in June. Brascan's holdings in the merged company was 20 percent, compared with its 42 percent stake in Noranda, the larger of the two companies.
The share sale to Xstrata valued Falconbridge at 28 Canadian dollars ($23.40) a share, slightly less than Friday's closing price on the Toronto Stock Exchange. If Xstrata makes an offer for other Falconbridge shares over the next nine months at a higher price, it will pay Brascan the difference.
Monday, August 15, 2005
??????????????
??????????????要买美国企业的不只是中国公司
过去几个月里，中国公司因为意图收购加州联合石油(Unocal Corp.)和Maytag Corp.这两家美国蓝筹公司而备受人们关注。然而，正如它们竞购失败的经验所示，通过收购之路进入美国市场并非易事。
激烈的市场竞争以及美国人对海外资本入侵感觉到的恐慌都给这条道路平添了重重障碍。但是一些分析师相信，虽然中国公司最近在这条道路上遭遇了挫折，但今后几年中，一些相对而言欠发达国家和地区的公司收购美国企业将日渐成为一大趋势。
有收购美企之意且行收购美企之事的将不仅仅只有中国公司。就在美国人为中国公司最近的竞购之举而大惊小怪之际，来自以色列、新加坡、巴西、印度和墨西哥等一些新兴市场的公司却已悄然进入美国制药、运输、钢铁等行业，进行著一系列规模较小的并购交易。
对此，美国管理咨询公司埃森哲(Accenture Ltd.)的并购战略子公司的负责人查目干(Ravi Chanmugam)断言：“虽说滴水汇成溪流尚需时日，但此乃大势所趋已是明白无误。”
根据Thomson financial的统计数据，今年头七个月里，欠发达国家和地区公司收购美国企业的交易计有70宗，交易总金额100亿美元出头。其中最大的一笔当属以色列Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.收购美国仿制药生产商Ivax Corp.的交易，金额超过70亿美元。
另外几笔金额较大的交易包括新加坡风险资本公司Orient Express Acquisition Co.以4.72亿美元的价格收购美国火车租赁公司Helm Holding Corp.和墨西哥Grupo Simec SA以2.29亿美元收购俄亥俄州钢铁公司Republic Engineered Products。
这70宗交易从金额上讲还不到同期所有收购美国公司交易总金额的2%，实可谓无足轻重。而与此相比，中国公司的在美并购行动就更算不得什么了。据美国银行(Bank of America)的数据，从1997年至2005年8月这八年多时间里，中国公司在美国市场的并购交易总计只有18亿美元，远不及以色列、墨西哥、南非、巴西和新加坡等国企业。
这些并购活动反映了许多新兴市场国家的快速成长。这些国家在同世界其他国家和地区的贸易中积累了大量的经常项目盈余。这些盈余今年预计将达到3,000亿美元，而据国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund, IMF)的统计，中国的经常项目盈余占到了所有新兴市场国家盈余总额的四分之一。
像中国一样，其他新兴市场国家也想利用它们不断增长的财富，走出一条通过收购而进入美国市场的快速通道。当年韩国的三星电子(Samsung Electronics Co.)和日本的丰田汽车(Toyota Motor Corp.)进入美国市场走的是一条白手起家，靠树立品牌形象闯出新市场的道路，而用埃森哲的查目干的话来说，如今新兴市场国家的企业则在寻求一条能更快看到结果的捷径。
“白手起家不如花钱收购那么具有吸引力，”查目干说。“越来越多的公司愿意多花些钱少费些事。”
瑞银证券(UBS Securities)驻拉美的投资银行部门主管耐特(Paul Knight)说，他预计会有更多的拉美公司寻求通过并购交易来接近美国客户并进入美国金融市场。
无论是以色列公司，还是韩国公司，抑或巴西公司，在美国银行首席市场策略师昆兰(Joseph Quinlan)看来，一旦它能在世界上最具竞争力的美国市场取得成功，那么它就有了在全球任何其他地方同样取得成功的胜算。这或许是许多外国公司想要跻身美国市场的一个重要诱因。据美国银行的预测，发展中国家公司收购美国企业的并购交易总额今年将从去年的128亿美元增至160亿美元左右。
这从另外一个角度讲也或可看成是美国经济竞争力正在不断下降的兆头，同时在某些美国人看来也是来自低成本国家的威胁不断加剧的表现。
但是昆兰所关注的则是事情积极的一面。他说，这些并购交易有助于进一步巩固加强美国同那些快速增长的新兴市场的关系。“美国与其新兴市场顶级投资者之间的联系越是紧密，相互间的关系便越是成熟、稳定。”他指出，对于投资者而言，这也是美国经济长远吸引力的一个具体表现，也正是我们一直以来千方百计要向那些“推销美国”的群体所著重强调的一点。
香港时间2005年08月15日21:07更新
过去几个月里，中国公司因为意图收购加州联合石油(Unocal Corp.)和Maytag Corp.这两家美国蓝筹公司而备受人们关注。然而，正如它们竞购失败的经验所示，通过收购之路进入美国市场并非易事。
激烈的市场竞争以及美国人对海外资本入侵感觉到的恐慌都给这条道路平添了重重障碍。但是一些分析师相信，虽然中国公司最近在这条道路上遭遇了挫折，但今后几年中，一些相对而言欠发达国家和地区的公司收购美国企业将日渐成为一大趋势。
有收购美企之意且行收购美企之事的将不仅仅只有中国公司。就在美国人为中国公司最近的竞购之举而大惊小怪之际，来自以色列、新加坡、巴西、印度和墨西哥等一些新兴市场的公司却已悄然进入美国制药、运输、钢铁等行业，进行著一系列规模较小的并购交易。
对此，美国管理咨询公司埃森哲(Accenture Ltd.)的并购战略子公司的负责人查目干(Ravi Chanmugam)断言：“虽说滴水汇成溪流尚需时日，但此乃大势所趋已是明白无误。”
根据Thomson financial的统计数据，今年头七个月里，欠发达国家和地区公司收购美国企业的交易计有70宗，交易总金额100亿美元出头。其中最大的一笔当属以色列Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.收购美国仿制药生产商Ivax Corp.的交易，金额超过70亿美元。
另外几笔金额较大的交易包括新加坡风险资本公司Orient Express Acquisition Co.以4.72亿美元的价格收购美国火车租赁公司Helm Holding Corp.和墨西哥Grupo Simec SA以2.29亿美元收购俄亥俄州钢铁公司Republic Engineered Products。
这70宗交易从金额上讲还不到同期所有收购美国公司交易总金额的2%，实可谓无足轻重。而与此相比，中国公司的在美并购行动就更算不得什么了。据美国银行(Bank of America)的数据，从1997年至2005年8月这八年多时间里，中国公司在美国市场的并购交易总计只有18亿美元，远不及以色列、墨西哥、南非、巴西和新加坡等国企业。
这些并购活动反映了许多新兴市场国家的快速成长。这些国家在同世界其他国家和地区的贸易中积累了大量的经常项目盈余。这些盈余今年预计将达到3,000亿美元，而据国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund, IMF)的统计，中国的经常项目盈余占到了所有新兴市场国家盈余总额的四分之一。
像中国一样，其他新兴市场国家也想利用它们不断增长的财富，走出一条通过收购而进入美国市场的快速通道。当年韩国的三星电子(Samsung Electronics Co.)和日本的丰田汽车(Toyota Motor Corp.)进入美国市场走的是一条白手起家，靠树立品牌形象闯出新市场的道路，而用埃森哲的查目干的话来说，如今新兴市场国家的企业则在寻求一条能更快看到结果的捷径。
“白手起家不如花钱收购那么具有吸引力，”查目干说。“越来越多的公司愿意多花些钱少费些事。”
瑞银证券(UBS Securities)驻拉美的投资银行部门主管耐特(Paul Knight)说，他预计会有更多的拉美公司寻求通过并购交易来接近美国客户并进入美国金融市场。
无论是以色列公司，还是韩国公司，抑或巴西公司，在美国银行首席市场策略师昆兰(Joseph Quinlan)看来，一旦它能在世界上最具竞争力的美国市场取得成功，那么它就有了在全球任何其他地方同样取得成功的胜算。这或许是许多外国公司想要跻身美国市场的一个重要诱因。据美国银行的预测，发展中国家公司收购美国企业的并购交易总额今年将从去年的128亿美元增至160亿美元左右。
这从另外一个角度讲也或可看成是美国经济竞争力正在不断下降的兆头，同时在某些美国人看来也是来自低成本国家的威胁不断加剧的表现。
但是昆兰所关注的则是事情积极的一面。他说，这些并购交易有助于进一步巩固加强美国同那些快速增长的新兴市场的关系。“美国与其新兴市场顶级投资者之间的联系越是紧密，相互间的关系便越是成熟、稳定。”他指出，对于投资者而言，这也是美国经济长远吸引力的一个具体表现，也正是我们一直以来千方百计要向那些“推销美国”的群体所著重强调的一点。
香港时间2005年08月15日21:07更新
Maytag?????????????
Maytag?????????????美国
Maytag董事会接受惠而浦的收购出价
Maytag Corp.董事会最终认可了惠而浦公司(Whirlpool Corp.)的收购出价，认为惠而浦的出价优于一私人资本集团提出的收购方案。但这宗总额达17亿美元、有望缔造出全球最大家用电器巨头的交易还须通过美国反垄断机构的审查。
Maytag似乎已经做好了接受政府审查的准备，公司董事会上周五发表的一份声明表示，将放弃由Ripplewood Holdings牵头的一个投资集团很早以前提出的每股14美元的收购出价，转而支持惠而浦每股21美元的出价。Maytag称，从财务角度比较，惠而浦的出价对公司更为有利，并表示，有理由相信，收购交易将能够顺利完成。
Ripplewood将有5天的时间对这一决定作出回应。据熟悉该公司内情的人士称，Ripplewood还没有决定是否提高对Maytag的收购出价。Ripplewood曾表示，如果它和Maytag先前签署的收购协议终止，公司将会获得4,000万美元的解约费。
据Prudential Equity Group LLC分析师Nicholas Heymann估计，Maytag和惠而浦合并后，新公司在美国主要家电市场的占有率将达到48%。Heymann依据的是取自家电杂志Appliance Magazine的2003年市场占有率数据。另外，他预计，新公司在洗衣机市场的占有率将达到72%，在气体乾衣机市场的占有率为81%、电子乾衣机市场的占有率为74%、冰箱市场占有率为31%。
一位反垄断专家上周五表示，预计惠而浦和Maytag的合并要想通过反垄断审查，至少要剥离一部分业务，但她预计收购交易不会完全被禁止。律师事务所Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider的合伙人Lauren Albert表示，有一些产品他们是不能收购的，在洗衣机领域，这两家公司的业务重合程度较高。
香港时间2005年08月15日11:06更新
Maytag董事会接受惠而浦的收购出价
Maytag Corp.董事会最终认可了惠而浦公司(Whirlpool Corp.)的收购出价，认为惠而浦的出价优于一私人资本集团提出的收购方案。但这宗总额达17亿美元、有望缔造出全球最大家用电器巨头的交易还须通过美国反垄断机构的审查。
Maytag似乎已经做好了接受政府审查的准备，公司董事会上周五发表的一份声明表示，将放弃由Ripplewood Holdings牵头的一个投资集团很早以前提出的每股14美元的收购出价，转而支持惠而浦每股21美元的出价。Maytag称，从财务角度比较，惠而浦的出价对公司更为有利，并表示，有理由相信，收购交易将能够顺利完成。
Ripplewood将有5天的时间对这一决定作出回应。据熟悉该公司内情的人士称，Ripplewood还没有决定是否提高对Maytag的收购出价。Ripplewood曾表示，如果它和Maytag先前签署的收购协议终止，公司将会获得4,000万美元的解约费。
据Prudential Equity Group LLC分析师Nicholas Heymann估计，Maytag和惠而浦合并后，新公司在美国主要家电市场的占有率将达到48%。Heymann依据的是取自家电杂志Appliance Magazine的2003年市场占有率数据。另外，他预计，新公司在洗衣机市场的占有率将达到72%，在气体乾衣机市场的占有率为81%、电子乾衣机市场的占有率为74%、冰箱市场占有率为31%。
一位反垄断专家上周五表示，预计惠而浦和Maytag的合并要想通过反垄断审查，至少要剥离一部分业务，但她预计收购交易不会完全被禁止。律师事务所Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider的合伙人Lauren Albert表示，有一些产品他们是不能收购的，在洗衣机领域，这两家公司的业务重合程度较高。
香港时间2005年08月15日11:06更新
Sunday, August 14, 2005
??
??社论/言论/天下事 2005-08-15
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
??
??社论/言论/天下事 2005-08-15
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
Friday, August 12, 2005
????
????优尼科股东批准雪佛龙收购
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
（洛杉矶综合电）美国石油企业优尼科（Unocal）的股东批准了同业雪佛龙（Chevron）逾170亿美元（280亿5000万新元）的收购。
雪佛龙在数小时后宣布交易已经完成。
此前，中国海洋石油（CNOOC）曾以更高的价格竞购优尼科，但最终因来自美国的强大政治阻力，而在本月初撤回收购要约。
雪佛龙总裁兼首席执行员赖利对路透社表示，一旦优尼科的资产与雪佛龙实现整合，公司预计每年可以节省3亿2500万美元。优尼科的资产遍布从缅甸到美湾的多个地区。赖利说，此次并购有望将2006年每股盈余（EPS）提高1-2％。
他也驳斥了雪佛龙在亚洲地区开展业务可能也面临政治阻力的揣测，并称他预计公司与中海油就澳洲高更（Gorgon）海上项目的谈判不会受到影响。
“伙伴之间相互竞争的现象并不鲜见，”他指出，“我们和中海油有很长的渊源……，我们希望这能够持续下去。”
优尼科称，77.2％的股东(以股权计)投票赞成雪佛龙的收购。
另据《金融时报》报道，美国国会议员反对中国的中海油收购优尼科公司，引起一阵“抨击中国”的风潮，赖利对此表示遗憾。
赖利说，他认为对中海油的批评源自于中海油是国有企业，变成“政策问题”，但他认为，雪佛龙和中国政府以及中海油的关系不会因此受到影响。
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
（洛杉矶综合电）美国石油企业优尼科（Unocal）的股东批准了同业雪佛龙（Chevron）逾170亿美元（280亿5000万新元）的收购。
雪佛龙在数小时后宣布交易已经完成。
此前，中国海洋石油（CNOOC）曾以更高的价格竞购优尼科，但最终因来自美国的强大政治阻力，而在本月初撤回收购要约。
雪佛龙总裁兼首席执行员赖利对路透社表示，一旦优尼科的资产与雪佛龙实现整合，公司预计每年可以节省3亿2500万美元。优尼科的资产遍布从缅甸到美湾的多个地区。赖利说，此次并购有望将2006年每股盈余（EPS）提高1-2％。
他也驳斥了雪佛龙在亚洲地区开展业务可能也面临政治阻力的揣测，并称他预计公司与中海油就澳洲高更（Gorgon）海上项目的谈判不会受到影响。
“伙伴之间相互竞争的现象并不鲜见，”他指出，“我们和中海油有很长的渊源……，我们希望这能够持续下去。”
优尼科称，77.2％的股东(以股权计)投票赞成雪佛龙的收购。
另据《金融时报》报道，美国国会议员反对中国的中海油收购优尼科公司，引起一阵“抨击中国”的风潮，赖利对此表示遗憾。
赖利说，他认为对中海油的批评源自于中海油是国有企业，变成“政策问题”，但他认为，雪佛龙和中国政府以及中海油的关系不会因此受到影响。
Thursday, August 11, 2005
???-??-?????????????
???-??-?????????????优尼科收购案背后的政治因素
余万里
2005年08月11日07:41 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中国海洋石油有限公司撤回对美国优尼科公司的收购要约已经不算新闻。不过，此事所引发的探讨乃至争论仍在继续。作为一名研究国际政治的学者，笔者更关注收购案背后的政治因素。众所周知，中海油对优尼科的收购从一开始便被政治化，而最终决定退出收购也是迫于“非常遗憾”的政治因素。
此事并非孤立的个案，去年联想集团收购IBM个人电脑业务时同样受到了美国有关部门严格的“安全审查”。随着整体实力的逐步壮大，国际化和跨国化正在成为中国企业成长的一条重要途径。从国内市场走向国际市场，这是一个实质性的跨越。伴随着竞争范围的扩大，企业同时还需应对更为复杂的政治因素。
马克思主义政治经济学强调，经济关系决定了政治权力的分配，政治反过来又左右着经济行为的趋向。兴起于20世纪70年代的西方国际政治经济学理论也认为，在国际政治经济秩序中，始终存在安全、财富、自由和公正4种“基本价值”的分配问题。然而，西方学者往往有意无意地在他们的理论和话语体系中，淡化国家和政治权力对市场的支配作用。但“自由主义市场”决定论并非空中楼阁，它同西方国家在当今世界的强势地位密不可分。中海油的案例表明，当国际资源和利益分配游戏出现新的参与者时，隐藏在“自由主义”外衣下的霸权、权力、意识形态等政治因素是不会保持沉默的。
在西方的“民主规则”下，诸多政治游戏是非理性的。中海油撤回收购要约的主要原因并非经济因素，交易的不确定性和风险更多地来自美国“政治间歇性癫痫病”———“中国威胁论”。收购案适逢新一轮“中国威胁论”明显升温之时。虽说大多数美国能源经济学家和市场分析师并不认为中海油有什么政治意图，但美国“亚太战略利益”乃至“国家安全受到威胁”等论调足以垒起一道难以逾越的政治障碍。
中海油不仅触动了“中国威胁论”秉持者们的敏感神经，在一定程度上也触及到了当代国际政治经济秩序背后的霸权基础。美国学者罗伯特·吉尔平认为，美国霸权以及“美国治下的和平”为美国企业的全球直接投资铺垫了道路，而跨国公司反过来也充当了“霸权的工具”。在霸权与市场的结构中，石油是美国人心目中一块“十分敏感”的“奶酪”。美国是一个“生活在汽车轮子上的国家”，很多美国人都是通过路边加油站的价目表来看国际形势的。即便是优尼科这样的小块“奶酪”，也会勾起某些美国人深层的战略隐忧。难怪“战略贸易学派”的代表人物保罗·克鲁格曼也站出来反对中海油并购优尼科。在他看来，中国人此举比当年日本人收购洛克菲勒大厦还要“精明”。
其实，中海油撤回收购要约未尝不是一件好事。它再次向走向世界的中国企业提示了值得注意的政治风险。中国企业的国际化、跨国化是一个不断探索的进程。重视政治风险并不意味着将市场行为泛政治化，关键在于如何从今天的案例中获取教益。
（作者为中国社会科学院美国研究所外交室副主任）
《人民日报》 (2005年08月11日 第三版)
余万里
2005年08月11日07:41 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中国海洋石油有限公司撤回对美国优尼科公司的收购要约已经不算新闻。不过，此事所引发的探讨乃至争论仍在继续。作为一名研究国际政治的学者，笔者更关注收购案背后的政治因素。众所周知，中海油对优尼科的收购从一开始便被政治化，而最终决定退出收购也是迫于“非常遗憾”的政治因素。
此事并非孤立的个案，去年联想集团收购IBM个人电脑业务时同样受到了美国有关部门严格的“安全审查”。随着整体实力的逐步壮大，国际化和跨国化正在成为中国企业成长的一条重要途径。从国内市场走向国际市场，这是一个实质性的跨越。伴随着竞争范围的扩大，企业同时还需应对更为复杂的政治因素。
马克思主义政治经济学强调，经济关系决定了政治权力的分配，政治反过来又左右着经济行为的趋向。兴起于20世纪70年代的西方国际政治经济学理论也认为，在国际政治经济秩序中，始终存在安全、财富、自由和公正4种“基本价值”的分配问题。然而，西方学者往往有意无意地在他们的理论和话语体系中，淡化国家和政治权力对市场的支配作用。但“自由主义市场”决定论并非空中楼阁，它同西方国家在当今世界的强势地位密不可分。中海油的案例表明，当国际资源和利益分配游戏出现新的参与者时，隐藏在“自由主义”外衣下的霸权、权力、意识形态等政治因素是不会保持沉默的。
在西方的“民主规则”下，诸多政治游戏是非理性的。中海油撤回收购要约的主要原因并非经济因素，交易的不确定性和风险更多地来自美国“政治间歇性癫痫病”———“中国威胁论”。收购案适逢新一轮“中国威胁论”明显升温之时。虽说大多数美国能源经济学家和市场分析师并不认为中海油有什么政治意图，但美国“亚太战略利益”乃至“国家安全受到威胁”等论调足以垒起一道难以逾越的政治障碍。
中海油不仅触动了“中国威胁论”秉持者们的敏感神经，在一定程度上也触及到了当代国际政治经济秩序背后的霸权基础。美国学者罗伯特·吉尔平认为，美国霸权以及“美国治下的和平”为美国企业的全球直接投资铺垫了道路，而跨国公司反过来也充当了“霸权的工具”。在霸权与市场的结构中，石油是美国人心目中一块“十分敏感”的“奶酪”。美国是一个“生活在汽车轮子上的国家”，很多美国人都是通过路边加油站的价目表来看国际形势的。即便是优尼科这样的小块“奶酪”，也会勾起某些美国人深层的战略隐忧。难怪“战略贸易学派”的代表人物保罗·克鲁格曼也站出来反对中海油并购优尼科。在他看来，中国人此举比当年日本人收购洛克菲勒大厦还要“精明”。
其实，中海油撤回收购要约未尝不是一件好事。它再次向走向世界的中国企业提示了值得注意的政治风险。中国企业的国际化、跨国化是一个不断探索的进程。重视政治风险并不意味着将市场行为泛政治化，关键在于如何从今天的案例中获取教益。
（作者为中国社会科学院美国研究所外交室副主任）
《人民日报》 (2005年08月11日 第三版)
