Saturday, August 20, 2005
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China - New York Times
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China - New York TimesAugust 18, 2005
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Aug. 17 - Sudden shortages of gasoline and diesel in Southeastern China are reigniting a debate here: Is pressure from state companies, coupled with freely available information on oil prices, driving China to accept market forces faster than it may have wanted?
Dozens of service stations in Southeastern China, notably in cities near Hong Kong, abruptly ran out of fuel this week just as officials in Beijing were debating requests from domestic oil companies to charge more for diesel and gasoline. The shortages have produced long lines of angry motorists at service stations and have disrupted some freight shipments, as trucks do not have the diesel to make trips.
Some in China and abroad say the state oil companies created the shortages to increase prices. China regulates retail fuel prices, adjusting them no more than once a month. But the government has not raised them nearly as quickly as world oil prices have risen, hoping to keep inflation in check. This has left refiners with negligible profit margins, and even losses, as they convert oil into gasoline and diesel.
Sinopec, the state-controlled oil company that dominates the refining of fuel in China, especially in Southeastern China, said late Wednesday that the shortages were a result of people stockpiling fuel now that they have enough information to bet on the direction of oil prices.
Asked if a shortage had been deliberately created, Evan Jia, a spokesman for Sinopec, said, "We try our best to supply the marketplace."
People in China today have much greater access to information about world prices than ever before, and as they see high world oil prices, they are topping off fuel tanks in expectation that China will soon raise domestic prices, Mr. Jia said.
"They buy inventory for their own tank in the hope the price will be changing," Mr. Jia said. "People think the trend in China should be toward a price increase."
While there are no good figures on the private storage capacity for fuel in China, oil experts say it is probably considerable as years of electricity shortages have prompted factories across the country to install backup diesel generators with large fuel tanks. Chinese factories appear to have run down their fuel tanks in the second quarter, when previously torrid diesel sales slowed to a crawl, and may be refilling their tanks now.
A typhoon and a tropical storm have also disrupted tanker deliveries to Southeastern China in the last two weeks, Mr. Jia said.
Sinopec is a conglomerate of nearly 10,000 formerly separate oil production, refining and distribution entities, previously under the direct control of local, provincial and central government agencies and still somewhat influenced by them.
"Refineries do not want to process the crude. We try our best," Mr. Jia said.
But the timing of the latest shortages, coinciding with an active debate in the government-controlled news media over whether China should liberalize retail energy prices, has made many energy analysts suspicious of these rationales.
Sam Dale, an Asian oil analyst in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a newsletter-publishing company based in New York, said oil companies appeared to be putting pressure on the Chinese government to free retail prices, by running their refineries below capacity and holding back supplies from the market. "It's an artificial shortage," he said.
Jeff Brown, an oil demand analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris, said retail prices had not been high enough in China to cover refiners' costs for many months. He said it was mysterious that the shortages appear to be worse now than under similar conditions in April.
Chinese refiners' razor-thin margins have not changed much in recent months, Mr. Brown noted. The margins narrowed last winter and have remained narrow because rising world oil prices in dollars have been offset by more slowly rising retail prices in China and last month's 2 percent increase in the value of China's currency.
Mr. Jia said Sinopec service stations would be fully stocked by Thursday in cities near here that have been experiencing shortages.
Sinopec's refineries are operating at 89 to 90 percent of capacity, compared with past rates as high as 97 to 98 percent, Mr. Jia said. There is a shortfall mainly because some refineries are closed for maintenance, but some refinery managers are also reluctant to produce at full tilt when retail prices are low, he added.
Sinopec's closest domestic rival in refining, PetroChina, is more active in Northern China.
PetroChina officials had no comment on Wednesday.
Fuel Shortages Put Pressure on Price Controls in China
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Aug. 17 - Sudden shortages of gasoline and diesel in Southeastern China are reigniting a debate here: Is pressure from state companies, coupled with freely available information on oil prices, driving China to accept market forces faster than it may have wanted?
Dozens of service stations in Southeastern China, notably in cities near Hong Kong, abruptly ran out of fuel this week just as officials in Beijing were debating requests from domestic oil companies to charge more for diesel and gasoline. The shortages have produced long lines of angry motorists at service stations and have disrupted some freight shipments, as trucks do not have the diesel to make trips.
Some in China and abroad say the state oil companies created the shortages to increase prices. China regulates retail fuel prices, adjusting them no more than once a month. But the government has not raised them nearly as quickly as world oil prices have risen, hoping to keep inflation in check. This has left refiners with negligible profit margins, and even losses, as they convert oil into gasoline and diesel.
Sinopec, the state-controlled oil company that dominates the refining of fuel in China, especially in Southeastern China, said late Wednesday that the shortages were a result of people stockpiling fuel now that they have enough information to bet on the direction of oil prices.
Asked if a shortage had been deliberately created, Evan Jia, a spokesman for Sinopec, said, "We try our best to supply the marketplace."
People in China today have much greater access to information about world prices than ever before, and as they see high world oil prices, they are topping off fuel tanks in expectation that China will soon raise domestic prices, Mr. Jia said.
"They buy inventory for their own tank in the hope the price will be changing," Mr. Jia said. "People think the trend in China should be toward a price increase."
While there are no good figures on the private storage capacity for fuel in China, oil experts say it is probably considerable as years of electricity shortages have prompted factories across the country to install backup diesel generators with large fuel tanks. Chinese factories appear to have run down their fuel tanks in the second quarter, when previously torrid diesel sales slowed to a crawl, and may be refilling their tanks now.
A typhoon and a tropical storm have also disrupted tanker deliveries to Southeastern China in the last two weeks, Mr. Jia said.
Sinopec is a conglomerate of nearly 10,000 formerly separate oil production, refining and distribution entities, previously under the direct control of local, provincial and central government agencies and still somewhat influenced by them.
"Refineries do not want to process the crude. We try our best," Mr. Jia said.
But the timing of the latest shortages, coinciding with an active debate in the government-controlled news media over whether China should liberalize retail energy prices, has made many energy analysts suspicious of these rationales.
Sam Dale, an Asian oil analyst in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a newsletter-publishing company based in New York, said oil companies appeared to be putting pressure on the Chinese government to free retail prices, by running their refineries below capacity and holding back supplies from the market. "It's an artificial shortage," he said.
Jeff Brown, an oil demand analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris, said retail prices had not been high enough in China to cover refiners' costs for many months. He said it was mysterious that the shortages appear to be worse now than under similar conditions in April.
Chinese refiners' razor-thin margins have not changed much in recent months, Mr. Brown noted. The margins narrowed last winter and have remained narrow because rising world oil prices in dollars have been offset by more slowly rising retail prices in China and last month's 2 percent increase in the value of China's currency.
Mr. Jia said Sinopec service stations would be fully stocked by Thursday in cities near here that have been experiencing shortages.
Sinopec's refineries are operating at 89 to 90 percent of capacity, compared with past rates as high as 97 to 98 percent, Mr. Jia said. There is a shortfall mainly because some refineries are closed for maintenance, but some refinery managers are also reluctant to produce at full tilt when retail prices are low, he added.
Sinopec's closest domestic rival in refining, PetroChina, is more active in Northern China.
PetroChina officials had no comment on Wednesday.
China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan - New York Times
August 16, 2005
China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Tuesday, Aug. 16 - Chinese and Indian state-owned oil companies are trying to buy a Canadian company with oil fields in Kazakhstan, in the most direct competition yet for energy between Asia's most populous countries.
A joint venture of the China National Petroleum Corporation, China's biggest oil company, and PetroChina, its publicly traded subsidiary, offered roughly $3.2 billion late Monday for PetroKazakhstan, a person close to the negotiations said. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, India's main state-owned oil company, has already reportedly submitted a bid of $3.6 billion in cooperation with the steel maker Mittal Group.
PetroKazakhstan, whose shares are traded in Toronto, issued a statement from its headquarters in Calgary, Alberta, after the close of trading that it had received proposals to acquire the entire company. The company announced in late June that it had been approached by suitors, and investment bankers had identified the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation as being interested.
While the Chinese bid appeared to be lower than the Indian bid, Chevron's successful pursuit of Unocal this summer despite a higher bid from Cnooc Ltd. of China has shown that the higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy.
The China National Petroleum Corporation already has substantial oil investments of its own in Kazakhstan, and has been trying to build a pipeline to carry the oil to China. The Chinese government has been actively courting Kazakhstan as well, partly because Beijing officials want to make sure that no Muslim insurgency develops in heavily Muslim areas of Xinjiang Province near the Kazakh border.
PetroKazakhstan has been locked in bitter disputes with the Kazakh government over its flaring of natural gas and other issues, disputes that China's alliance with Kazakhstan might be able to smooth over.
An Indian buyer of PetroKazakhstan would face a more difficult challenge in exporting oil from Kazakhstan, which does not share a border with India. Oil experts said that an Indian buyer might need to export the oil through Russia, further increasing Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia at a time when Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic, has been trying to develop a broader array of international relationships.
"That's probably behind the cheaper bid from the Chinese," said Sam Dale, an oil industry expert in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a New York-based newsletter publishing group.
The rival attempts to buy PetroKazakhstan underline the inherent competition between China and India for oil, even though both countries' senior officials have called repeatedly this year for cooperation.
The two countries together hold 37 percent of the world's population. India's oil imports rose 11 percent last year while China's soared 33 percent, although part of China's increase last year reflected stockpiling, and the pace of Chinese imports has started to slow this year.
Western oil executives have complained that they may find it hard to buy oil fields at commercially viable prices if bidding soars because of the involvement of state-owned oil companies that may be driven by military and strategic objectives as well as a need for profits.China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan - New York Times
China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan
By KEITH BRADSHER
HONG KONG, Tuesday, Aug. 16 - Chinese and Indian state-owned oil companies are trying to buy a Canadian company with oil fields in Kazakhstan, in the most direct competition yet for energy between Asia's most populous countries.
A joint venture of the China National Petroleum Corporation, China's biggest oil company, and PetroChina, its publicly traded subsidiary, offered roughly $3.2 billion late Monday for PetroKazakhstan, a person close to the negotiations said. The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, India's main state-owned oil company, has already reportedly submitted a bid of $3.6 billion in cooperation with the steel maker Mittal Group.
PetroKazakhstan, whose shares are traded in Toronto, issued a statement from its headquarters in Calgary, Alberta, after the close of trading that it had received proposals to acquire the entire company. The company announced in late June that it had been approached by suitors, and investment bankers had identified the China National Petroleum Corporation and the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation as being interested.
While the Chinese bid appeared to be lower than the Indian bid, Chevron's successful pursuit of Unocal this summer despite a higher bid from Cnooc Ltd. of China has shown that the higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy.
The China National Petroleum Corporation already has substantial oil investments of its own in Kazakhstan, and has been trying to build a pipeline to carry the oil to China. The Chinese government has been actively courting Kazakhstan as well, partly because Beijing officials want to make sure that no Muslim insurgency develops in heavily Muslim areas of Xinjiang Province near the Kazakh border.
PetroKazakhstan has been locked in bitter disputes with the Kazakh government over its flaring of natural gas and other issues, disputes that China's alliance with Kazakhstan might be able to smooth over.
An Indian buyer of PetroKazakhstan would face a more difficult challenge in exporting oil from Kazakhstan, which does not share a border with India. Oil experts said that an Indian buyer might need to export the oil through Russia, further increasing Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia at a time when Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic, has been trying to develop a broader array of international relationships.
"That's probably behind the cheaper bid from the Chinese," said Sam Dale, an oil industry expert in Singapore with Energy Intelligence, a New York-based newsletter publishing group.
The rival attempts to buy PetroKazakhstan underline the inherent competition between China and India for oil, even though both countries' senior officials have called repeatedly this year for cooperation.
The two countries together hold 37 percent of the world's population. India's oil imports rose 11 percent last year while China's soared 33 percent, although part of China's increase last year reflected stockpiling, and the pace of Chinese imports has started to slow this year.
Western oil executives have complained that they may find it hard to buy oil fields at commercially viable prices if bidding soars because of the involvement of state-owned oil companies that may be driven by military and strategic objectives as well as a need for profits.China and India Vie for Company With Oil Fields in Kazakhstan - New York Times
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover - New York Times
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover - New York TimesAugust 16, 2005
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover
By IAN AUSTEN
OTTAWA, Aug. 15 - The purchase of just under 20 percent of Falconbridge, Canada's largest mining company, by the Swiss coal producer Xstrata on Monday led to immediate speculation that it would move to take control of the company.
Xstrata has agreed to pay Brascan, a Canadian investment company, 2.05 billion Canadian dollars ($1.71 billion) for a 19.9 percent holding in Falconbridge, which is based in Toronto, putting it just under a Canadian legal threshold requiring a bid for all outstanding shares.
"I think it's a fairly good guess that they aren't buying this to hold a 20 percent stake," said Greg Barnes, a base metals analyst with Canaccord Capital in Toronto. "This deal effectively blocks anyone else out."
In a conference call with analysts, Xstrata's chief executive, Mick Davis, fueled the speculation about future moves.
"We don't intend to be a long-term investor with a minority interest in the company," Mr. Davis said. However, when asked directly by an analyst if investors should expect a larger play for Falconbridge, he declined to answer.
The share sale marks the end of a sometimes difficult effort by Brascan, which is based in Toronto, to leave mining and concentrate its investments in other sectors, particularly commercial real estate and electric power generation.
Last year, Brascan put its main mining asset, then known as Noranda, up for auction. It reached a preliminary deal with the China Minmetals Corporation in late September. But the Chinese government's control of Minmetals prompted a political outcry in Canada, and the deal fell apart.
Other would-be bidders, including Xstrata, had declined to bid on Noranda because it did not fully own Falconbridge, a leading Canadian nickel producer.
To resolve that issue, Brascan engineered a complex merger between Falconbridge and Noranda that was completed in June. Brascan's holdings in the merged company was 20 percent, compared with its 42 percent stake in Noranda, the larger of the two companies.
The share sale to Xstrata valued Falconbridge at 28 Canadian dollars ($23.40) a share, slightly less than Friday's closing price on the Toronto Stock Exchange. If Xstrata makes an offer for other Falconbridge shares over the next nine months at a higher price, it will pay Brascan the difference.
Canadian Mining Deal Prompts Discussion of a Takeover
By IAN AUSTEN
OTTAWA, Aug. 15 - The purchase of just under 20 percent of Falconbridge, Canada's largest mining company, by the Swiss coal producer Xstrata on Monday led to immediate speculation that it would move to take control of the company.
Xstrata has agreed to pay Brascan, a Canadian investment company, 2.05 billion Canadian dollars ($1.71 billion) for a 19.9 percent holding in Falconbridge, which is based in Toronto, putting it just under a Canadian legal threshold requiring a bid for all outstanding shares.
"I think it's a fairly good guess that they aren't buying this to hold a 20 percent stake," said Greg Barnes, a base metals analyst with Canaccord Capital in Toronto. "This deal effectively blocks anyone else out."
In a conference call with analysts, Xstrata's chief executive, Mick Davis, fueled the speculation about future moves.
"We don't intend to be a long-term investor with a minority interest in the company," Mr. Davis said. However, when asked directly by an analyst if investors should expect a larger play for Falconbridge, he declined to answer.
The share sale marks the end of a sometimes difficult effort by Brascan, which is based in Toronto, to leave mining and concentrate its investments in other sectors, particularly commercial real estate and electric power generation.
Last year, Brascan put its main mining asset, then known as Noranda, up for auction. It reached a preliminary deal with the China Minmetals Corporation in late September. But the Chinese government's control of Minmetals prompted a political outcry in Canada, and the deal fell apart.
Other would-be bidders, including Xstrata, had declined to bid on Noranda because it did not fully own Falconbridge, a leading Canadian nickel producer.
To resolve that issue, Brascan engineered a complex merger between Falconbridge and Noranda that was completed in June. Brascan's holdings in the merged company was 20 percent, compared with its 42 percent stake in Noranda, the larger of the two companies.
The share sale to Xstrata valued Falconbridge at 28 Canadian dollars ($23.40) a share, slightly less than Friday's closing price on the Toronto Stock Exchange. If Xstrata makes an offer for other Falconbridge shares over the next nine months at a higher price, it will pay Brascan the difference.
Monday, August 15, 2005
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??????????????要买美国企业的不只是中国公司
过去几个月里，中国公司因为意图收购加州联合石油(Unocal Corp.)和Maytag Corp.这两家美国蓝筹公司而备受人们关注。然而，正如它们竞购失败的经验所示，通过收购之路进入美国市场并非易事。
激烈的市场竞争以及美国人对海外资本入侵感觉到的恐慌都给这条道路平添了重重障碍。但是一些分析师相信，虽然中国公司最近在这条道路上遭遇了挫折，但今后几年中，一些相对而言欠发达国家和地区的公司收购美国企业将日渐成为一大趋势。
有收购美企之意且行收购美企之事的将不仅仅只有中国公司。就在美国人为中国公司最近的竞购之举而大惊小怪之际，来自以色列、新加坡、巴西、印度和墨西哥等一些新兴市场的公司却已悄然进入美国制药、运输、钢铁等行业，进行著一系列规模较小的并购交易。
对此，美国管理咨询公司埃森哲(Accenture Ltd.)的并购战略子公司的负责人查目干(Ravi Chanmugam)断言：“虽说滴水汇成溪流尚需时日，但此乃大势所趋已是明白无误。”
根据Thomson financial的统计数据，今年头七个月里，欠发达国家和地区公司收购美国企业的交易计有70宗，交易总金额100亿美元出头。其中最大的一笔当属以色列Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.收购美国仿制药生产商Ivax Corp.的交易，金额超过70亿美元。
另外几笔金额较大的交易包括新加坡风险资本公司Orient Express Acquisition Co.以4.72亿美元的价格收购美国火车租赁公司Helm Holding Corp.和墨西哥Grupo Simec SA以2.29亿美元收购俄亥俄州钢铁公司Republic Engineered Products。
这70宗交易从金额上讲还不到同期所有收购美国公司交易总金额的2%，实可谓无足轻重。而与此相比，中国公司的在美并购行动就更算不得什么了。据美国银行(Bank of America)的数据，从1997年至2005年8月这八年多时间里，中国公司在美国市场的并购交易总计只有18亿美元，远不及以色列、墨西哥、南非、巴西和新加坡等国企业。
这些并购活动反映了许多新兴市场国家的快速成长。这些国家在同世界其他国家和地区的贸易中积累了大量的经常项目盈余。这些盈余今年预计将达到3,000亿美元，而据国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund, IMF)的统计，中国的经常项目盈余占到了所有新兴市场国家盈余总额的四分之一。
像中国一样，其他新兴市场国家也想利用它们不断增长的财富，走出一条通过收购而进入美国市场的快速通道。当年韩国的三星电子(Samsung Electronics Co.)和日本的丰田汽车(Toyota Motor Corp.)进入美国市场走的是一条白手起家，靠树立品牌形象闯出新市场的道路，而用埃森哲的查目干的话来说，如今新兴市场国家的企业则在寻求一条能更快看到结果的捷径。
“白手起家不如花钱收购那么具有吸引力，”查目干说。“越来越多的公司愿意多花些钱少费些事。”
瑞银证券(UBS Securities)驻拉美的投资银行部门主管耐特(Paul Knight)说，他预计会有更多的拉美公司寻求通过并购交易来接近美国客户并进入美国金融市场。
无论是以色列公司，还是韩国公司，抑或巴西公司，在美国银行首席市场策略师昆兰(Joseph Quinlan)看来，一旦它能在世界上最具竞争力的美国市场取得成功，那么它就有了在全球任何其他地方同样取得成功的胜算。这或许是许多外国公司想要跻身美国市场的一个重要诱因。据美国银行的预测，发展中国家公司收购美国企业的并购交易总额今年将从去年的128亿美元增至160亿美元左右。
这从另外一个角度讲也或可看成是美国经济竞争力正在不断下降的兆头，同时在某些美国人看来也是来自低成本国家的威胁不断加剧的表现。
但是昆兰所关注的则是事情积极的一面。他说，这些并购交易有助于进一步巩固加强美国同那些快速增长的新兴市场的关系。“美国与其新兴市场顶级投资者之间的联系越是紧密，相互间的关系便越是成熟、稳定。”他指出，对于投资者而言，这也是美国经济长远吸引力的一个具体表现，也正是我们一直以来千方百计要向那些“推销美国”的群体所著重强调的一点。
香港时间2005年08月15日21:07更新
过去几个月里，中国公司因为意图收购加州联合石油(Unocal Corp.)和Maytag Corp.这两家美国蓝筹公司而备受人们关注。然而，正如它们竞购失败的经验所示，通过收购之路进入美国市场并非易事。
激烈的市场竞争以及美国人对海外资本入侵感觉到的恐慌都给这条道路平添了重重障碍。但是一些分析师相信，虽然中国公司最近在这条道路上遭遇了挫折，但今后几年中，一些相对而言欠发达国家和地区的公司收购美国企业将日渐成为一大趋势。
有收购美企之意且行收购美企之事的将不仅仅只有中国公司。就在美国人为中国公司最近的竞购之举而大惊小怪之际，来自以色列、新加坡、巴西、印度和墨西哥等一些新兴市场的公司却已悄然进入美国制药、运输、钢铁等行业，进行著一系列规模较小的并购交易。
对此，美国管理咨询公司埃森哲(Accenture Ltd.)的并购战略子公司的负责人查目干(Ravi Chanmugam)断言：“虽说滴水汇成溪流尚需时日，但此乃大势所趋已是明白无误。”
根据Thomson financial的统计数据，今年头七个月里，欠发达国家和地区公司收购美国企业的交易计有70宗，交易总金额100亿美元出头。其中最大的一笔当属以色列Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.收购美国仿制药生产商Ivax Corp.的交易，金额超过70亿美元。
另外几笔金额较大的交易包括新加坡风险资本公司Orient Express Acquisition Co.以4.72亿美元的价格收购美国火车租赁公司Helm Holding Corp.和墨西哥Grupo Simec SA以2.29亿美元收购俄亥俄州钢铁公司Republic Engineered Products。
这70宗交易从金额上讲还不到同期所有收购美国公司交易总金额的2%，实可谓无足轻重。而与此相比，中国公司的在美并购行动就更算不得什么了。据美国银行(Bank of America)的数据，从1997年至2005年8月这八年多时间里，中国公司在美国市场的并购交易总计只有18亿美元，远不及以色列、墨西哥、南非、巴西和新加坡等国企业。
这些并购活动反映了许多新兴市场国家的快速成长。这些国家在同世界其他国家和地区的贸易中积累了大量的经常项目盈余。这些盈余今年预计将达到3,000亿美元，而据国际货币基金组织(International Monetary Fund, IMF)的统计，中国的经常项目盈余占到了所有新兴市场国家盈余总额的四分之一。
像中国一样，其他新兴市场国家也想利用它们不断增长的财富，走出一条通过收购而进入美国市场的快速通道。当年韩国的三星电子(Samsung Electronics Co.)和日本的丰田汽车(Toyota Motor Corp.)进入美国市场走的是一条白手起家，靠树立品牌形象闯出新市场的道路，而用埃森哲的查目干的话来说，如今新兴市场国家的企业则在寻求一条能更快看到结果的捷径。
“白手起家不如花钱收购那么具有吸引力，”查目干说。“越来越多的公司愿意多花些钱少费些事。”
瑞银证券(UBS Securities)驻拉美的投资银行部门主管耐特(Paul Knight)说，他预计会有更多的拉美公司寻求通过并购交易来接近美国客户并进入美国金融市场。
无论是以色列公司，还是韩国公司，抑或巴西公司，在美国银行首席市场策略师昆兰(Joseph Quinlan)看来，一旦它能在世界上最具竞争力的美国市场取得成功，那么它就有了在全球任何其他地方同样取得成功的胜算。这或许是许多外国公司想要跻身美国市场的一个重要诱因。据美国银行的预测，发展中国家公司收购美国企业的并购交易总额今年将从去年的128亿美元增至160亿美元左右。
这从另外一个角度讲也或可看成是美国经济竞争力正在不断下降的兆头，同时在某些美国人看来也是来自低成本国家的威胁不断加剧的表现。
但是昆兰所关注的则是事情积极的一面。他说，这些并购交易有助于进一步巩固加强美国同那些快速增长的新兴市场的关系。“美国与其新兴市场顶级投资者之间的联系越是紧密，相互间的关系便越是成熟、稳定。”他指出，对于投资者而言，这也是美国经济长远吸引力的一个具体表现，也正是我们一直以来千方百计要向那些“推销美国”的群体所著重强调的一点。
香港时间2005年08月15日21:07更新
Maytag?????????????
Maytag?????????????美国
Maytag董事会接受惠而浦的收购出价
Maytag Corp.董事会最终认可了惠而浦公司(Whirlpool Corp.)的收购出价，认为惠而浦的出价优于一私人资本集团提出的收购方案。但这宗总额达17亿美元、有望缔造出全球最大家用电器巨头的交易还须通过美国反垄断机构的审查。
Maytag似乎已经做好了接受政府审查的准备，公司董事会上周五发表的一份声明表示，将放弃由Ripplewood Holdings牵头的一个投资集团很早以前提出的每股14美元的收购出价，转而支持惠而浦每股21美元的出价。Maytag称，从财务角度比较，惠而浦的出价对公司更为有利，并表示，有理由相信，收购交易将能够顺利完成。
Ripplewood将有5天的时间对这一决定作出回应。据熟悉该公司内情的人士称，Ripplewood还没有决定是否提高对Maytag的收购出价。Ripplewood曾表示，如果它和Maytag先前签署的收购协议终止，公司将会获得4,000万美元的解约费。
据Prudential Equity Group LLC分析师Nicholas Heymann估计，Maytag和惠而浦合并后，新公司在美国主要家电市场的占有率将达到48%。Heymann依据的是取自家电杂志Appliance Magazine的2003年市场占有率数据。另外，他预计，新公司在洗衣机市场的占有率将达到72%，在气体乾衣机市场的占有率为81%、电子乾衣机市场的占有率为74%、冰箱市场占有率为31%。
一位反垄断专家上周五表示，预计惠而浦和Maytag的合并要想通过反垄断审查，至少要剥离一部分业务，但她预计收购交易不会完全被禁止。律师事务所Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider的合伙人Lauren Albert表示，有一些产品他们是不能收购的，在洗衣机领域，这两家公司的业务重合程度较高。
香港时间2005年08月15日11:06更新
Maytag董事会接受惠而浦的收购出价
Maytag Corp.董事会最终认可了惠而浦公司(Whirlpool Corp.)的收购出价，认为惠而浦的出价优于一私人资本集团提出的收购方案。但这宗总额达17亿美元、有望缔造出全球最大家用电器巨头的交易还须通过美国反垄断机构的审查。
Maytag似乎已经做好了接受政府审查的准备，公司董事会上周五发表的一份声明表示，将放弃由Ripplewood Holdings牵头的一个投资集团很早以前提出的每股14美元的收购出价，转而支持惠而浦每股21美元的出价。Maytag称，从财务角度比较，惠而浦的出价对公司更为有利，并表示，有理由相信，收购交易将能够顺利完成。
Ripplewood将有5天的时间对这一决定作出回应。据熟悉该公司内情的人士称，Ripplewood还没有决定是否提高对Maytag的收购出价。Ripplewood曾表示，如果它和Maytag先前签署的收购协议终止，公司将会获得4,000万美元的解约费。
据Prudential Equity Group LLC分析师Nicholas Heymann估计，Maytag和惠而浦合并后，新公司在美国主要家电市场的占有率将达到48%。Heymann依据的是取自家电杂志Appliance Magazine的2003年市场占有率数据。另外，他预计，新公司在洗衣机市场的占有率将达到72%，在气体乾衣机市场的占有率为81%、电子乾衣机市场的占有率为74%、冰箱市场占有率为31%。
一位反垄断专家上周五表示，预计惠而浦和Maytag的合并要想通过反垄断审查，至少要剥离一部分业务，但她预计收购交易不会完全被禁止。律师事务所Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider的合伙人Lauren Albert表示，有一些产品他们是不能收购的，在洗衣机领域，这两家公司的业务重合程度较高。
香港时间2005年08月15日11:06更新
Sunday, August 14, 2005
??
??社论/言论/天下事 2005-08-15
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
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??社论/言论/天下事 2005-08-15
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
美国经济民族主义的胜利？
● 王江雨
中国海洋石油有限公司(“中海油”）竞购美国加州联合石油公司（Unocal，简称“优尼科”）这一中国公司迄今最大的海外并购案，经过半年多的一波三折，一唱三叹，终以中海油自动撤销收购而落下帷幕。
这期间围绕这一乍看之下似乎纯粹是“经济交易”的事件所发生的风风雨雨，已经为中国企业的海外扩张投下诸多不确定因素，也彰显了美国国内因为中国崛起而引起的保护主义和经济民族主义的回潮，并且预示了中美经济关系中在可预见的未来还将发生种种冲突。
交易被政治因素扼杀
中海油收购优尼科原本可以成为一宗很美好的商业交易。优尼科连年亏损已经申请破产。今年6月，在美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙（Chevron）宣布以164亿美元的报价收购优尼科之后，中海油提出以185亿美元的全现金收购报价。
比较两个公司开出的条件，很显然中海油的报价在经济上更具有吸引力：首先在于全现金收购，相比之下，雪佛龙的收购方案则只包括四分之一的现金（44亿美元）和四分之三的股票交换。更重要的是，中海油的出价比雪佛龙的首次出价高出20亿美元，也比雪佛龙后来提高后的最终报价高出10亿美元。此外中海油还许诺在并购后不裁撤优尼科在美国的员工。
中海油的收购计划在美国政坛掀起了轩然大波，而美国政客们短视的政治意图和对中国的偏见最终扼杀了这宗交易。
自从中海油收购方案揭示之后，一波又一波的美国政治势力呼吁美国政府禁止这笔交易。6月30日，美国众议院以压倒多数通过了两项决议，一是禁止美国政府批准中海油收购优尼科的申请，另一项是要求政府立即对这一收购所带来的对美国国家安全的影响进行审议。7月25日，当情况显示优尼科董事会倾向于接受中海油的优越报价时，美国国会节外又生新枝，通过法案直接把美国政府对审查的评估延后了多达141天，使得中海油的收购计划失去时间上的可行性和商业意义。
中海油声明，美国恶性的政治环境是这一并购无法正常进行的最直接的和最重要的原因。
美国和西方其他国家的媒体评论也响应上述观点。报道这一事件的各大报纸的标题就很有说明意义。《金融时报》的标题是“国会的愤怒终结了中国的收购计划”；英国《卫报》的标题是“华盛顿的反对力量迫使中国撤销并购”；《纽约时报》的标题是“政治反对扼杀了中国公司收购优尼科”。
美国经济民族主义回潮
1930年，美国国会通过了恶名昭著的《斯穆特－郝利关税法》，建立了平均进口税高达53%的税率结构。该法案引发了世界级的贸易战，直接恶化了已经开始萧条的世界经济，并且间接促成了10年后的第二次世界大战。
二战之后，各国认识到自由贸易队推动世界和平有着重大作用。此后的许多年里，美国成为世界自由贸易的最主要的推动着和维护者。二战之后到90年代，美国的贸易政策虽然时有保护主义的例子，但并未偏离自由贸易的轨道。
但是近些年来，美国的贸易政策出现了很大的不确定性。布什政府在2001年单方面决定采取的紧急保障措施将钢铁产品关税升至30%（后来被世界贸易组织两审判定为违反国际贸易法），是近年来对自由贸易伤害最大的事件。
中国改革开放后几乎势不可挡的经济发展已经在美国的政界和知识界引发了深切的敌意和焦虑感。进入21世纪以来，仅美国国会就对中国崛起的问题进行了数十场听证和辩论会，而大多数会议基调并不是关于中美之间的自由贸易，而是美国应如何用各种方式，包括经济遏制的手段，来应对中国的崛起和保持美国的优势地位。如关于中海油收购案的首场听证竟是由众议院军事委员会举办。在现场的专家证人中，除智库卡托研究所的杰瑞泰勒（Jerry Taylor）一人认为“中国在美国投资越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就越小”之外，与会的绝大数人士均称收购案会危害美国安全。
虽然说在美国主流媒体上从不缺乏反驳上述观点并帮中海油说话的言论，但是，在政客中间，尤其是国会山上的议员中间，恐华厌华情绪还是很有市场。
为世界经济带来恶果
鉴于中美经贸关系对两国彼此以及对全世界经济发展的重要性，如果两国的政治高层动辄将经济问题政治化，这将对双边经济交往投下种种不确定因素，降低互信，并且会加剧双边关系中的“囚徒困境”，引发误判并增大贸易冲突的可能性。
美国向来以自由贸易精神立国，但这一次超常规运作，以政治力量强势干涉自由市场，为其他国家树立了很消极的榜样。这是自2001年钢铁产品紧急保障措施后美国又一次破坏全球自由贸易的例证。所不同的是，这一次美国商业利益可能会付出代价。
中国自改革开放以来，正积极由计划经济向市场经济过渡。美国企业已经大举进入中国并且取得了巨大的既得利益和期待利益。就在最近，美国银行（Bank of America）购买了中国最大的银行之一中国建设银行15%的股份，并且还可能继续增持。中国其他的大银行，如中国银行和中国工商银行，都在商讨引进“战略投资者”，美国和欧洲大的金融机构都在虎视眈眈。
虽然中国经济市场化程度已经相当高，但是政府在现阶段还是保留了相当多的干预手段。如果中国决定“以暴易暴”，对美国在华商业利益采取报复措施，会有很多“法宝”可以祭出。
有能源专家就已经指出，鉴于雪佛龙积极游说美国国会反对中海油的收购，它以后就别指望在中国市场拓展业务了。收购了优尼科后，雪佛龙将成为西方石油公司在亚太地区拥有最多油气资产的企业。不言而喻，这个地区最大的客户之一就是中国。雪佛龙将在澳洲叫做“高冈”（Gorgon）的地方拥有一处天然气项目，而中海油已经暂时答应支付220亿美元以购买这个项目12.5%的股份和25年的油气供应。鉴于此事还在谈判之中，现在中海油极可能含怒离去。如一位分析家所指出的，“比起中海油对高冈的需求来，高冈的主人更需要中海油。”
不应偏离自由贸易原则
无论是对中国和美国彼此来说还是对世界格局来说，中美关系都极其复杂而重要。虽然在国家的外交政策中，有时候经济政策和政治政策互相牵连，但是为了维持成熟的、正常的国家关系，有必要将经济和政治加以适当区分。
美国迄今还是全球自由贸易的支柱，中国在过去20多年来可以说是从全球自由贸易体系中获益最多的国家之一。中美关系不同于冷战时期的美苏关系的一个根本点在于，中美之间已经建立起了密切复杂的经济交往；而美苏在40多年的冷战期在经济方面发展的是两个几乎“老死不相往来”的平行市场。
在这个意义上，中美维持基于自由贸易的成熟的经济关系，已经成为和平的一个保障。在中海油事件中，美国政客对一宗商业交易横加干预最终致其流产，已经大大越过了经济与政治之间最基本的界限。
·作者是在国立大学法学院任教的中国学者/助理教授
Friday, August 12, 2005
????
????优尼科股东批准雪佛龙收购
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
（洛杉矶综合电）美国石油企业优尼科（Unocal）的股东批准了同业雪佛龙（Chevron）逾170亿美元（280亿5000万新元）的收购。
雪佛龙在数小时后宣布交易已经完成。
此前，中国海洋石油（CNOOC）曾以更高的价格竞购优尼科，但最终因来自美国的强大政治阻力，而在本月初撤回收购要约。
雪佛龙总裁兼首席执行员赖利对路透社表示，一旦优尼科的资产与雪佛龙实现整合，公司预计每年可以节省3亿2500万美元。优尼科的资产遍布从缅甸到美湾的多个地区。赖利说，此次并购有望将2006年每股盈余（EPS）提高1-2％。
他也驳斥了雪佛龙在亚洲地区开展业务可能也面临政治阻力的揣测，并称他预计公司与中海油就澳洲高更（Gorgon）海上项目的谈判不会受到影响。
“伙伴之间相互竞争的现象并不鲜见，”他指出，“我们和中海油有很长的渊源……，我们希望这能够持续下去。”
优尼科称，77.2％的股东(以股权计)投票赞成雪佛龙的收购。
另据《金融时报》报道，美国国会议员反对中国的中海油收购优尼科公司，引起一阵“抨击中国”的风潮，赖利对此表示遗憾。
赖利说，他认为对中海油的批评源自于中海油是国有企业，变成“政策问题”，但他认为，雪佛龙和中国政府以及中海油的关系不会因此受到影响。
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
（洛杉矶综合电）美国石油企业优尼科（Unocal）的股东批准了同业雪佛龙（Chevron）逾170亿美元（280亿5000万新元）的收购。
雪佛龙在数小时后宣布交易已经完成。
此前，中国海洋石油（CNOOC）曾以更高的价格竞购优尼科，但最终因来自美国的强大政治阻力，而在本月初撤回收购要约。
雪佛龙总裁兼首席执行员赖利对路透社表示，一旦优尼科的资产与雪佛龙实现整合，公司预计每年可以节省3亿2500万美元。优尼科的资产遍布从缅甸到美湾的多个地区。赖利说，此次并购有望将2006年每股盈余（EPS）提高1-2％。
他也驳斥了雪佛龙在亚洲地区开展业务可能也面临政治阻力的揣测，并称他预计公司与中海油就澳洲高更（Gorgon）海上项目的谈判不会受到影响。
“伙伴之间相互竞争的现象并不鲜见，”他指出，“我们和中海油有很长的渊源……，我们希望这能够持续下去。”
优尼科称，77.2％的股东(以股权计)投票赞成雪佛龙的收购。
另据《金融时报》报道，美国国会议员反对中国的中海油收购优尼科公司，引起一阵“抨击中国”的风潮，赖利对此表示遗憾。
赖利说，他认为对中海油的批评源自于中海油是国有企业，变成“政策问题”，但他认为，雪佛龙和中国政府以及中海油的关系不会因此受到影响。
Thursday, August 11, 2005
???-??-?????????????
???-??-?????????????优尼科收购案背后的政治因素
余万里
2005年08月11日07:41 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中国海洋石油有限公司撤回对美国优尼科公司的收购要约已经不算新闻。不过，此事所引发的探讨乃至争论仍在继续。作为一名研究国际政治的学者，笔者更关注收购案背后的政治因素。众所周知，中海油对优尼科的收购从一开始便被政治化，而最终决定退出收购也是迫于“非常遗憾”的政治因素。
此事并非孤立的个案，去年联想集团收购IBM个人电脑业务时同样受到了美国有关部门严格的“安全审查”。随着整体实力的逐步壮大，国际化和跨国化正在成为中国企业成长的一条重要途径。从国内市场走向国际市场，这是一个实质性的跨越。伴随着竞争范围的扩大，企业同时还需应对更为复杂的政治因素。
马克思主义政治经济学强调，经济关系决定了政治权力的分配，政治反过来又左右着经济行为的趋向。兴起于20世纪70年代的西方国际政治经济学理论也认为，在国际政治经济秩序中，始终存在安全、财富、自由和公正4种“基本价值”的分配问题。然而，西方学者往往有意无意地在他们的理论和话语体系中，淡化国家和政治权力对市场的支配作用。但“自由主义市场”决定论并非空中楼阁，它同西方国家在当今世界的强势地位密不可分。中海油的案例表明，当国际资源和利益分配游戏出现新的参与者时，隐藏在“自由主义”外衣下的霸权、权力、意识形态等政治因素是不会保持沉默的。
在西方的“民主规则”下，诸多政治游戏是非理性的。中海油撤回收购要约的主要原因并非经济因素，交易的不确定性和风险更多地来自美国“政治间歇性癫痫病”———“中国威胁论”。收购案适逢新一轮“中国威胁论”明显升温之时。虽说大多数美国能源经济学家和市场分析师并不认为中海油有什么政治意图，但美国“亚太战略利益”乃至“国家安全受到威胁”等论调足以垒起一道难以逾越的政治障碍。
中海油不仅触动了“中国威胁论”秉持者们的敏感神经，在一定程度上也触及到了当代国际政治经济秩序背后的霸权基础。美国学者罗伯特·吉尔平认为，美国霸权以及“美国治下的和平”为美国企业的全球直接投资铺垫了道路，而跨国公司反过来也充当了“霸权的工具”。在霸权与市场的结构中，石油是美国人心目中一块“十分敏感”的“奶酪”。美国是一个“生活在汽车轮子上的国家”，很多美国人都是通过路边加油站的价目表来看国际形势的。即便是优尼科这样的小块“奶酪”，也会勾起某些美国人深层的战略隐忧。难怪“战略贸易学派”的代表人物保罗·克鲁格曼也站出来反对中海油并购优尼科。在他看来，中国人此举比当年日本人收购洛克菲勒大厦还要“精明”。
其实，中海油撤回收购要约未尝不是一件好事。它再次向走向世界的中国企业提示了值得注意的政治风险。中国企业的国际化、跨国化是一个不断探索的进程。重视政治风险并不意味着将市场行为泛政治化，关键在于如何从今天的案例中获取教益。
（作者为中国社会科学院美国研究所外交室副主任）
《人民日报》 (2005年08月11日 第三版)
余万里
2005年08月11日07:41 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中国海洋石油有限公司撤回对美国优尼科公司的收购要约已经不算新闻。不过，此事所引发的探讨乃至争论仍在继续。作为一名研究国际政治的学者，笔者更关注收购案背后的政治因素。众所周知，中海油对优尼科的收购从一开始便被政治化，而最终决定退出收购也是迫于“非常遗憾”的政治因素。
此事并非孤立的个案，去年联想集团收购IBM个人电脑业务时同样受到了美国有关部门严格的“安全审查”。随着整体实力的逐步壮大，国际化和跨国化正在成为中国企业成长的一条重要途径。从国内市场走向国际市场，这是一个实质性的跨越。伴随着竞争范围的扩大，企业同时还需应对更为复杂的政治因素。
马克思主义政治经济学强调，经济关系决定了政治权力的分配，政治反过来又左右着经济行为的趋向。兴起于20世纪70年代的西方国际政治经济学理论也认为，在国际政治经济秩序中，始终存在安全、财富、自由和公正4种“基本价值”的分配问题。然而，西方学者往往有意无意地在他们的理论和话语体系中，淡化国家和政治权力对市场的支配作用。但“自由主义市场”决定论并非空中楼阁，它同西方国家在当今世界的强势地位密不可分。中海油的案例表明，当国际资源和利益分配游戏出现新的参与者时，隐藏在“自由主义”外衣下的霸权、权力、意识形态等政治因素是不会保持沉默的。
在西方的“民主规则”下，诸多政治游戏是非理性的。中海油撤回收购要约的主要原因并非经济因素，交易的不确定性和风险更多地来自美国“政治间歇性癫痫病”———“中国威胁论”。收购案适逢新一轮“中国威胁论”明显升温之时。虽说大多数美国能源经济学家和市场分析师并不认为中海油有什么政治意图，但美国“亚太战略利益”乃至“国家安全受到威胁”等论调足以垒起一道难以逾越的政治障碍。
中海油不仅触动了“中国威胁论”秉持者们的敏感神经，在一定程度上也触及到了当代国际政治经济秩序背后的霸权基础。美国学者罗伯特·吉尔平认为，美国霸权以及“美国治下的和平”为美国企业的全球直接投资铺垫了道路，而跨国公司反过来也充当了“霸权的工具”。在霸权与市场的结构中，石油是美国人心目中一块“十分敏感”的“奶酪”。美国是一个“生活在汽车轮子上的国家”，很多美国人都是通过路边加油站的价目表来看国际形势的。即便是优尼科这样的小块“奶酪”，也会勾起某些美国人深层的战略隐忧。难怪“战略贸易学派”的代表人物保罗·克鲁格曼也站出来反对中海油并购优尼科。在他看来，中国人此举比当年日本人收购洛克菲勒大厦还要“精明”。
其实，中海油撤回收购要约未尝不是一件好事。它再次向走向世界的中国企业提示了值得注意的政治风险。中国企业的国际化、跨国化是一个不断探索的进程。重视政治风险并不意味着将市场行为泛政治化，关键在于如何从今天的案例中获取教益。
（作者为中国社会科学院美国研究所外交室副主任）
《人民日报》 (2005年08月11日 第三版)
Thursday, August 04, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 Singapore Press Holdings Limited
The Straits Times (Singapore)
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: World
LENGTH: 518 words
HEADLINE: Unocal episode won't stop Chinese oil firms' foreign hunt
BYLINE: Tschang Chi-chu , China Correspondent
BODY:
BEIJING - STATE-owned energy company CNOOC's spectacular failure to acquire American oil firm Unocal is merely a speed bump, rather than a brick wall deterring Chinese oil companies from making acquisition of foreign oil assets down the road.
On Tuesday evening, China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) withdrew its US$18.5 billion (S$30.8 billion) bid for California-based Unocal. It blamed the political opposition on Capitol Hill for scotching the deal.
'CNOOC lost a battle but will continue to look for foreign overseas assets, as will the other Chinese oil companies,' said Mr Kurt Barrow, a senior partner with energy consulting firm Purvin & Gertz, referring to Chinese state-owned rivals PetroChina and Sinopec.
Never before has a Chinese company offered so much for a foreign company as CNOOC did for Unocal. But with US$711 billion in foreign currency reserves saved up in the bank, Beijing is not shy about spending some of that money to secure strategic oil and energy resources.
The Chinese economy's appetite for energy outgrew its domestic oil production capacity in 1993, forcing local oil companies to venture overseas for oil.
China is expected to import 130 metric tonnes of crude oil this year. This will satisfy only 43 per cent of the world's second largest oil consumer's total need.
The quest for oil has already taken China to pariah nations such as Sudan, Iran, Syria and Myanmar, where it would not have to compete with the United States - the world's largest oil consumer.
'China didn't realise that we wouldn't have enough oil to fuel our economic development until relatively late, so that when we go overseas now to secure sources of oil, the US, Japan and other developed nations already have a presence in the best places,' said Mr Tan Zhuzhou, honorary chairman of the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association.
The next possible targets for acquisition may be located in the Middle East, Kazakhstan or West Africa, where Sinopec and PetroChina already have a presence, according to analysts.
For example, PetroChina has expressed interest in buying Calgary-based PetroKazakhstan, which has oil fields in Kazakhstan.
However, in light of CNOOC's unsuccessful attempt to buy Unocal, Chinese companies may be more reticent about paying billions of dollars for oil assets.
DBS Vickers oil analyst Gideon Lo said that CNOOC and other oil firms would continue to look at potential investment projects, but 'the scale will not be that big in size'. He added: 'After the Unocal issue, they may have to take a step back and take a look at the global environment before they do such kinds of mega-size acquisition.'
Chinese oil firms can opt to buy individual assets, such as oil fields, or parts of companies - a strategy they have pursued with greater success.
CNOOC's Hong Kong-listed shares rose as much as 5.5 per cent after the opening bell, before closing at HK$5.55 (S$1.19) a share yesterday.
Investors were finally able to breath a sigh of relief after worrying for the past six weeks that CNOOC would overpay for Unocal.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
The Straits Times (Singapore)
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: World
LENGTH: 518 words
HEADLINE: Unocal episode won't stop Chinese oil firms' foreign hunt
BYLINE: Tschang Chi-chu , China Correspondent
BODY:
BEIJING - STATE-owned energy company CNOOC's spectacular failure to acquire American oil firm Unocal is merely a speed bump, rather than a brick wall deterring Chinese oil companies from making acquisition of foreign oil assets down the road.
On Tuesday evening, China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) withdrew its US$18.5 billion (S$30.8 billion) bid for California-based Unocal. It blamed the political opposition on Capitol Hill for scotching the deal.
'CNOOC lost a battle but will continue to look for foreign overseas assets, as will the other Chinese oil companies,' said Mr Kurt Barrow, a senior partner with energy consulting firm Purvin & Gertz, referring to Chinese state-owned rivals PetroChina and Sinopec.
Never before has a Chinese company offered so much for a foreign company as CNOOC did for Unocal. But with US$711 billion in foreign currency reserves saved up in the bank, Beijing is not shy about spending some of that money to secure strategic oil and energy resources.
The Chinese economy's appetite for energy outgrew its domestic oil production capacity in 1993, forcing local oil companies to venture overseas for oil.
China is expected to import 130 metric tonnes of crude oil this year. This will satisfy only 43 per cent of the world's second largest oil consumer's total need.
The quest for oil has already taken China to pariah nations such as Sudan, Iran, Syria and Myanmar, where it would not have to compete with the United States - the world's largest oil consumer.
'China didn't realise that we wouldn't have enough oil to fuel our economic development until relatively late, so that when we go overseas now to secure sources of oil, the US, Japan and other developed nations already have a presence in the best places,' said Mr Tan Zhuzhou, honorary chairman of the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association.
The next possible targets for acquisition may be located in the Middle East, Kazakhstan or West Africa, where Sinopec and PetroChina already have a presence, according to analysts.
For example, PetroChina has expressed interest in buying Calgary-based PetroKazakhstan, which has oil fields in Kazakhstan.
However, in light of CNOOC's unsuccessful attempt to buy Unocal, Chinese companies may be more reticent about paying billions of dollars for oil assets.
DBS Vickers oil analyst Gideon Lo said that CNOOC and other oil firms would continue to look at potential investment projects, but 'the scale will not be that big in size'. He added: 'After the Unocal issue, they may have to take a step back and take a look at the global environment before they do such kinds of mega-size acquisition.'
Chinese oil firms can opt to buy individual assets, such as oil fields, or parts of companies - a strategy they have pursued with greater success.
CNOOC's Hong Kong-listed shares rose as much as 5.5 per cent after the opening bell, before closing at HK$5.55 (S$1.19) a share yesterday.
Investors were finally able to breath a sigh of relief after worrying for the past six weeks that CNOOC would overpay for Unocal.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
The Straits Times (Singapore)
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: World
LENGTH: 755 words
HEADLINE: US firms fear retaliation after CNOOC's failed bid;
China could stop buying American, but fallout won't be great, some say
BYLINE: Eugene Low , US Correspondent
BODY:
WASHINGTON - AMERICAN companies doing business in China could face a backlash from Beijing following the failure of China National Overseas Oil Corp's bid to buy US oil firm Unocal.
There are fears here that the scuttling of CNOOC's bid on political grounds could cause Beijing to retaliate against US businesses.
A large number of US companies are either dependent on low-cost Chinese imports or have significant manufacturing operations in China.
Many, such as American high-tech firms and natural resource extraction companies, also depend on sales to the fast-growing Chinese market.
Exxon-Mobil chief executive Lee Raymond said in June that it would be a 'big mistake' if Congress interferred with the deal because it would hurt US companies seeking to do business in China.
Computer chip-maker Intel, for example, has 5,000 employees in China and has invested some US$1.3 billion (S$2.1 billion) there. China accounted for around 15 per cent of Intel's global sales of US$34 billion last year.
Boeing also sells a significant number of its aircraft to China. Earlier this year, the company won orders for 60 of its new 787 jets from Chinese airlines. It also uses about US$600 million in parts from Chinese firms.
Although CNOOC is 70 per cent owned by the Chinese government, it tried to characterise its US$18.5 billion offer for Unocal as a purely commercial transaction. Lawmakers in the United States, however, were not impressed.
Congress, citing national security concerns, was strongly against CNOOC's bid. A number of congressmen introduced legislation to block the deal.
CNOOC said on Tuesday that it was dropping its bid for Unocal. It attributed its decision to the staunch political opposition it faced in Washington.
The scrapping of the deal is likely to anger China, said Dr David Rothkopf, professor of international affairs at Columbia University. 'If we hit them hard, they can come back and stop buying Boeing aircraft to send a message,' he told the San Francisco Chronicle newspaper.
A recent deal to facilitate the sales of US software to China's government agencies could also be derailed.
But given the complex web of economic relationships linking China with the US, analysts said such retaliation is likely to be limited in duration and scope.
The economies of both countries are heavily inter-dependent. The US is a huge export market for Chinese goods, as well as one of China's largest foreign investors.
China also holds a sizeable amount of American debt - about US$230.4 billion worth of US Treasury notes. This gives China a stake in the US' prosperity.
'The last thing in the world that China wants is a recession in the US,' said Dr Rothkopf.
'They are the department store that is giving us a credit card so we can keep buying.'
Dr Donald Straszheim, chief executive of Straszheim Global Advisors, agreed. His firm offers consultations to companies doing business in China. He said:
'We expect China to retaliate in some small, veiled way. Any damage from this will be transitory and small.'
But while the short-term impact on American businesses could be limited, the failure of CNOOC's bid for Unocal could prompt Beijing to rely more on non-commercial means to secure energy resources overseas.
It might pursue a more aggressive policy of ensuring its own energy security by competing more directly for access to oil and gas assets around the world.
'We need to engage China through a rules-based system to encourage it to adopt a similar posture,' said Mr Albert Keidel, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Democrat Representative James Moran of Virginia warned in Congress last month that blocking CNOOC's bid would only drive China to deal more with countries like Iran and Venezuela.
'If they don't buy American oil companies or Western oil companies, where are they going to go?' he said.
Encouraging Chinese investments in the US, on the other hand, would boost Si- no-US ties.
Said Cato Institute analyst Jerry Taylor: 'The more China invests here, the less likely we will be running into frictions down the road.'
eugene@sph.com.sg
Intel
Chip-maker Intel has 5,000 employees in China and has invested US$1.3 billion there.
China accounted for around 15 per cent of Intel's global sales of US$34 billion last year.
Boeing
Boeing, this year, won orders for 60 of its new 787 jets from Chinese airlines.
It also uses about US$600 million in parts from Chinese companies.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: World
LENGTH: 755 words
HEADLINE: US firms fear retaliation after CNOOC's failed bid;
China could stop buying American, but fallout won't be great, some say
BYLINE: Eugene Low , US Correspondent
BODY:
WASHINGTON - AMERICAN companies doing business in China could face a backlash from Beijing following the failure of China National Overseas Oil Corp's bid to buy US oil firm Unocal.
There are fears here that the scuttling of CNOOC's bid on political grounds could cause Beijing to retaliate against US businesses.
A large number of US companies are either dependent on low-cost Chinese imports or have significant manufacturing operations in China.
Many, such as American high-tech firms and natural resource extraction companies, also depend on sales to the fast-growing Chinese market.
Exxon-Mobil chief executive Lee Raymond said in June that it would be a 'big mistake' if Congress interferred with the deal because it would hurt US companies seeking to do business in China.
Computer chip-maker Intel, for example, has 5,000 employees in China and has invested some US$1.3 billion (S$2.1 billion) there. China accounted for around 15 per cent of Intel's global sales of US$34 billion last year.
Boeing also sells a significant number of its aircraft to China. Earlier this year, the company won orders for 60 of its new 787 jets from Chinese airlines. It also uses about US$600 million in parts from Chinese firms.
Although CNOOC is 70 per cent owned by the Chinese government, it tried to characterise its US$18.5 billion offer for Unocal as a purely commercial transaction. Lawmakers in the United States, however, were not impressed.
Congress, citing national security concerns, was strongly against CNOOC's bid. A number of congressmen introduced legislation to block the deal.
CNOOC said on Tuesday that it was dropping its bid for Unocal. It attributed its decision to the staunch political opposition it faced in Washington.
The scrapping of the deal is likely to anger China, said Dr David Rothkopf, professor of international affairs at Columbia University. 'If we hit them hard, they can come back and stop buying Boeing aircraft to send a message,' he told the San Francisco Chronicle newspaper.
A recent deal to facilitate the sales of US software to China's government agencies could also be derailed.
But given the complex web of economic relationships linking China with the US, analysts said such retaliation is likely to be limited in duration and scope.
The economies of both countries are heavily inter-dependent. The US is a huge export market for Chinese goods, as well as one of China's largest foreign investors.
China also holds a sizeable amount of American debt - about US$230.4 billion worth of US Treasury notes. This gives China a stake in the US' prosperity.
'The last thing in the world that China wants is a recession in the US,' said Dr Rothkopf.
'They are the department store that is giving us a credit card so we can keep buying.'
Dr Donald Straszheim, chief executive of Straszheim Global Advisors, agreed. His firm offers consultations to companies doing business in China. He said:
'We expect China to retaliate in some small, veiled way. Any damage from this will be transitory and small.'
But while the short-term impact on American businesses could be limited, the failure of CNOOC's bid for Unocal could prompt Beijing to rely more on non-commercial means to secure energy resources overseas.
It might pursue a more aggressive policy of ensuring its own energy security by competing more directly for access to oil and gas assets around the world.
'We need to engage China through a rules-based system to encourage it to adopt a similar posture,' said Mr Albert Keidel, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Democrat Representative James Moran of Virginia warned in Congress last month that blocking CNOOC's bid would only drive China to deal more with countries like Iran and Venezuela.
'If they don't buy American oil companies or Western oil companies, where are they going to go?' he said.
Encouraging Chinese investments in the US, on the other hand, would boost Si- no-US ties.
Said Cato Institute analyst Jerry Taylor: 'The more China invests here, the less likely we will be running into frictions down the road.'
eugene@sph.com.sg
Intel
Chip-maker Intel has 5,000 employees in China and has invested US$1.3 billion there.
China accounted for around 15 per cent of Intel's global sales of US$34 billion last year.
Boeing
Boeing, this year, won orders for 60 of its new 787 jets from Chinese airlines.
It also uses about US$600 million in parts from Chinese companies.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia)
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: BUSINESS; Pg. 35
LENGTH: 821 words
HEADLINE: Can we say 'no' to China?
BYLINE: TERRY MCCRANN
BODY:
IF WE WOULDN'T LET SHELL BUY WOODSIDE, WHY WOULD WE LET CHINA?
WHAT if China came knock, knock, knocking on Woodside Petroleum's door? Indeed, perhaps that question should be phrased as 'when' not 'if'?
It would pose delicate, even delicious questions in business terms; in foreign investment terms; and on the geopolitical front.
Woodside is our single biggest corporate oil and gas resource. It is also 'available' after the Federal Government prohibited its full acquisition by its biggest shareholder Shell.
It's acquisition by a cash-rich energy-hungry China would seem an absolute no-brainer. So what would 'we' say, if an approach was made?
Yesterday the Chinese Government-controlled oil group CNOOC abandoned its attempt to buy the big US oil group Unocal.
Interestingly, with Woodside capitalised at a tad over $20 billion, any bid for it would cost pretty much the same as the $23 billion CNOOC had been offering for Unocal.
The Unocal bid made three very significant statements. That China was prepared to spend some of the cash garnered from its continuing huge trade surpluses.
It was prepared to play with the big boys of western capitalism -- indeed, the very big boys -- by making a hostile takeover bid for a major publicly listed company.
And thirdly, and crucially so far as Woodside is concerned, it wants to buy oil assets; and is prepared to buy them at these record high prices.
That's to say, it knows exactly what it wants and it knows exactly what price it will have to pay. On the basis that whatever happens in its own economy and the world's, the demand for oil and gas is only going to keep going up. Along with the price.
Now Woodside is a very different company to Unocal. Its value lies in gas resources, owned via joint ventures and already mostly pledged to a range of buyers including China.
In some ways, that mix could be even more attractive to China than a conventional US-based oil company -- which is hostage to the political, energy and economic dynamics of that country.
So why hasn't there been a move on Woodside? The answer might be as prosaic as an assumption that Woodside is 'not for sale'.
Because of Shell's dominant 34 per cent shareholding, and the Australian Government's rejection of the Shell bid for the rest.
If we wouldn't let Shell buy Woodside, why would we let China? That in itself raises some tantalising, even tricky political questions.
We wouldn't let Shell buy the rest precisely because Shell was a global oil major.
Setting aside the persuasiveness of Woodside chairman Charles Goode, essentially the concern was that Shell would 'mothball' Woodside-controlled resources to enable other Shell resources to proceed first.
That would certainly not be an issue if energy-hungry China was the buyer. Presumably it would want to fast-track resources it had paid $20 billion or more to buy.
While we were worried about Shell leaving the resources in the ground, would we be wildly enthusiastic about China pumping them out -- but then shipping them far away?
But would Shell sell? Letting Woodside fall to China might seem fundamentally counter-intuitive. If Shell wanted Woodside in order to control development of its resource base, why would it sell to the one buyer that would go gangbusters on development?
Maybe, because it might work to build a more productive relationship with the country that is going to become the world's biggest energy buyer through the 21st century.
What about the politics? CNOOC's bid for Unocal unleashed a storm of protest in the US Congress. Would it be warmly welcomed in Canberra?
It's hard to see how the Government could reasonably reject a bid from China. The grounds used to reject Shell would work to directly endorse an energy-hungry buyer. And a buyer that would want to retain and grow Woodside's skills base and exploration dynamic.
John Howard took great credit for the $25 billion Woodside-led gas contract with China. It would be hard for him to say they could buy the gas but not the gas producer.
BP gone green
WE THOUGHT we had to beware of Shell coming bearing gifts; we should be warier of its fellow British sister BP pretending to do something similar.
BP has well and truly 'gone on the -- greenhouse -- wagon'. Behaving like a reformed carbon drunk, it's urging everyone to renounce the evil Big-C.
In corporate terms, this is known as getting on the front foot. You pump a lot of hydro-carbon, so you shout from the rooftops how evil it is, and how much investment you are putting into the sun keeping on shining.
Whether or not it proves a successful business strategy, only time will tell. But it's perfectly legitimate for management to propose and a board of directors to endorse.
But let's not pretend it's anything else. BP executives like to wander the world preaching the green gospel. That doesn't make them either green or preachers.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: BUSINESS; Pg. 35
LENGTH: 821 words
HEADLINE: Can we say 'no' to China?
BYLINE: TERRY MCCRANN
BODY:
IF WE WOULDN'T LET SHELL BUY WOODSIDE, WHY WOULD WE LET CHINA?
WHAT if China came knock, knock, knocking on Woodside Petroleum's door? Indeed, perhaps that question should be phrased as 'when' not 'if'?
It would pose delicate, even delicious questions in business terms; in foreign investment terms; and on the geopolitical front.
Woodside is our single biggest corporate oil and gas resource. It is also 'available' after the Federal Government prohibited its full acquisition by its biggest shareholder Shell.
It's acquisition by a cash-rich energy-hungry China would seem an absolute no-brainer. So what would 'we' say, if an approach was made?
Yesterday the Chinese Government-controlled oil group CNOOC abandoned its attempt to buy the big US oil group Unocal.
Interestingly, with Woodside capitalised at a tad over $20 billion, any bid for it would cost pretty much the same as the $23 billion CNOOC had been offering for Unocal.
The Unocal bid made three very significant statements. That China was prepared to spend some of the cash garnered from its continuing huge trade surpluses.
It was prepared to play with the big boys of western capitalism -- indeed, the very big boys -- by making a hostile takeover bid for a major publicly listed company.
And thirdly, and crucially so far as Woodside is concerned, it wants to buy oil assets; and is prepared to buy them at these record high prices.
That's to say, it knows exactly what it wants and it knows exactly what price it will have to pay. On the basis that whatever happens in its own economy and the world's, the demand for oil and gas is only going to keep going up. Along with the price.
Now Woodside is a very different company to Unocal. Its value lies in gas resources, owned via joint ventures and already mostly pledged to a range of buyers including China.
In some ways, that mix could be even more attractive to China than a conventional US-based oil company -- which is hostage to the political, energy and economic dynamics of that country.
So why hasn't there been a move on Woodside? The answer might be as prosaic as an assumption that Woodside is 'not for sale'.
Because of Shell's dominant 34 per cent shareholding, and the Australian Government's rejection of the Shell bid for the rest.
If we wouldn't let Shell buy Woodside, why would we let China? That in itself raises some tantalising, even tricky political questions.
We wouldn't let Shell buy the rest precisely because Shell was a global oil major.
Setting aside the persuasiveness of Woodside chairman Charles Goode, essentially the concern was that Shell would 'mothball' Woodside-controlled resources to enable other Shell resources to proceed first.
That would certainly not be an issue if energy-hungry China was the buyer. Presumably it would want to fast-track resources it had paid $20 billion or more to buy.
While we were worried about Shell leaving the resources in the ground, would we be wildly enthusiastic about China pumping them out -- but then shipping them far away?
But would Shell sell? Letting Woodside fall to China might seem fundamentally counter-intuitive. If Shell wanted Woodside in order to control development of its resource base, why would it sell to the one buyer that would go gangbusters on development?
Maybe, because it might work to build a more productive relationship with the country that is going to become the world's biggest energy buyer through the 21st century.
What about the politics? CNOOC's bid for Unocal unleashed a storm of protest in the US Congress. Would it be warmly welcomed in Canberra?
It's hard to see how the Government could reasonably reject a bid from China. The grounds used to reject Shell would work to directly endorse an energy-hungry buyer. And a buyer that would want to retain and grow Woodside's skills base and exploration dynamic.
John Howard took great credit for the $25 billion Woodside-led gas contract with China. It would be hard for him to say they could buy the gas but not the gas producer.
BP gone green
WE THOUGHT we had to beware of Shell coming bearing gifts; we should be warier of its fellow British sister BP pretending to do something similar.
BP has well and truly 'gone on the -- greenhouse -- wagon'. Behaving like a reformed carbon drunk, it's urging everyone to renounce the evil Big-C.
In corporate terms, this is known as getting on the front foot. You pump a lot of hydro-carbon, so you shout from the rooftops how evil it is, and how much investment you are putting into the sun keeping on shining.
Whether or not it proves a successful business strategy, only time will tell. But it's perfectly legitimate for management to propose and a board of directors to endorse.
But let's not pretend it's anything else. BP executives like to wander the world preaching the green gospel. That doesn't make them either green or preachers.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
?????:???????????????
中海油表示：撤回并购优尼科报价并非经济因素
www.XINHUANET.com 2005年08月03日 22:18:50 来源：新华网
【字体：大 中 小】 【打印本稿】 【读后感言】 【进入论坛】 【推荐 】
【关闭】
这是中海油东方1－1气田远景（7月28日摄）。 新华社记者赵颖全摄
这是中海油东方1－1气田工作人员在检查设备（7月28日摄）。新华社记者赵颖全摄
新华网北京8月3日电（记者常志鹏）中国海洋石油有限公司表示，中海油撤回其对优尼科公司的收购要约。其主要原因并非经济因素。
中海油的宣布介绍，中海油曾经积极考虑进一步提高收购要约中的条件。如果不是由于美国的政治环境，应已付诸实施。中海油竞购交易宣布后，在美国出现了前所未有的政治上的反对声音，甚至要取消或更改美国外国投资委员会多年来行之有效的程序，这实在令人遗憾，也有失公道。中海油为完成此项商业目的的竞购，曾做出多项承诺，以消除美国监管当局可能的担心，在这种情况下，美国的政治反对声就显得更加可叹，更为不合时宜了。这种非常遗憾的政治环境使中海油很难准确评估成功的几率，对中海油完成交易形成了很高的不确定性和无法接受的风险。尽管中海油不情愿，但不得不撤回其报价，这对优尼科的股东及员工来说无疑是非常不利的。 （完）
中海油撤回并购要约是激流勇退的明智之举
新华网北京８月３日电（记者 安蓓 韩乔）中国海洋石油有限公司于北京时间２日晚宣布撤回对美国优尼科石油公司的收购要约，从而正式退出了与雪佛龙公司持续整整４０天的收购竞争。纽约股市和此间专家做出的第一反应均是：中海油激流勇退是明智之举。
中海油退出收购的消息传出后，纽约证券交易所中海油股票价格飙升３．８２美元，雪佛龙股票上扬８８美分，优尼科股票下降５美分。
一位本次并购的知情人士３日向新华社记者表示，中海油尚有加价空间，但美国的政治环境为交易增加了不确定性和“无法接受的风险”，从而使中海油难以对成功几率作出准确评估。“中海油不能用股东的钱去冒巨大的政治风险。”
中海油在２日晚发表的声明中说，目前情况下继续进行竞购已不能代表股东的最佳利益。
此间专家在接受新华社记者采访时指出，中海油并购优尼科遇到了超乎想象的政治干扰，停止收购，虽是不得已而为之，但也是理性明智之举。
商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院专家邢厚媛说，如果在先前出价１８５亿美元的基础上继续加价竞购，即使拿下也可能是个“苦果”，中海油不仅要付出更大的经济代价，还可能被迫接受种种制约性条款。
“中海油在评估了商业风险后收回并购要约，向美国和国际社会证明，其并购优尼科完全是商业行为。”国务院发展研究中心企业所副所长张文魁说，“即使中海油并购成功，由于当地舆论不利和政客阻挠，今后顺利运作也存在很大不确定性。”
中海油在６月２３日宣布以要约价１８５亿美元全现金收购优尼科后，来自美国国会的反对声浪愈演愈烈，一些议员以美国国家安全受到威胁为由设置了重重障碍。
７月１９日，优尼科董事会在关键性的投票中表示支持雪佛龙修改后的并购计划，并向８月１０日的特别股东大会推荐，这使得中海油并购成功的希望更加渺茫。上周，美国国会通过议案，要求布什政府对审查中海油收购优尼科公司，延长１４０天作业时间。
这意味着，雪佛龙公司很可能在短期内即可完成收购优尼科的程序，而中海油的并购之路还将历时数月之久，并且前途未卜。面对巨大的商业风险和政治风险，中海油选择了激流勇退。
这场持续４０天的中海油并购优尼科的大戏已告落幕，对中海油来说，这并不是一个失败，对计划展开海外并购的中国企业来说，更是上了关于国际化的生动一课。
张文魁认为，对于资源导向型企业的并购，应采取更加审慎的策略。在寻求国际能源合作中，中国可以更多地利用贸易、期货等市场手段，海外并购并非唯一选择。
商务部研究院研究员梅新育建议，在进行海外并购时，中国企业应更加注重策略性。“可选择非股权安排或通过第三方迂回投资的方式，减少不必要的干扰和阻力”。
分析者指出，中海油已为这次竞购承受了前期投入的损失，以及由于参与竞购透露企业战略有可能带来的分红损失。不过，退出竞购并不会对公司的发展战略产生重大影响。（完）
www.XINHUANET.com 2005年08月03日 22:18:50 来源：新华网
【字体：大 中 小】 【打印本稿】 【读后感言】 【进入论坛】 【推荐 】
【关闭】
这是中海油东方1－1气田远景（7月28日摄）。 新华社记者赵颖全摄
这是中海油东方1－1气田工作人员在检查设备（7月28日摄）。新华社记者赵颖全摄
新华网北京8月3日电（记者常志鹏）中国海洋石油有限公司表示，中海油撤回其对优尼科公司的收购要约。其主要原因并非经济因素。
中海油的宣布介绍，中海油曾经积极考虑进一步提高收购要约中的条件。如果不是由于美国的政治环境，应已付诸实施。中海油竞购交易宣布后，在美国出现了前所未有的政治上的反对声音，甚至要取消或更改美国外国投资委员会多年来行之有效的程序，这实在令人遗憾，也有失公道。中海油为完成此项商业目的的竞购，曾做出多项承诺，以消除美国监管当局可能的担心，在这种情况下，美国的政治反对声就显得更加可叹，更为不合时宜了。这种非常遗憾的政治环境使中海油很难准确评估成功的几率，对中海油完成交易形成了很高的不确定性和无法接受的风险。尽管中海油不情愿，但不得不撤回其报价，这对优尼科的股东及员工来说无疑是非常不利的。 （完）
中海油撤回并购要约是激流勇退的明智之举
新华网北京８月３日电（记者 安蓓 韩乔）中国海洋石油有限公司于北京时间２日晚宣布撤回对美国优尼科石油公司的收购要约，从而正式退出了与雪佛龙公司持续整整４０天的收购竞争。纽约股市和此间专家做出的第一反应均是：中海油激流勇退是明智之举。
中海油退出收购的消息传出后，纽约证券交易所中海油股票价格飙升３．８２美元，雪佛龙股票上扬８８美分，优尼科股票下降５美分。
一位本次并购的知情人士３日向新华社记者表示，中海油尚有加价空间，但美国的政治环境为交易增加了不确定性和“无法接受的风险”，从而使中海油难以对成功几率作出准确评估。“中海油不能用股东的钱去冒巨大的政治风险。”
中海油在２日晚发表的声明中说，目前情况下继续进行竞购已不能代表股东的最佳利益。
此间专家在接受新华社记者采访时指出，中海油并购优尼科遇到了超乎想象的政治干扰，停止收购，虽是不得已而为之，但也是理性明智之举。
商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院专家邢厚媛说，如果在先前出价１８５亿美元的基础上继续加价竞购，即使拿下也可能是个“苦果”，中海油不仅要付出更大的经济代价，还可能被迫接受种种制约性条款。
“中海油在评估了商业风险后收回并购要约，向美国和国际社会证明，其并购优尼科完全是商业行为。”国务院发展研究中心企业所副所长张文魁说，“即使中海油并购成功，由于当地舆论不利和政客阻挠，今后顺利运作也存在很大不确定性。”
中海油在６月２３日宣布以要约价１８５亿美元全现金收购优尼科后，来自美国国会的反对声浪愈演愈烈，一些议员以美国国家安全受到威胁为由设置了重重障碍。
７月１９日，优尼科董事会在关键性的投票中表示支持雪佛龙修改后的并购计划，并向８月１０日的特别股东大会推荐，这使得中海油并购成功的希望更加渺茫。上周，美国国会通过议案，要求布什政府对审查中海油收购优尼科公司，延长１４０天作业时间。
这意味着，雪佛龙公司很可能在短期内即可完成收购优尼科的程序，而中海油的并购之路还将历时数月之久，并且前途未卜。面对巨大的商业风险和政治风险，中海油选择了激流勇退。
这场持续４０天的中海油并购优尼科的大戏已告落幕，对中海油来说，这并不是一个失败，对计划展开海外并购的中国企业来说，更是上了关于国际化的生动一课。
张文魁认为，对于资源导向型企业的并购，应采取更加审慎的策略。在寻求国际能源合作中，中国可以更多地利用贸易、期货等市场手段，海外并购并非唯一选择。
商务部研究院研究员梅新育建议，在进行海外并购时，中国企业应更加注重策略性。“可选择非股权安排或通过第三方迂回投资的方式，减少不必要的干扰和阻力”。
分析者指出，中海油已为这次竞购承受了前期投入的损失，以及由于参与竞购透露企业战略有可能带来的分红损失。不过，退出竞购并不会对公司的发展战略产生重大影响。（完）
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Financial Times (London, England)
August 4, 2005 Thursday
London Edition 2
SECTION: COMPANIES ASIA-PACIFIC; Pg. 22
LENGTH: 444 words
HEADLINE: CNOOC might look to Australian groups OIL & GAS:
BYLINE: By TIM JOHNSTON
DATELINE: SYDNEY
BODY:
The failure of CNOOC's bid for Unocal has revived speculation that the company might set its sights on Australia's Woodside Petroleum or Santos.
But analysts are warning any such acquisition plans could run into political problems in Canberra and say the potential targets would come at a high price.
Although CNOOC's expansion plans have been temporarily blunted by the Unocal setback, China's hunger for reliable sources of oil is unlikely to remain contained for long, and Asian acquisitions would be a logical next step.
CNOOC is involved with Woodside, Australia's biggest oil and gas company, through the North West Shelf Venture, which Woodside operates and owns a 17 per cent share.
Woodside also has interests in assets in the Timor sea, off Western Australia and in Algeria and says it aims to more than double production to more than 150m barrels of oil equivalent by 2010. It has a market capitalisation of ADollars 20.33bn (USDollars 15.6bn) and made record net profits last year of ADollars 1.08bn.
Woodside yesterday declined to comment on speculation it might be a takeover target.
Santos is smaller, with a market capitalisation of ADollars 6.46bn and production of 47m boe in 2004 principally from assets in Australia and south-east Asia.
Woodside is 34 per cent owned by Royal Dutch/Shell, giving CNOOC an obvious acquisition route, but any bid is likely to run into political barriers in Australia. The government has proved highly sensitive to the question of ownership of Woodside, and in 2001 Peter Costello, Australia's Treasurer, rejected Shell's bid to take a controlling shareholding in the company on the grounds that it would be against the national interest.
Political scientists believe the government would take a similar line on any move by CNOOC, partially following the lead of the US over the Unocal bid, and partially playing to the xenophobic tendencies of the Australian electorate.
"They would say in terms of principle that this is too close to a national security issue, particularly when there is a national anxiety regarding fuel," said Dr Michael McKinley, a lecturer in International Relations and Strategy at the Australian National University in Canberra.
But he says it would be a difficult decision for the government nonetheless, particularly given western attempts to persuade China to open up its domestic markets.
Speculation has added to rising oil prices to drive up the shares of both Woodside and Santos. Woodside hit a record high of ADollars 31.15 on Tuesday, up 1.9 per cent and Santos closed up 3.4 per cent at ADollars 11.08, although that was assisted by the announcement of a new gas find off the coast of Victoria.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
August 4, 2005 Thursday
London Edition 2
SECTION: COMPANIES ASIA-PACIFIC; Pg. 22
LENGTH: 444 words
HEADLINE: CNOOC might look to Australian groups OIL & GAS:
BYLINE: By TIM JOHNSTON
DATELINE: SYDNEY
BODY:
The failure of CNOOC's bid for Unocal has revived speculation that the company might set its sights on Australia's Woodside Petroleum or Santos.
But analysts are warning any such acquisition plans could run into political problems in Canberra and say the potential targets would come at a high price.
Although CNOOC's expansion plans have been temporarily blunted by the Unocal setback, China's hunger for reliable sources of oil is unlikely to remain contained for long, and Asian acquisitions would be a logical next step.
CNOOC is involved with Woodside, Australia's biggest oil and gas company, through the North West Shelf Venture, which Woodside operates and owns a 17 per cent share.
Woodside also has interests in assets in the Timor sea, off Western Australia and in Algeria and says it aims to more than double production to more than 150m barrels of oil equivalent by 2010. It has a market capitalisation of ADollars 20.33bn (USDollars 15.6bn) and made record net profits last year of ADollars 1.08bn.
Woodside yesterday declined to comment on speculation it might be a takeover target.
Santos is smaller, with a market capitalisation of ADollars 6.46bn and production of 47m boe in 2004 principally from assets in Australia and south-east Asia.
Woodside is 34 per cent owned by Royal Dutch/Shell, giving CNOOC an obvious acquisition route, but any bid is likely to run into political barriers in Australia. The government has proved highly sensitive to the question of ownership of Woodside, and in 2001 Peter Costello, Australia's Treasurer, rejected Shell's bid to take a controlling shareholding in the company on the grounds that it would be against the national interest.
Political scientists believe the government would take a similar line on any move by CNOOC, partially following the lead of the US over the Unocal bid, and partially playing to the xenophobic tendencies of the Australian electorate.
"They would say in terms of principle that this is too close to a national security issue, particularly when there is a national anxiety regarding fuel," said Dr Michael McKinley, a lecturer in International Relations and Strategy at the Australian National University in Canberra.
But he says it would be a difficult decision for the government nonetheless, particularly given western attempts to persuade China to open up its domestic markets.
Speculation has added to rising oil prices to drive up the shares of both Woodside and Santos. Woodside hit a record high of ADollars 31.15 on Tuesday, up 1.9 per cent and Santos closed up 3.4 per cent at ADollars 11.08, although that was assisted by the announcement of a new gas find off the coast of Victoria.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 Nationwide News Pty Limited
The Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia)
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: FINANCE; Pg. 21
LENGTH: 650 words
HEADLINE: Woodside next in Beijing's sights?
BYLINE: Terry McCrann
BODY:
WHAT if China came knocking on Woodside Petroleum's door?
Indeed, perhaps that question should be "when" not "if".
It would pose delicate, even delicious questions in business terms, in foreign investment terms, and on the geopolitical front.
Woodside is our single biggest corporate oil and gas company. It is also "available" after the Federal Government prohibited its full acquisition by its biggest shareholder Shell. Its acquisition by a cash-rich, energy-hungry China would seem an absolute no-brainer. So what would "we" say, if an approach was made?
Yesterday the Chinese Government-controlled oil group CNOOC abandoned its attempt to buy big US oil group Unocal.
Interestingly, with Woodside capitalised at a tad more than $20 billion, any bid for it would cost pretty much the same as the $24 billion CNOOC had been offering for Unocal.
The Unocal bid made three very significant statements. That China was prepared to spend some of the cash garnered from its continuing huge trade surpluses.
It was prepared to play with the big boys of Western capitalism -- indeed, the very big boys -- by making a hostile takeover bid for a major publicly listed company.
And thirdly, and crucially so far as Woodside is concerned, it wants to buy oil assets and is prepared to buy them at record high prices.
That's to say it knows exactly what it wants and it knows exactly what price it will have to pay. On the basis that whatever happens in its own economy and the world's, the demand for oil and gas is only going to keep going up. Along with the price.
Now Woodside is a very different company to Unocal. Its value lies in gas resources, owned via joint ventures and already mostly pledged to a range of buyers including China.
In some ways, that mix could be even more attractive to China than a conventional US-based oil company -- which is hostage to the political, energy and economic dynamics of that country.
So why hasn't there been a move on Woodside? The answer might be as prosaic as an assumption that Woodside is "not for sale". Because of Shell's dominant 34 per cent shareholding and the Australian Government's rejection of the Shell bid for the rest.
If we wouldn't let Shell buy Woodside, why would we let China? That in itself raises some tantalising, even tricky political questions.
We wouldn't let Shell buy the rest precisely because Shell was a global oil major.
Setting aside the persuasiveness of Woodside chairman Charles Goode, essentially the concern was that Shell would "mothball" Woodside-controlled resources to enable other Shell resources to proceed first. That would certainly not be an issue if energy-hungry China was the buyer. Presumably it would want to fast-track resources it had paid $20 billion or more to buy.
While we were worried about Shell leaving the resources in the ground, would we be wildly enthusiastic about China pumping them out -- but then shipping them far away?
Continued Page 23
Woodside next on Beijing's shopping list?
From Page 21
But would Shell sell? Letting Woodside fall to China might seem fundamentally counter-intuitive.
If Shell wanted Woodside in order to stop development of its resource base, why would it sell to the one buyer that would go gangbusters on development?
Maybe because it might work to build a much more productive relationship with the country that is going to become the world's biggest energy buyer.
What about the politics? CNOOC's bid for Unocal unleashed a storm of protest in the US Congress. Would it be warmly welcomed in Canberra?
It's hard to see how the Government could reasonably reject a China bid. The grounds used to reject Shell would work to directly endorse an energy-hungry buyer. John Howard took credit for the $25 billion Woodside-led China gas deal.
It would be hard for him to say they could buy the gas but not the producer.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
The Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia)
August 4, 2005 Thursday
SECTION: FINANCE; Pg. 21
LENGTH: 650 words
HEADLINE: Woodside next in Beijing's sights?
BYLINE: Terry McCrann
BODY:
WHAT if China came knocking on Woodside Petroleum's door?
Indeed, perhaps that question should be "when" not "if".
It would pose delicate, even delicious questions in business terms, in foreign investment terms, and on the geopolitical front.
Woodside is our single biggest corporate oil and gas company. It is also "available" after the Federal Government prohibited its full acquisition by its biggest shareholder Shell. Its acquisition by a cash-rich, energy-hungry China would seem an absolute no-brainer. So what would "we" say, if an approach was made?
Yesterday the Chinese Government-controlled oil group CNOOC abandoned its attempt to buy big US oil group Unocal.
Interestingly, with Woodside capitalised at a tad more than $20 billion, any bid for it would cost pretty much the same as the $24 billion CNOOC had been offering for Unocal.
The Unocal bid made three very significant statements. That China was prepared to spend some of the cash garnered from its continuing huge trade surpluses.
It was prepared to play with the big boys of Western capitalism -- indeed, the very big boys -- by making a hostile takeover bid for a major publicly listed company.
And thirdly, and crucially so far as Woodside is concerned, it wants to buy oil assets and is prepared to buy them at record high prices.
That's to say it knows exactly what it wants and it knows exactly what price it will have to pay. On the basis that whatever happens in its own economy and the world's, the demand for oil and gas is only going to keep going up. Along with the price.
Now Woodside is a very different company to Unocal. Its value lies in gas resources, owned via joint ventures and already mostly pledged to a range of buyers including China.
In some ways, that mix could be even more attractive to China than a conventional US-based oil company -- which is hostage to the political, energy and economic dynamics of that country.
So why hasn't there been a move on Woodside? The answer might be as prosaic as an assumption that Woodside is "not for sale". Because of Shell's dominant 34 per cent shareholding and the Australian Government's rejection of the Shell bid for the rest.
If we wouldn't let Shell buy Woodside, why would we let China? That in itself raises some tantalising, even tricky political questions.
We wouldn't let Shell buy the rest precisely because Shell was a global oil major.
Setting aside the persuasiveness of Woodside chairman Charles Goode, essentially the concern was that Shell would "mothball" Woodside-controlled resources to enable other Shell resources to proceed first. That would certainly not be an issue if energy-hungry China was the buyer. Presumably it would want to fast-track resources it had paid $20 billion or more to buy.
While we were worried about Shell leaving the resources in the ground, would we be wildly enthusiastic about China pumping them out -- but then shipping them far away?
Continued Page 23
Woodside next on Beijing's shopping list?
From Page 21
But would Shell sell? Letting Woodside fall to China might seem fundamentally counter-intuitive.
If Shell wanted Woodside in order to stop development of its resource base, why would it sell to the one buyer that would go gangbusters on development?
Maybe because it might work to build a much more productive relationship with the country that is going to become the world's biggest energy buyer.
What about the politics? CNOOC's bid for Unocal unleashed a storm of protest in the US Congress. Would it be warmly welcomed in Canberra?
It's hard to see how the Government could reasonably reject a China bid. The grounds used to reject Shell would work to directly endorse an energy-hungry buyer. John Howard took credit for the $25 billion Woodside-led China gas deal.
It would be hard for him to say they could buy the gas but not the producer.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 The Christian Science Publishing Society
Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA)
August 4, 2005, Thursday
SECTION: USA; Pg. 01
LENGTH: 908 words
HEADLINE: New rules in global rivalry for oil
BYLINE: By Mark Trumbull Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
HIGHLIGHT:
The growing Asian demand for energy could alter US strategy.
BODY:
Although a Chinese oil company withdrew its bid for a major US-based energy producer this week, the effort put America on notice: China and other nations have launched a concerted push to secure access to oil and natural gas, and the United States must consider how to respond.
It's probably too strong to call it a pipeline-and-tanker version of a global arms race - in fact, that's precisely what many world leaders hope to avoid.
But in an era of rising oil prices and burgeoning demand for fuel, the issues of energy and national security appear increasingly linked.
The $ 18.5 billion bid to buy Unocal Corp. stirred concerns in the US Congress, which approved energy legislation last week that included a provision that would have delayed a takeover by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC Ltd.). In withdrawing its offer Tuesday, the government-controlled company cited political opposition in the US.
Many observers say American fears were overblown, but the Capitol Hill angst highlighted a key question: Will energy markets be marked by international competition or cooperation? The contest between China and the US is as much about strategy as resources.
Up to now, the US has relied largely on oil markets to divvy up resources. Its focus is on promoting an expanding and smooth-running global energy market. China is deploying government wealth - fed by its large trade surplus - to back the expansion of firms like CNOOC.
"To support their economic growth countries like China and India are aggressively moving to secure new energy streams," says David Phillips, an energy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "The US needs to have a comprehensive energy strategy, which is part of our overall national-security strategy."
That assessment is widely shared.
Oil remains the key fuel for transportation, and demand for natural gas - a Unocal emphasis - has been soaring. India and China, the world's most populous nations, are scrambling to ensure the foundation of their expanding middle class. That economic growth suggests that in the near future demand could outstrip supply.
Some argue that, with competition for resources growing, Washington should review - and sometimes restrict - energy deals involving US companies.
Japan's thirst for oil was a catalyst for its war with America 65 years ago, Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, warned in testimony to Congress last month. Although China has not taken a military approach in its quest for oil, "We ignore at our peril ... the fact the Beijing is engaged in an even more ambitious effort to acquire legal title to energy resources," Mr. Gaffney said in opposing CNOOC's bid for Unocal.
He argues that Congress should adopt a much more rigorous approach to reviewing such business deals - with national-security interests at the forefront.
National-security concerns in this new era could go well beyond China - and beyond the realm of corporate mergers. India, in its own rush for fossil fuels, has proposed the development of a natural-gas pipeline from Iran. This is controversial in Washington, which would like to isolate Iran amid concerns about nuclear proliferation there.
The Middle East, of course, remains the geopolitical center of the oil question. Some two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves are there or in North Africa.
While few see the US-led war in Iraq as fundamentally about oil, neither that effort nor the 1991 Gulf war was undertaken without careful consideration of oil-market implications.
"One of the assumptions, and they were obviously wrong, was that a liberated or democratic Iraq ... could break the back of OPEC," and supply additional oil on world markets, says Frank Verrastro, who specializes in energy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Indeed, given the world's current dependence on Saudi Arabia and other OPEC nations, many experts say large buyers of oil such as the US and China have more to gain from cooperation than rivalry.
"They are countries that have the same common interests we do - diverse energy supplies" to support economic growth, says Amy Myers Jaffe, an energy expert at the James A. Baker III Institute in Houston.
Such cooperation could range from technology development to agreements to take turns when buying oil to fill strategic reserves.
Most important, experts say, it means promoting a free and open world energy market. "When we isolate other countries, it becomes harder to secure their constructive participation in addressing America's needs," says Mr. Phillips of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Among the dangers: nations negotiating bilaterally for pledges of oil, rather than selling and buying it on the open market. State-run firms now control about three-fourths of the world's oil resources.
Energy rivalries could accelerate, if those supplies become the stuff of diplomacy rather than of dollars in the marketplace.
In the long run, experts from Mr. Gaffney to Mr. Verrastro agree it's vital to reduce reliance on oil through steps such as conservation and the development of alternative energy sources.
In the meantime, much of the global economy will still run on oil. In the US, Chevron is now free to pursue its own bid for Unocal. And China will push forward on new energy deals, as it has been for a decade now.
(c) Copyright 2005. The Christian Science Monitor
LOAD-DATE: August 03, 2005
Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA)
August 4, 2005, Thursday
SECTION: USA; Pg. 01
LENGTH: 908 words
HEADLINE: New rules in global rivalry for oil
BYLINE: By Mark Trumbull Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
HIGHLIGHT:
The growing Asian demand for energy could alter US strategy.
BODY:
Although a Chinese oil company withdrew its bid for a major US-based energy producer this week, the effort put America on notice: China and other nations have launched a concerted push to secure access to oil and natural gas, and the United States must consider how to respond.
It's probably too strong to call it a pipeline-and-tanker version of a global arms race - in fact, that's precisely what many world leaders hope to avoid.
But in an era of rising oil prices and burgeoning demand for fuel, the issues of energy and national security appear increasingly linked.
The $ 18.5 billion bid to buy Unocal Corp. stirred concerns in the US Congress, which approved energy legislation last week that included a provision that would have delayed a takeover by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC Ltd.). In withdrawing its offer Tuesday, the government-controlled company cited political opposition in the US.
Many observers say American fears were overblown, but the Capitol Hill angst highlighted a key question: Will energy markets be marked by international competition or cooperation? The contest between China and the US is as much about strategy as resources.
Up to now, the US has relied largely on oil markets to divvy up resources. Its focus is on promoting an expanding and smooth-running global energy market. China is deploying government wealth - fed by its large trade surplus - to back the expansion of firms like CNOOC.
"To support their economic growth countries like China and India are aggressively moving to secure new energy streams," says David Phillips, an energy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "The US needs to have a comprehensive energy strategy, which is part of our overall national-security strategy."
That assessment is widely shared.
Oil remains the key fuel for transportation, and demand for natural gas - a Unocal emphasis - has been soaring. India and China, the world's most populous nations, are scrambling to ensure the foundation of their expanding middle class. That economic growth suggests that in the near future demand could outstrip supply.
Some argue that, with competition for resources growing, Washington should review - and sometimes restrict - energy deals involving US companies.
Japan's thirst for oil was a catalyst for its war with America 65 years ago, Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy, warned in testimony to Congress last month. Although China has not taken a military approach in its quest for oil, "We ignore at our peril ... the fact the Beijing is engaged in an even more ambitious effort to acquire legal title to energy resources," Mr. Gaffney said in opposing CNOOC's bid for Unocal.
He argues that Congress should adopt a much more rigorous approach to reviewing such business deals - with national-security interests at the forefront.
National-security concerns in this new era could go well beyond China - and beyond the realm of corporate mergers. India, in its own rush for fossil fuels, has proposed the development of a natural-gas pipeline from Iran. This is controversial in Washington, which would like to isolate Iran amid concerns about nuclear proliferation there.
The Middle East, of course, remains the geopolitical center of the oil question. Some two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves are there or in North Africa.
While few see the US-led war in Iraq as fundamentally about oil, neither that effort nor the 1991 Gulf war was undertaken without careful consideration of oil-market implications.
"One of the assumptions, and they were obviously wrong, was that a liberated or democratic Iraq ... could break the back of OPEC," and supply additional oil on world markets, says Frank Verrastro, who specializes in energy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Indeed, given the world's current dependence on Saudi Arabia and other OPEC nations, many experts say large buyers of oil such as the US and China have more to gain from cooperation than rivalry.
"They are countries that have the same common interests we do - diverse energy supplies" to support economic growth, says Amy Myers Jaffe, an energy expert at the James A. Baker III Institute in Houston.
Such cooperation could range from technology development to agreements to take turns when buying oil to fill strategic reserves.
Most important, experts say, it means promoting a free and open world energy market. "When we isolate other countries, it becomes harder to secure their constructive participation in addressing America's needs," says Mr. Phillips of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Among the dangers: nations negotiating bilaterally for pledges of oil, rather than selling and buying it on the open market. State-run firms now control about three-fourths of the world's oil resources.
Energy rivalries could accelerate, if those supplies become the stuff of diplomacy rather than of dollars in the marketplace.
In the long run, experts from Mr. Gaffney to Mr. Verrastro agree it's vital to reduce reliance on oil through steps such as conservation and the development of alternative energy sources.
In the meantime, much of the global economy will still run on oil. In the US, Chevron is now free to pursue its own bid for Unocal. And China will push forward on new energy deals, as it has been for a decade now.
(c) Copyright 2005. The Christian Science Monitor
LOAD-DATE: August 03, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 Nationwide News Pty Limited
The Australian
August 4, 2005 Thursday All-round First Edition
SECTION: FINANCE; Pg. 27
LENGTH: 697 words
HEADLINE: China's lesson in politics
SOURCE: MATP
BYLINE: Catherine Armitage
BODY:
Despite the setback, China is keen to secure its energy needs, writes China correspondent Catherine Armitage
CNOOC's aborted $US18.5 billion ($24 billion) offer for the middle-ranked US oil producer Unocal shows that at this early stage, the success of China's ambition to acquire overseas assets depends as much on its companies' ability to play politics as read the market. The fate of the bid demonstrates that China can be disquietingly ham-fisted at both.
Unocal would have been China's largest overseas takeover ever. The bid sent the strongest signal yet of its serious intent to secure strategic energy supplies abroad.
CNOOC, apparently caught unawares by the ferocious reaction to its bid on Capitol Hill, said efforts in Congress to delay or block any Chinese takeover were "regrettable and unjustified". The company decided against making a higher offer because of the "political environment", according to the statement.
This followed the intervention late last month by the Chinese foreign ministry in a letter to the US Congress demanding that it "correct its mistaken ways of politicising economic and trade issues and stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two countries".
The close ties between the state-owned CNOOC, China's third-largest oil producer, and China's Communist Government were exploited in Chevron's spoiling campaign.
There is no doubt the bid had government backing at the highest levels, and the funding also appeared to enjoy a government subsidy.
The foreign ministry's outrage at the notion of governments interfering in commercial transactions is also ironic considering its energetically successful campaign to stymie BHP Billiton's effort to strike a price with China for its iron ore which more closely reflected commercial reality.
But the market shared none of the Chinese side's disappointment on the failed Unocal bid, delivering a verdict of relief that the company would avoid a heavy debt burden and sending CNOOC shares to a record high on Tuesday.
In an earlier interview with The Washington Post, CNOOC chairman Fu Chengyu declared himself taken aback by the "overreaction" from Washington which he attributed to critics viewing China through a lens of 20 years ago. "I didn't expect so many people would be sensitive to this. We are following a system that was set up by leading Western companies, especially the US. We are walking along a path that they paved," he said.
However, it is not surprising that China should encounter the same kinds of problems that greeted Japanese buyers of US and Australian assets in the 1980s. Nor is it surprising that the proud Chinese defend themselves more vigorously than their more quietly spoken Japanese rivals.
The biggest losers would be Unocal shareholders, followed by Chevron, says Beijing-based energy consultant Han Xiaoping. "They will damage their relations in China." Even if they succeed in the deal, their products won't be welcomed in China, he says.
But he says the Chinese will not be deterred from further purchases of strategic energy resources. "The US can't control such things outside America."
The CNOOC bid eclipsed both Lenovo's acquisition of the IBM personal computer business for $US1.75 billion and Haier's $US1.3 billion bid for fellow appliance maker Maytag, the ailing US producer of Hoover vacuum cleaners.
CNOOC's Fu Chengyu had described the offer as both "clearly superior for Unocal shareholders" and "good for America".
But was it good for China? It came at a time of heightened concern over Chinese influence in the US economy and mounting fears about the US's energy security.
There is also a precedent for the political backlash. Earlier this year, a $US7 billion bid by China Minmetals for Canadian ore producer Noranda failed partly due to an anti-Chinese backlash. Since then the Canadian Government has introduced a bill to block foreign takeovers on national security grounds.
Coverage in the official Chinese media yesterday was relatively restrained, with the government news agency Xinhua merely commenting that the US gained little by stopping the bid.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
The Australian
August 4, 2005 Thursday All-round First Edition
SECTION: FINANCE; Pg. 27
LENGTH: 697 words
HEADLINE: China's lesson in politics
SOURCE: MATP
BYLINE: Catherine Armitage
BODY:
Despite the setback, China is keen to secure its energy needs, writes China correspondent Catherine Armitage
CNOOC's aborted $US18.5 billion ($24 billion) offer for the middle-ranked US oil producer Unocal shows that at this early stage, the success of China's ambition to acquire overseas assets depends as much on its companies' ability to play politics as read the market. The fate of the bid demonstrates that China can be disquietingly ham-fisted at both.
Unocal would have been China's largest overseas takeover ever. The bid sent the strongest signal yet of its serious intent to secure strategic energy supplies abroad.
CNOOC, apparently caught unawares by the ferocious reaction to its bid on Capitol Hill, said efforts in Congress to delay or block any Chinese takeover were "regrettable and unjustified". The company decided against making a higher offer because of the "political environment", according to the statement.
This followed the intervention late last month by the Chinese foreign ministry in a letter to the US Congress demanding that it "correct its mistaken ways of politicising economic and trade issues and stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two countries".
The close ties between the state-owned CNOOC, China's third-largest oil producer, and China's Communist Government were exploited in Chevron's spoiling campaign.
There is no doubt the bid had government backing at the highest levels, and the funding also appeared to enjoy a government subsidy.
The foreign ministry's outrage at the notion of governments interfering in commercial transactions is also ironic considering its energetically successful campaign to stymie BHP Billiton's effort to strike a price with China for its iron ore which more closely reflected commercial reality.
But the market shared none of the Chinese side's disappointment on the failed Unocal bid, delivering a verdict of relief that the company would avoid a heavy debt burden and sending CNOOC shares to a record high on Tuesday.
In an earlier interview with The Washington Post, CNOOC chairman Fu Chengyu declared himself taken aback by the "overreaction" from Washington which he attributed to critics viewing China through a lens of 20 years ago. "I didn't expect so many people would be sensitive to this. We are following a system that was set up by leading Western companies, especially the US. We are walking along a path that they paved," he said.
However, it is not surprising that China should encounter the same kinds of problems that greeted Japanese buyers of US and Australian assets in the 1980s. Nor is it surprising that the proud Chinese defend themselves more vigorously than their more quietly spoken Japanese rivals.
The biggest losers would be Unocal shareholders, followed by Chevron, says Beijing-based energy consultant Han Xiaoping. "They will damage their relations in China." Even if they succeed in the deal, their products won't be welcomed in China, he says.
But he says the Chinese will not be deterred from further purchases of strategic energy resources. "The US can't control such things outside America."
The CNOOC bid eclipsed both Lenovo's acquisition of the IBM personal computer business for $US1.75 billion and Haier's $US1.3 billion bid for fellow appliance maker Maytag, the ailing US producer of Hoover vacuum cleaners.
CNOOC's Fu Chengyu had described the offer as both "clearly superior for Unocal shareholders" and "good for America".
But was it good for China? It came at a time of heightened concern over Chinese influence in the US economy and mounting fears about the US's energy security.
There is also a precedent for the political backlash. Earlier this year, a $US7 billion bid by China Minmetals for Canadian ore producer Noranda failed partly due to an anti-Chinese backlash. Since then the Canadian Government has introduced a bill to block foreign takeovers on national security grounds.
Coverage in the official Chinese media yesterday was relatively restrained, with the government news agency Xinhua merely commenting that the US gained little by stopping the bid.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
LexisNexis(TM) Academic - Document
Copyright 2005 Nationwide News Pty Limited
The Australian
August 4, 2005 Thursday All-round Country Edition
SECTION: FINANCE; Pg. 27
LENGTH: 796 words
HEADLINE: CNOOC pays a high price for politics in Unocal takeover bid
SOURCE: MATP
BYLINE: Catherine Armitage
BODY:
Despite the setback, China is determined to secure its energy needs, writes China correspondent Catherine Armitage
CNOOC's aborted $US18.5 billion ($24 billion) offer for the middle-ranked US oil producer Unocal shows that at this early stage, the success of China's ambition to acquire overseas assets depends as much on its companies' ability to play politics as read the market.
The sorry fate of the bid demonstrates that China can be disquietingly ham-fisted at both.
Unocal would have been China's largest overseas takeover ever. The bid sent the strongest signal yet of its serious intent to secure strategic energy supplies abroad.
CNOOC, apparently caught unawares by the ferocious reaction to its bid on Capitol Hill, said efforts in Congress to delay or block any Chinese takeover were "regrettable and unjustified". The company decided against making a higher offer because of the "political environment", according to the statement.
This followed the astonishing intervention late last month by the Chinese foreign ministry in a letter to the US Congress demanding that it "correct its mistaken ways of politicising economic and trade issues and stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two countries".
The close ties between the state-owned CNOOC, China's third-largest oil producer, and China's Communist Government were successfully exploited in Chevron's spoiling campaign.
There is no doubt the bid had government backing at the highest levels, and the funding also appeared to enjoy a government subsidy.
The foreign ministry's outrage at the notion of governments interfering in commercial transactions is also ironic considering its energetically successful campaign to stymie BHP Billiton's effort to strike a price with China for its iron ore which more closely reflected commercial reality.
But the market shared none of the Chinese side's disappointment on the failed Unocal bid, delivering a verdict of relief that the company would avoid a heavy debt burden by sending CNOOC shares to a record high on Tuesday.
In an earlier interview with The Washington Post CNOOC's chairman Fu Chengyu declared himself taken aback by the "overreaction" from Washington which he attributed to critics viewing China through a lens of 20 years ago.
"I didn't expect so many people would be sensitive to this. We are following a system that was set up by leading Western companies, especially the United States. We are walking along a path that they paved," he said.
However, it is not surprising that China should encounter the same kind of problems which greeted Japanese purchasers of US and Australian assets in the 1980s. Nor is it surprising that the proud Chinese defend themselves more vigorously than their more quietly-spoken Japanese rivals.
The biggest losers would be Unocal shareholders, followed by Chevron, insisted Beijing-based private energy consultant Han Xiaoping yesterday.
"They will damage their relations in China." Even if they succeed in the deal, their products won't be welcomed in China in the future, he said.
But he said the Chinese would not be deterred from further purchases of strategic energy resources. "The US can't control such things outside America," he said.
The CNOOC bid eclipsed both Lenovo's acquisition of the IBM personal computer business for $US1.75 billion and Haier's $US1.3 billion bid for fellow appliance maker Maytag, the ailing American producer of Hoover vacuum cleaners.
CNOOC's Fu Chengyu had described the offer as both "clearly superior for Unocal shareholders" and "good for America".
But was it good for China?
It came at a time of heightened concern over Chinese influence in the US economy and mounting fears about the US's energy security.
There was also precedent for the political backlash it sparked. Earlier in the year, a $US7 billion bid by China Minmetals for Canadian ore producer Noranda failed partly due an anti-Chinese backlash which has since seen the Canadian Government introduce a bill meant to block foreign takeovers on national security grounds.
Coverage in the official Chinese media yesterday was relatively restrained, with the government news agency Xinhua merely commenting that the US gained little by stopping the bid. Internet bulletin boards were feistier, with one typical posting proclaiming: "it's a waste of time to deal with the US. They are more like hooligans and less democratic than any other country!"
The experience would cause Chinese companies to be "more sober-minded" when considering their internationalisation strategies", said Ministry of Commerce researcher Mei Xinyu. He said companies needed to spend more time assessing the political risks of overseas bids.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
The Australian
August 4, 2005 Thursday All-round Country Edition
SECTION: FINANCE; Pg. 27
LENGTH: 796 words
HEADLINE: CNOOC pays a high price for politics in Unocal takeover bid
SOURCE: MATP
BYLINE: Catherine Armitage
BODY:
Despite the setback, China is determined to secure its energy needs, writes China correspondent Catherine Armitage
CNOOC's aborted $US18.5 billion ($24 billion) offer for the middle-ranked US oil producer Unocal shows that at this early stage, the success of China's ambition to acquire overseas assets depends as much on its companies' ability to play politics as read the market.
The sorry fate of the bid demonstrates that China can be disquietingly ham-fisted at both.
Unocal would have been China's largest overseas takeover ever. The bid sent the strongest signal yet of its serious intent to secure strategic energy supplies abroad.
CNOOC, apparently caught unawares by the ferocious reaction to its bid on Capitol Hill, said efforts in Congress to delay or block any Chinese takeover were "regrettable and unjustified". The company decided against making a higher offer because of the "political environment", according to the statement.
This followed the astonishing intervention late last month by the Chinese foreign ministry in a letter to the US Congress demanding that it "correct its mistaken ways of politicising economic and trade issues and stop interfering in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two countries".
The close ties between the state-owned CNOOC, China's third-largest oil producer, and China's Communist Government were successfully exploited in Chevron's spoiling campaign.
There is no doubt the bid had government backing at the highest levels, and the funding also appeared to enjoy a government subsidy.
The foreign ministry's outrage at the notion of governments interfering in commercial transactions is also ironic considering its energetically successful campaign to stymie BHP Billiton's effort to strike a price with China for its iron ore which more closely reflected commercial reality.
But the market shared none of the Chinese side's disappointment on the failed Unocal bid, delivering a verdict of relief that the company would avoid a heavy debt burden by sending CNOOC shares to a record high on Tuesday.
In an earlier interview with The Washington Post CNOOC's chairman Fu Chengyu declared himself taken aback by the "overreaction" from Washington which he attributed to critics viewing China through a lens of 20 years ago.
"I didn't expect so many people would be sensitive to this. We are following a system that was set up by leading Western companies, especially the United States. We are walking along a path that they paved," he said.
However, it is not surprising that China should encounter the same kind of problems which greeted Japanese purchasers of US and Australian assets in the 1980s. Nor is it surprising that the proud Chinese defend themselves more vigorously than their more quietly-spoken Japanese rivals.
The biggest losers would be Unocal shareholders, followed by Chevron, insisted Beijing-based private energy consultant Han Xiaoping yesterday.
"They will damage their relations in China." Even if they succeed in the deal, their products won't be welcomed in China in the future, he said.
But he said the Chinese would not be deterred from further purchases of strategic energy resources. "The US can't control such things outside America," he said.
The CNOOC bid eclipsed both Lenovo's acquisition of the IBM personal computer business for $US1.75 billion and Haier's $US1.3 billion bid for fellow appliance maker Maytag, the ailing American producer of Hoover vacuum cleaners.
CNOOC's Fu Chengyu had described the offer as both "clearly superior for Unocal shareholders" and "good for America".
But was it good for China?
It came at a time of heightened concern over Chinese influence in the US economy and mounting fears about the US's energy security.
There was also precedent for the political backlash it sparked. Earlier in the year, a $US7 billion bid by China Minmetals for Canadian ore producer Noranda failed partly due an anti-Chinese backlash which has since seen the Canadian Government introduce a bill meant to block foreign takeovers on national security grounds.
Coverage in the official Chinese media yesterday was relatively restrained, with the government news agency Xinhua merely commenting that the US gained little by stopping the bid. Internet bulletin boards were feistier, with one typical posting proclaiming: "it's a waste of time to deal with the US. They are more like hooligans and less democratic than any other country!"
The experience would cause Chinese companies to be "more sober-minded" when considering their internationalisation strategies", said Ministry of Commerce researcher Mei Xinyu. He said companies needed to spend more time assessing the political risks of overseas bids.
LOAD-DATE: August 3, 2005
Wednesday, August 03, 2005
bhagwati
Not a Flat World
By Jagdish Bhagwati
1,743 words
4 August 2005
The Asian Wall Street Journal
A7
English
(c) 2005 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. To see the edition in which this article appeared, click here http://awsj.com.hk/factiva-ns
Metaphors matter. They define how one sees reality, as when the phenomenon of skilled emigration turns into the problem of "brain drain", evoking the image of a leaky faucet that few can regard with equanimity.
The phenomenon of globalization has prompted competing metaphors. The prolific Thomas Friedman talks everywhere, and writes in his latest bestseller, of globalization being marked by a "flat world". Writing almost a decade earlier in the New Republic, I advanced an alternative -- and less demotic -- metaphor, that globalization was characterized by "kaleidoscopic comparative advantage." Let me explain why the two metaphors diverge dramatically and carry startlingly different policy implications -- and why Mr. Friedman gets it wrong.
One cannot but be aware that countries face intensified competition in the world economy: a phenomenon that forced itself on our attention long before China and India began to loom large in fevered imaginations. Interest rates are less far apart than earlier: a continual opening and global integration of financial markets has occurred. Multinationals now consider many alternative locations for final assembly and to manufacture components, so their know-how becomes available in effect to several likely locations. Access to other knowledge is more diffused than ever before: student enrolments in foreign countries have grown, better educational institutions have opened in some developing countries, and the demand for skilled professionals has led to shifts in immigration policies to draw them in to countries that have excess demand for these skills. Producers in distant places can now access markets thanks to the Internet, to the point where many talk melodramatically of the "death of distance" and I say, with tongue partly in cheek, that "geography is history."
Yet it is wrong to infer from this that the world has gone "flat," and that there is no comparative advantage left. The notion of a flat world is as wrong metaphorically now as it was when Copernicus showed it to be literally wrong. To be more precise than his metaphor, Mr. Friedman has on his mind not the world but a large fraction of it -- India and China. He believes that the gradient which the citizens of these countries had to climb to get to America's shores and outcompete the U.S. has now disappeared, yielding to a level playing field that America ignores at its peril.
But he takes too literally his friends in Bangalore. They flex their muscles on IT the way Popeye does on spinach, and tell him that some Indians can now do anything that the Americans can do. But it is a leap to translate this into the proposition that several Indians will now do everything that the Americans do. Then again, there is Intel Chairman Craig Barrett talking about 300 million Indians and Chinese professionals who will hurtle down the flat road. And Clyde Prestowitz, in his latest book, carries the argument to its logical conclusion with the American nightmare that there will be three billion Indians and Chinese capitalists soon down that road.
In truth, the flat road is not flat at all. Take the supply of educated manpower in India. Of the numbers in the age cohort for college education, only about 6 % make it to college. Of these, only two-thirds graduate, and just a small fraction can read English. Of these, a further fraction can speak it; and of these, a smaller fraction still can speak it in a way which you and I can understand. The truth of the matter, therefore, is that even for the call-answer and back-office services, the numbers who will compete are only a very small fraction of the numbers being thrown about. India's huge size and the dazzle of the few Institutes of Technology are totally misleading. The road is not flat; the gradient becomes steep as wages rise for those who can manage while others cannot qualify.
Again, just think back on why China has not managed to break into IT the way it has on a range of manufactures, while India has. Surely, that has to do with the fact that India is democratic and hence IT can flourish. By contrast, the CP (the Communist Party) is not compatible with the PC: authoritarian regimes are fearful of IT -- a gigantic pothole in the road.
Such fears of a flat road were rampant when many thought that Japan would be a fearsome Godzilla, trampling over our activities all around. But then it turned out that the Japanese were real klutzes in the financial sector. They still are. And remember that while the Chinese and Indians have lower wages, America has better infrastructure, stronger venture capital markets, an ability to attract talent from around the world, and a culture of inventiveness. Comparative advantage persists; the road is simply not flat.
The flat road metaphor is, therefore, both inapt and mistakenly alarming. The real problem in the increasingly globalized economy is rather that most producers in traded activities -- an expanding set because services have become steadily more tradeable -- face intensified competition. A specific producer here will find rival suppliers stealing up on him from somewhere, whether Portugal, Brazil or Malaysia, indeed from sources which may not include India and China. In consequence, almost no producer is truly relaxed. I was at a Parents' Day at my daughter's camp in 1991 in Vermont and talked to a father producing chips in Silicon Valley. He lamented, as did Bill Clinton soon after, that competition from Japan and South Korea was fierce (and wicked). So I turned to another dad listening in on us and asked him what he did. "I grow mushrooms", he said. "Ah, you must be happier," I remarked. He replied, tearing at his hair: "Oh no, Taiwan is killing me!"
Gone are Adam Smith's days, when no one in Haifa lost sleep because Edinburgh could grow oranges in greenhouses: the cost differences would be substantial. Comparative advantage was "thick", shielded by big buffers. This is no longer so: not predictably from India and China, but almost certainly from somewhere. Hence I use the metaphor: "kaleidoscopic comparative advantage". Today, you have it; but in our state of knife-edge equilibrium, you may lose it tomorrow and regain it the day after. Boeing might win today, Airbus tomorrow, and then Boeing may be back in play again. It is as if the design of trade patterns that you see now gives way to another, as if a kaleidoscope had turned.
In this situation of flux and change, we see the Friedman metaphor turned on its head. Faced with fierce competition, firms and unions often seek to iron out whatever differences they can so that the cost conditions for foreign rivals are brought closer to what they are for oneself. Producer (including labor) interests lobby to narrow (if not equalize) as far as politically possible the cost advantages that accrue to rivals from differences in all sorts of domestic policies and institutions. They try, through political agitation, to shield themselves.
Hence the massive demand for "fair trade," a seductive phrase that has become a principal ally of protectionism. So you see demands for enhanced labor and environmental standards in trade treaties, not as altruism but as a way to reduce the competitiveness of rivals. This game cannot be played in the multilateral trade negotiations because countries like India and Brazil see through it. But it can be played when smaller fry are involved in bilateral FTAs: a hegemonic power like the U.S., captured in turn by fearful lobbies seeking to flatten the world, can get the minnows to do almost anything that it wants.
The real answer cannot be to seek to flatten the world, as this flies in the face of commonsense and good economic sense as well. Except for a few universal principles, diversity of labor and environmental standards is legitimate and forcing convergence is simply another act of high-handedness by a "selfish hegemon" pretending to be an "altruistic hegemon."
But even if plans to flatten the world thus were to succeed, they cannot but leave out the vast numbers of bumps and gradients that simply cannot be steamrolled: the world cannot be flattened, frankly. And so the proper response to flux is to manage it. What does this imply? Evidently, America must strengthen the Adjustment Assistance Programs, which it has done from 1962 when they were introduced at the time of the Kennedy Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. They must be rapidly enlarged, especially to include service workers.
But that is not enough. The U.S. also needs to ensure that when a radiologist in Boston loses his work to one in Bombay, he is able to retrain for the new skilled medical jobs that arise daily as new problems arrive: e.g. the obesity epidemic and the associated diabetes outbreak. In fact, new medical employment will multiply in cosmetic surgery with an ageing population as nose jobs, silicon transplants and chin tucks capture the female half and spread to the male half as well. The radiologist may be able to find for himself the training to get new jobs closest to his skills; but it is clear that more aged radiologists will need more assistance and that professional societies such as the American Medical Association could assist in this task by defining optimal transition paths from the old to the new jobs.
Yet it is not enough to say that America must educate its people to stay ahead of the curve. Yes, that is important: But it is also necessary to look at the content of the education. In a world of kaleidoscopic flux, an American aeronautical engineer in Boeing may well find that the industry has suddenly lost to Airbus, and that he must move into automobile engineering, where the Honda and Toyota transplants may be expanding. It is important that his training provide a larger share of general engineering skills and less of specialized ones. And thus, instead of succumbing to the panic of the flat world metaphor, we need to embrace the kaleidoscopic metaphor of flux and redefine our institutional and policy response to make the best use of the opportunities today in the globalized world.
---
Mr. Bhagwati, university professor of Economics and Law at Columbia, and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "In Defense of Globalization" (Oxford, 2004).
asj lessons
Lessons From the Cnooc-Unocal Saga
By Philip Andrews-Speed and Ma Xin
909 words
4 August 2005
The Asian Wall Street Journal
A7
English
(c) 2005 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. To see the edition in which this article appeared, click here http://awsj.com.hk/factiva-ns
As the directors of Cnooc lick their wounds after this fight they have a number of lessons to ponder, as does the Chinese government.
Cnooc had been the slowest among the three Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) to move into the international arena. Its assets are limited to Indonesia and Australia. The planned takeover of Unocal would, at one bound, have allowed it to satisfy a number of ambitions: to expand its size and its geographic scope to take it into the rank of medium-sized international oil companies, and to build on its regional gas interests in Southeast Asia. Where the other Chinese NOCs expanded in a piecemeal fashion, Cnooc sought to reach its goal in one bound.
This ambition became unstuck, not through faulty commercial judgment, but through a failure to adequately assess the political furore that would be stirred in Washington by threatening the concerns of both the anti-China and the energy-security lobbies. In hindsight, it would be interesting to know how much attention was spent by the Cnooc board and their advisers in assessing this risk.
These political machinations will have reinforced the assessment of Cnooc and the two other Chinese NOCs, Sinopec and China National Petroleum Corporation, that the international energy world is highly politicized -- not just in developing and transition countries, but in market economies as well. The obvious conclusion from that is that, in future, it makes more sense to grow in a more incremental manner, buying up smaller companies, parts of companies or individual production assets. Cnooc's next target is likely to be much smaller. Indeed there are already reports that it is considering bidding for the British gas company BG, which has extensive assets in Central and Southeast Asia.
At the same time Cnooc's board might want to review the way in which it carries out such bids. The overt backing of the Chinese government can be seen as a liability rather than an asset. Reliance on financing from state banks and from the parent company was used as evidence of direct government support and provided the basis for the argument relating to unfair competition in the battle with Chevron -- despite Cnooc's insistence that the terms were strictly commercial.
The Chinese government needs to review both its overseas energy strategy and industrial policy. The drive for Chinese NOCs to gain access to overseas oil and gas production lies at the heart of Beijing's energy-security policy. This episode with Unocal is the most visible example of a failure to properly implement this strategy. CNPC had previously been repelled in its bid for Russia's Sibneft, and Sinopec and Cnooc were pre-empted by partners in their attempt to buy British Gas's share of the giant Kashagan field in Kazakhstan. But none of these contests were played out in such public view as the bid for Unocal.
The Chinese government is unlikely to change its overseas energy strategy in response to this disappointment, but the realization will start to dawn that the international petroleum arena is risky and unpredictable. As many international oil companies know, the best laid plans can go awry, sometimes with huge costs. The Chinese government and its NOCs are undergoing a rapid and intense learning process on risk assessment and risk management.
The more subtle lessons relate to the relationship between the Chinese government and its NOCs, the structure of the NOCs, and the nature and extent of government ownership of the NOCs. At present the Chinese government retains 100% ownership of each of the three NOCs. Each has a corporatized subsidiary of which only a minority of shares are publicly owned; 30% in the case of Cnooc It may now be time for the Chinese government to consider raising the percentage of traded shares so that it becomes a minority shareholder, allowing the company to both behave and appear more like an independent agent.
Another issue for the Chinese government to consider is that consumer governments, which are China's competitors for energy resources, are as important to have as friends as producer governments. During the last few years, successive Chinese leaders have courted the governments of the world's oil producing nations, large and small. It may be time to spend as much effort on the governments of the major oil-importing nations, both in the West, and in South Asia and East Asia.
Cnooc's bold bid for Unocal has attracted global attention, not least from the NOCs of other countries. Developments in recent years had suggested that NOCs have a competitive advantage over international oil companies (IOCs). Political connections, easy access to cheap capital and overenthusiasm combine to give them what can be seen as an "unfair" advantage. This advantage may be further enhanced by the tendency of some NOCs to treat the issue of reputational risk with disdain, by invest in countries which IOCs dare not touch. What the Cnooc-Unocal episode has shown is that, in some fields, the IOCs still retain the advantage.
---
Mr. Andrews-Speed is director of the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at the University of Dundee, Scotland, and author of "Energy Policy and Regulation in the People's Republic of China" (Kluwer Law International, 2004). Ms. Ma is a researcher and doctoral candidate at the Centre.
Document AWSJ000020050803e1840001y
asj editoria
REVIEW & OUTLOOK (Editorial)
China Paranoia
394 words
4 August 2005
The Asian Wall Street Journal
A7
English
(c) 2005 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. To see the edition in which this article appeared, click here http://awsj.com.hk/factiva-ns
The Red-scare protectionists in the U.S. Congress won a victory of sorts this week when the Chinese-owned oil company, Cnooc Ltd., withdrew its offer to purchase Unocal for $18.4 billion. But at whose expense? We suspect the big losers are not so much the Chinese but rather Unocal shareholders, who will have to take a lower price for their shares.
Cnooc's offer was about $1 billion higher than what American-owned Chevron Corp. has put on the table. Had it not been for six weeks of congressional jaw-boning against the Cnooc offer, there's a strong likelihood a bidding war with Chevron might have prompted Cnooc to raise the price further.
This awkward affair follows on the Bush Administration's misguided demands that China revalue the yuan and the tariff measures directed at Chinese imports introduced in both Houses of Congress. So we now have a fissure in U.S.-China relations at a time when $250 billion a year in two-way trade flows are unambiguously enriching both nations.
The mystery is why there is a Washington celebration over Cnooc's stand-down. To be sure, China is a nation with inexcusably suppressed political freedom and way too much state intrusion in the economy. We too were troubled that Cnooc is quasi-state owned. But it is a good thing for Americans if the Chinese use their increasing economic clout and the dollars they accumulate from trade to bid up the value of U.S. assets.
And since there is one global price for oil, whether Unocal's resources are owned by a Chinese or American firm has no bearing on the price Americans pay for gas. China, like the U.S., is a major importer of oil; Cnooc would have had every incentive to pump oil to keep it on the market.
A zero-sum neurosis has taken hold on Capitol Hill that the Chinese, with their double-digit rates of economic growth, are creating too much wealth and that all this wealth is coming at America's expense. The real lesson of China's economic miracle of the past decade is that capitalism works. The lesson of the failed Cnooc deal with Unocal is that there are still too many mercantilists in Washington.
Document AWSJ000020050803e1840001r
Tuesday, August 02, 2005
???-??-???????:?????????
???-??-???????:?????????退出并购优尼科：中海油得到了什么？
新华社记者 常志鹏
2005年08月03日00:58 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
记者从中海油获悉，北京时间8月2日， 中国海洋石油有限公司宣布已撤回其对优尼科公司的收购要约。此时中海油报价仍然超出雪佛龙公司目前竞价约10亿美元。
进与退：选择曾一波三折
中海油收购优尼科的事情，走过了半年多的历程，可谓一波三折。
今年年初，美国第九大石油公司优尼科挂牌出售。这家公司在泰国、印尼、孟加拉国等亚洲国家拥有良好的油气区块资源。近年来优尼科由于经营不善等原因导致连年亏损，并申请破产。
优尼科挂牌后，中海油有意对优尼科进行收购。同时对此表示出浓厚兴趣的还包括壳牌、戴文能源公司和西方石油公司在内的国际石油巨头们。
３月份，中海油开始与优尼科高层接触。并向优尼科提交了“无约束力报价”。优尼科当时的市值还不到百亿美元，但很快，国际原油价格飙升，优尼科股价迅速上涨，中海油内部对这一收购看法出现分歧。在中海油意见还没有统一之时，美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙4月宣布以160亿美元加股票的形式收购优尼科，收购计划包括25%的现金(44亿美元)、75%的股票交换，以及接收优尼科的16亿美元债务。
6月10日，美国联邦贸易委员会批准雪佛龙的收购计划，此时，中海油失去了第一次竞购机会。
但是，根据美国法律规定，该交易还需要美国证券交易委员会（SEC）批准，只有在批准之后优尼科董事会才能向股东正式发函,在此后30天由全体股东表决。实际上，中海油还有最后一次机会，即在发函之前提出新的收购方案，若被优尼科董事会认可，就有收购成功的可能。
7月20日，优尼科董事会决定接受雪佛龙公司加价之后的报价，并推荐给股东大会。据悉，由于雪佛龙提高了报价，优尼科决定维持原来推荐不变。
对此，中海油深表遗憾。但中海油认为185亿美元的全现金报价仍然具有竞争力，优于雪佛龙现金加股票的出价。中海油表示：为了维护股东利益，公司无意提高原报价。
得与失：此番收购值不值？
在中海油宣布参与收购之初，有能源领域的专家从优尼科的资源、中海油的资金及发展战略提出了三大疑问，记者在关注并购过程时曾小心求证相关问题的结论。
优尼科有多少资源？
从有关资料来看，有着115年历史的优尼科在全球石油市场版图上，规模并不算大，但其在东南亚、墨西哥湾、里海等地区拥有大量优质油气储备。然而对中海油来说，收购优尼科，则更看中其很大一部分资源是天然气。优尼科有约一半的油气储备位于东南亚的天然气田。该公司还持有阿塞拜疆一个大型油田10%的股份，它在美国和加拿大的油气储量为5.57亿桶油当量。
中海油在LNG(液化天然气)项目方面享有得天独厚的优势，能够很好地消化优尼科的资源。
中海油涉及的LNG项目有7个，广东、福建的项目已经在建，上海、宁波的已经得到国家发改委批复，而秦皇岛、温州和海南的项目则已经跟当地政府签署了协议。凭借其在LNG上的优势，中海油收购优尼科后能够比较容易与其进行整合。
中国能源网信息总监韩晓平说，“由于优尼科在泰国、印尼、孟加拉国等亚洲国家拥有良好的油气区块资源，中海油收购优尼科后能够将其在亚洲的资源与中海油原先在印尼和澳大利亚的油田进行产业结构整合，并由协同效应带来成本节约。”
中海油有多少资金？
据了解，中海油在1999年上市之初市值只有人民币60亿元，而现在资产总值已经达到225亿美元。
优尼科的资源中有大量的天然气资源，没有落实下游市场。如果两家公司合并，就等于这些资源马上可以成为最有价值的资产，其市值将会迅速上升，可以在很短的时间之内归还兼并的融资，使其债务状况恢复正常。
至于收购资金，是上市公司承担主要部分，母公司承担其余部分。上市公司将通过商业途径融资，协助中海油收购的高盛和JP摩根公司愿意提供收购的全部融资，中海油还将安排国内工商银行同时参与融资。
中海油总经理傅成玉表示：这个收购完全按照商业模式操作，不需要政府出资，中海油有能力独立消化。中海油一直在依托国际资本市场成长。
中海油有怎样的战略？
虽然中海油所要收购的是一个美国公司。但中海油的兴趣，似乎并不在美国土地上的石油资源。
目前，国际业务已占到优尼科天然气和石油开采量的一半以上，而国际业务的大部分又集中在东南亚。自上世纪70年代以来，优尼科逐渐将业务重心向这一区域转移。目前公司在东南亚地区的泰国、缅甸和印尼拥有丰富的油气资源，其中缅甸沿海的油气田拥有超过1400亿立方米的天然气储量，并且已经建设了油气运输的管道基础设施。
有推测说，中海油有意于优尼科的亚洲资产，并已要求投资银行研究整体收购优尼科随后出售其美国资产的可能性。
在上市后的2002至2004年度，中海油进行了总计15.53亿美元的6次跨国收购。除在哈萨克斯坦北里海油田收购未成，其余5次成功的收购都在亚太地区的印尼和澳大利亚。
中海油在以上5笔收购之后，收购优尼科在东南亚的这批油气储量资源。这种交易在空间上的密集分布，使人相信中海油在有意营造一个区域性网络。
这是中海油的企业战略。
成与败：中国企业得到了什么？
从有关方面获得的信息显示，一家美国民意调查公司，每天抽样调查500位美国人对收购优尼科的反映。其中3天的调查结果显示，绝大多数美国民众并不知道中海油，甚至很多人也不知道优尼科，原因是优尼科的资产主要在海外，在美国影响有限。在抽样调查中，当受访者被问道“是否同意将优尼科出售给中国”时，52％的人反对，仅有12％的人支持；当继续被问道“如果这项并购将不会造成美国人失业”时，在加州30％继续反对，47％的人转为支持。而全国反对的人为35％，支持的人为41％；调查员提出第三个问题“如果兼并后在美国的石油资源将继续供应美国”后，反对的人只剩下20％，而支持者高达60％。
尽管在美国民间中海油的支持率在增高，然而令众多国内外能源领域专家学者不解的是，在美国政府，本该是一个双赢的、简单的企业并购行为，却被无端政治化了。法国《解放报》发表的文章说，中国海洋石油总公司公开出价收购美国优尼科公司一事再次唤醒美国的反华阵线。一些国会议员已经提出应该以国家安全为由阻止这一收购行动。马里兰大学的一位经济学教授指责说：“中国人显然已经决定到美国投资。他们的目的是获取技术，扩大影响力并削弱反对他们的力量：他们是想腐蚀美国的政治制度。”
美国《纽约时报》发表的文章认为，大多数并购案都可以由价格来决定：出价最高的竞购者获胜。但从华盛顿的强烈反应来看，优尼科并购案可没有这么简单。如今，石油价格达到每桶60美元，能源储备日益升值，而美国也对自己的石油和天然气资源感到担心。优尼科公司的外国竞购者正是在这个时候意外出现的。与此同时，美国政府需要在贸易和货币问题上与中国合作，它对中国与日俱增的经济实力也感到越来越担心。
面对这些，中海油表示，这项交易不会对美国石油和天然气市场带来任何不利影响，因为优尼科在美国境内所生产的石油和天然气将继续在美国市场销售。优尼科美国油气资产的产量只占全美石油和天然气消耗量的不到１％。
其实，中国和美国的经济依存程度比通常想象的更高，根据美国海关统计，2004年中美双边贸易额为2314.2亿美元，同比增长28%，中国成为美国第五大出口市场，第二大进口市场。在全球化的今天，贸易使国家之间紧密融合，美国并不会因为阻止中海油的收购而得到什么特别的好处，所以中海油竞购优尼科不是对中国企业的考验，而是对美国政府智慧的考验。
有关国际问题观察员认为，从合作共赢的角度，中国需要发展，就需要石油，如果中国只是在市场上购买，而不参与到增加石油供应的投资，以及不承担相应的责任和风险，石油的价格将无法控制，资源供应国和企业将会一步一步提高油价和LNG的价格。对于中国将会受到石油价格上涨所带来的压力，但是中国能源体系中对于石油的依赖程度远远低于美国。
（新华社北京８月２日电）
新华社记者 常志鹏
2005年08月03日00:58 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
记者从中海油获悉，北京时间8月2日， 中国海洋石油有限公司宣布已撤回其对优尼科公司的收购要约。此时中海油报价仍然超出雪佛龙公司目前竞价约10亿美元。
进与退：选择曾一波三折
中海油收购优尼科的事情，走过了半年多的历程，可谓一波三折。
今年年初，美国第九大石油公司优尼科挂牌出售。这家公司在泰国、印尼、孟加拉国等亚洲国家拥有良好的油气区块资源。近年来优尼科由于经营不善等原因导致连年亏损，并申请破产。
优尼科挂牌后，中海油有意对优尼科进行收购。同时对此表示出浓厚兴趣的还包括壳牌、戴文能源公司和西方石油公司在内的国际石油巨头们。
３月份，中海油开始与优尼科高层接触。并向优尼科提交了“无约束力报价”。优尼科当时的市值还不到百亿美元，但很快，国际原油价格飙升，优尼科股价迅速上涨，中海油内部对这一收购看法出现分歧。在中海油意见还没有统一之时，美国第二大石油公司雪佛龙4月宣布以160亿美元加股票的形式收购优尼科，收购计划包括25%的现金(44亿美元)、75%的股票交换，以及接收优尼科的16亿美元债务。
6月10日，美国联邦贸易委员会批准雪佛龙的收购计划，此时，中海油失去了第一次竞购机会。
但是，根据美国法律规定，该交易还需要美国证券交易委员会（SEC）批准，只有在批准之后优尼科董事会才能向股东正式发函,在此后30天由全体股东表决。实际上，中海油还有最后一次机会，即在发函之前提出新的收购方案，若被优尼科董事会认可，就有收购成功的可能。
7月20日，优尼科董事会决定接受雪佛龙公司加价之后的报价，并推荐给股东大会。据悉，由于雪佛龙提高了报价，优尼科决定维持原来推荐不变。
对此，中海油深表遗憾。但中海油认为185亿美元的全现金报价仍然具有竞争力，优于雪佛龙现金加股票的出价。中海油表示：为了维护股东利益，公司无意提高原报价。
得与失：此番收购值不值？
在中海油宣布参与收购之初，有能源领域的专家从优尼科的资源、中海油的资金及发展战略提出了三大疑问，记者在关注并购过程时曾小心求证相关问题的结论。
优尼科有多少资源？
从有关资料来看，有着115年历史的优尼科在全球石油市场版图上，规模并不算大，但其在东南亚、墨西哥湾、里海等地区拥有大量优质油气储备。然而对中海油来说，收购优尼科，则更看中其很大一部分资源是天然气。优尼科有约一半的油气储备位于东南亚的天然气田。该公司还持有阿塞拜疆一个大型油田10%的股份，它在美国和加拿大的油气储量为5.57亿桶油当量。
中海油在LNG(液化天然气)项目方面享有得天独厚的优势，能够很好地消化优尼科的资源。
中海油涉及的LNG项目有7个，广东、福建的项目已经在建，上海、宁波的已经得到国家发改委批复，而秦皇岛、温州和海南的项目则已经跟当地政府签署了协议。凭借其在LNG上的优势，中海油收购优尼科后能够比较容易与其进行整合。
中国能源网信息总监韩晓平说，“由于优尼科在泰国、印尼、孟加拉国等亚洲国家拥有良好的油气区块资源，中海油收购优尼科后能够将其在亚洲的资源与中海油原先在印尼和澳大利亚的油田进行产业结构整合，并由协同效应带来成本节约。”
中海油有多少资金？
据了解，中海油在1999年上市之初市值只有人民币60亿元，而现在资产总值已经达到225亿美元。
优尼科的资源中有大量的天然气资源，没有落实下游市场。如果两家公司合并，就等于这些资源马上可以成为最有价值的资产，其市值将会迅速上升，可以在很短的时间之内归还兼并的融资，使其债务状况恢复正常。
至于收购资金，是上市公司承担主要部分，母公司承担其余部分。上市公司将通过商业途径融资，协助中海油收购的高盛和JP摩根公司愿意提供收购的全部融资，中海油还将安排国内工商银行同时参与融资。
中海油总经理傅成玉表示：这个收购完全按照商业模式操作，不需要政府出资，中海油有能力独立消化。中海油一直在依托国际资本市场成长。
中海油有怎样的战略？
虽然中海油所要收购的是一个美国公司。但中海油的兴趣，似乎并不在美国土地上的石油资源。
目前，国际业务已占到优尼科天然气和石油开采量的一半以上，而国际业务的大部分又集中在东南亚。自上世纪70年代以来，优尼科逐渐将业务重心向这一区域转移。目前公司在东南亚地区的泰国、缅甸和印尼拥有丰富的油气资源，其中缅甸沿海的油气田拥有超过1400亿立方米的天然气储量，并且已经建设了油气运输的管道基础设施。
有推测说，中海油有意于优尼科的亚洲资产，并已要求投资银行研究整体收购优尼科随后出售其美国资产的可能性。
在上市后的2002至2004年度，中海油进行了总计15.53亿美元的6次跨国收购。除在哈萨克斯坦北里海油田收购未成，其余5次成功的收购都在亚太地区的印尼和澳大利亚。
中海油在以上5笔收购之后，收购优尼科在东南亚的这批油气储量资源。这种交易在空间上的密集分布，使人相信中海油在有意营造一个区域性网络。
这是中海油的企业战略。
成与败：中国企业得到了什么？
从有关方面获得的信息显示，一家美国民意调查公司，每天抽样调查500位美国人对收购优尼科的反映。其中3天的调查结果显示，绝大多数美国民众并不知道中海油，甚至很多人也不知道优尼科，原因是优尼科的资产主要在海外，在美国影响有限。在抽样调查中，当受访者被问道“是否同意将优尼科出售给中国”时，52％的人反对，仅有12％的人支持；当继续被问道“如果这项并购将不会造成美国人失业”时，在加州30％继续反对，47％的人转为支持。而全国反对的人为35％，支持的人为41％；调查员提出第三个问题“如果兼并后在美国的石油资源将继续供应美国”后，反对的人只剩下20％，而支持者高达60％。
尽管在美国民间中海油的支持率在增高，然而令众多国内外能源领域专家学者不解的是，在美国政府，本该是一个双赢的、简单的企业并购行为，却被无端政治化了。法国《解放报》发表的文章说，中国海洋石油总公司公开出价收购美国优尼科公司一事再次唤醒美国的反华阵线。一些国会议员已经提出应该以国家安全为由阻止这一收购行动。马里兰大学的一位经济学教授指责说：“中国人显然已经决定到美国投资。他们的目的是获取技术，扩大影响力并削弱反对他们的力量：他们是想腐蚀美国的政治制度。”
美国《纽约时报》发表的文章认为，大多数并购案都可以由价格来决定：出价最高的竞购者获胜。但从华盛顿的强烈反应来看，优尼科并购案可没有这么简单。如今，石油价格达到每桶60美元，能源储备日益升值，而美国也对自己的石油和天然气资源感到担心。优尼科公司的外国竞购者正是在这个时候意外出现的。与此同时，美国政府需要在贸易和货币问题上与中国合作，它对中国与日俱增的经济实力也感到越来越担心。
面对这些，中海油表示，这项交易不会对美国石油和天然气市场带来任何不利影响，因为优尼科在美国境内所生产的石油和天然气将继续在美国市场销售。优尼科美国油气资产的产量只占全美石油和天然气消耗量的不到１％。
其实，中国和美国的经济依存程度比通常想象的更高，根据美国海关统计，2004年中美双边贸易额为2314.2亿美元，同比增长28%，中国成为美国第五大出口市场，第二大进口市场。在全球化的今天，贸易使国家之间紧密融合，美国并不会因为阻止中海油的收购而得到什么特别的好处，所以中海油竞购优尼科不是对中国企业的考验，而是对美国政府智慧的考验。
有关国际问题观察员认为，从合作共赢的角度，中国需要发展，就需要石油，如果中国只是在市场上购买，而不参与到增加石油供应的投资，以及不承担相应的责任和风险，石油的价格将无法控制，资源供应国和企业将会一步一步提高油价和LNG的价格。对于中国将会受到石油价格上涨所带来的压力，但是中国能源体系中对于石油的依赖程度远远低于美国。
（新华社北京８月２日电）
???-??-???????? ????????
???-??-???????? ????????有信心通过美审查 中海油提交通知书
贾南
2005年07月04日11:04 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中国海洋石油有限公司7月3日宣布，公司已向美国外国投资委员会提交通知书，以便于其展开对中海油并购优尼科公司提议的审查。美国外国投资委员会规定，若该委员会向优尼科提出与交易相关的问题，此后7日内优尼科要予以回复。
“我们已向优尼科表明我们的全现金收购方案具有很强的确定性，在法规审批方面也有保障。”中海油首席财务官杨华指出，“一旦有机会获得美国外国投资委员会的审查，我们有信心对该委员会关注的问题进行解答，以通过埃克森-佛罗里奥条款的审查。我们会全力配合并期望这一正式审查能够立即展开。”
鉴于中海油对优尼科的并购交易备受各方关注，杨华表示，期望美国外国投资委员会开始审查，以解答各方所关注的问题，并让优尼科股东了解中海油的并购条款优越。“今天的申报将使中海油有机会以公开透明的方式遵照美国法律法规要求行事，并就这一提议展开充分讨论。我们欢迎这一机会，并且相信，一旦所有的事实为各方所了解，我们的商业意图及交易条款为大家所充分理解，最初的许多不实印象将会被纠正，所有的疑虑和问题都会得到完美的解决。”
此前，杨华就对中海油并购优尼科一事表示过乐观的态度，但随后，6月29日美国雪佛龙方面传出其并购优尼科的方案已经通过美国证券交易委员会的批准。此前有消息称，雪佛龙的策略似乎是要让人们认为，中海油的收购要约肯定将受到严格而漫长的审查。这或许会使优尼科的股东们觉得，虽然雪佛龙报价较低，但快速通过审查程序令其要约更具吸引力。
雪佛龙公司否认了有关媒体报道，称雪佛龙并未寻求世贸组织介入调查中海油收购优尼科计划。
《国际金融报》 (2005年07月04日 第一版)
（责任编辑：周昕）
贾南
2005年07月04日11:04 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中国海洋石油有限公司7月3日宣布，公司已向美国外国投资委员会提交通知书，以便于其展开对中海油并购优尼科公司提议的审查。美国外国投资委员会规定，若该委员会向优尼科提出与交易相关的问题，此后7日内优尼科要予以回复。
“我们已向优尼科表明我们的全现金收购方案具有很强的确定性，在法规审批方面也有保障。”中海油首席财务官杨华指出，“一旦有机会获得美国外国投资委员会的审查，我们有信心对该委员会关注的问题进行解答，以通过埃克森-佛罗里奥条款的审查。我们会全力配合并期望这一正式审查能够立即展开。”
鉴于中海油对优尼科的并购交易备受各方关注，杨华表示，期望美国外国投资委员会开始审查，以解答各方所关注的问题，并让优尼科股东了解中海油的并购条款优越。“今天的申报将使中海油有机会以公开透明的方式遵照美国法律法规要求行事，并就这一提议展开充分讨论。我们欢迎这一机会，并且相信，一旦所有的事实为各方所了解，我们的商业意图及交易条款为大家所充分理解，最初的许多不实印象将会被纠正，所有的疑虑和问题都会得到完美的解决。”
此前，杨华就对中海油并购优尼科一事表示过乐观的态度，但随后，6月29日美国雪佛龙方面传出其并购优尼科的方案已经通过美国证券交易委员会的批准。此前有消息称，雪佛龙的策略似乎是要让人们认为，中海油的收购要约肯定将受到严格而漫长的审查。这或许会使优尼科的股东们觉得，虽然雪佛龙报价较低，但快速通过审查程序令其要约更具吸引力。
雪佛龙公司否认了有关媒体报道，称雪佛龙并未寻求世贸组织介入调查中海油收购优尼科计划。
《国际金融报》 (2005年07月04日 第一版)
（责任编辑：周昕）
???-??-????:?????????
???-??-????:?????????环球时报：美国政客何必紧张？
单仁平
2005年07月01日14:22 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
美国早就有这样一则政治笑话：如何能让衣冠楚楚的参议员暴跳如雷？答案是：让中国人买下美国公司！如今，笑话有了“现实版”：在美参议院金融委员会的美中经济关系听证会上，政客们对中海油要买美国优尼科石油公司的消息怒不可遏，要求政府阻拦这笔交易。原本是对买卖双方都有好处的正常商业行为，这些美国政客却从中看到了“对美国国家安全的威胁”。
纵观当代世界经济发展，跨国并购可说是经济体崛起的必由之路。美国在二战后掀起对欧洲企业的并购潮，日本企业也借日元升值的机会全球扩张，中国经济发展到今天，已经到了需要通过海外收购实现国际化的必经阶段。无论是海尔收购美国家电厂商美泰克还是中海油提出收购优尼科，中国企业的海外并购都不过是一笔你情我愿的商业交易，在经济一体化的今天，完全不值得见多识广的美国议员如此大惊小怪。从数额上讲，对美国企业投资额最高的是瑞士，其次是日本，人们没有听说它们对美国构成了什么安全威胁。据美国商务部统计，美国对中国的投资是中国对美投资的13倍。如果说海外并购真会带来什么安全威胁的话，要担心的应该是中国才对。
中海油买的也不是一个制造军用飞机或者掌握导弹技术的公司，说到底，买的不过是用来让汽车跑起来的石油。波音正向中国卖更多的飞机，美国的汽车制造商也在中国建厂，它们同样需要石油。如今油价居高不下，对于石油企业来说，直接买油显然不如自己采油划算。世界各国的石油企业都在寻求海外扩张的机会，美国最大的石油公司埃克森美孚就有七八成的收入都来自美国国外。而中海油要买的这家公司在美国的市场份额只占区区1%，中海油还承诺收购后不会改变其在美国本土生产油气的销售路线，这笔交易根本不会影响美国市场的能源供应，所谓的“安全威胁”更是无从谈起。
由于西方媒体恶意泄密，中海油在买卖时机上已经吃了亏。中海油的竞价则给了美国很大的好处：挽救濒临破产的优尼科公司，保障优尼科的员工就业，提出对优尼科股东十分优厚的收购条件，还为美国增加了投资。美国政客对中国并购的敌意使人想起了20多年前美国对日本的态度。当时财大气粗的日本企业在美国买房买地买工厂，美国政客如临大敌，说如不加阻止，日本会买下整个美国，还说日本企业会把美国的技术和工作机会都带回日本，掏空美国工业。后来证实这些担心是多余的，日本当年的举动为美国提供了大量资本和近63万个就业机会。中海油能否如愿现在还是个未知数。交易总有个讨价还价的过程，如果最后没谈成也很正常，中国有句老话说得好，“买卖不成仁义在”。不过，要是有人非得在正常的商业行为中搀杂过多的政治因素，把一笔对双方都有好处的交易搅黄，那就实在没意思了。自由贸易是美国政府长期以来鼓吹和提倡的，美国也曾多次指责俄罗斯人不向其石油公司敞开大门。这次美国又准备如何处理中海油问题呢？这将考验美国对自由贸易的诚意。
(环球时报 第989期 ２００5年6月27日)
单仁平
2005年07月01日14:22 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
美国早就有这样一则政治笑话：如何能让衣冠楚楚的参议员暴跳如雷？答案是：让中国人买下美国公司！如今，笑话有了“现实版”：在美参议院金融委员会的美中经济关系听证会上，政客们对中海油要买美国优尼科石油公司的消息怒不可遏，要求政府阻拦这笔交易。原本是对买卖双方都有好处的正常商业行为，这些美国政客却从中看到了“对美国国家安全的威胁”。
纵观当代世界经济发展，跨国并购可说是经济体崛起的必由之路。美国在二战后掀起对欧洲企业的并购潮，日本企业也借日元升值的机会全球扩张，中国经济发展到今天，已经到了需要通过海外收购实现国际化的必经阶段。无论是海尔收购美国家电厂商美泰克还是中海油提出收购优尼科，中国企业的海外并购都不过是一笔你情我愿的商业交易，在经济一体化的今天，完全不值得见多识广的美国议员如此大惊小怪。从数额上讲，对美国企业投资额最高的是瑞士，其次是日本，人们没有听说它们对美国构成了什么安全威胁。据美国商务部统计，美国对中国的投资是中国对美投资的13倍。如果说海外并购真会带来什么安全威胁的话，要担心的应该是中国才对。
中海油买的也不是一个制造军用飞机或者掌握导弹技术的公司，说到底，买的不过是用来让汽车跑起来的石油。波音正向中国卖更多的飞机，美国的汽车制造商也在中国建厂，它们同样需要石油。如今油价居高不下，对于石油企业来说，直接买油显然不如自己采油划算。世界各国的石油企业都在寻求海外扩张的机会，美国最大的石油公司埃克森美孚就有七八成的收入都来自美国国外。而中海油要买的这家公司在美国的市场份额只占区区1%，中海油还承诺收购后不会改变其在美国本土生产油气的销售路线，这笔交易根本不会影响美国市场的能源供应，所谓的“安全威胁”更是无从谈起。
由于西方媒体恶意泄密，中海油在买卖时机上已经吃了亏。中海油的竞价则给了美国很大的好处：挽救濒临破产的优尼科公司，保障优尼科的员工就业，提出对优尼科股东十分优厚的收购条件，还为美国增加了投资。美国政客对中国并购的敌意使人想起了20多年前美国对日本的态度。当时财大气粗的日本企业在美国买房买地买工厂，美国政客如临大敌，说如不加阻止，日本会买下整个美国，还说日本企业会把美国的技术和工作机会都带回日本，掏空美国工业。后来证实这些担心是多余的，日本当年的举动为美国提供了大量资本和近63万个就业机会。中海油能否如愿现在还是个未知数。交易总有个讨价还价的过程，如果最后没谈成也很正常，中国有句老话说得好，“买卖不成仁义在”。不过，要是有人非得在正常的商业行为中搀杂过多的政治因素，把一笔对双方都有好处的交易搅黄，那就实在没意思了。自由贸易是美国政府长期以来鼓吹和提倡的，美国也曾多次指责俄罗斯人不向其石油公司敞开大门。这次美国又准备如何处理中海油问题呢？这将考验美国对自由贸易的诚意。
(环球时报 第989期 ２００5年6月27日)
???-??-????????????
???-??-????????????中海油收购案爆惊人丑闻
美议员涉嫌接受雪佛龙捐款
2005年06月30日12:43 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
人民网华盛顿6月30日电 记者唐勇报道：据英国《金融时报》报道,公开资料显示,反对中海油收购美国优尼科石油公司的部分美国议员自2002年起，累计从另一竞购方雪佛龙公司获得了超过10万美元的政治捐款。
报道援引美国专门监督政府和国会腐败行为的"敏感政治中心"披露的资料称,最早对中海油收购优尼科提出反对意见的议员理查德·庞博在过去3年中从雪佛龙公司收取了13500美元的捐款。
而在几天前联名上书政府要求严查中海油收购案的41名美国众议院议员中,有22人在过去的三届选举中从雪佛龙公司收取了政治捐款。分析人士认为,如果消息属实,对中海油收购优尼科来说无疑是个好消息。
来源：人民网
美议员涉嫌接受雪佛龙捐款
2005年06月30日12:43 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
人民网华盛顿6月30日电 记者唐勇报道：据英国《金融时报》报道,公开资料显示,反对中海油收购美国优尼科石油公司的部分美国议员自2002年起，累计从另一竞购方雪佛龙公司获得了超过10万美元的政治捐款。
报道援引美国专门监督政府和国会腐败行为的"敏感政治中心"披露的资料称,最早对中海油收购优尼科提出反对意见的议员理查德·庞博在过去3年中从雪佛龙公司收取了13500美元的捐款。
而在几天前联名上书政府要求严查中海油收购案的41名美国众议院议员中,有22人在过去的三届选举中从雪佛龙公司收取了政治捐款。分析人士认为,如果消息属实,对中海油收购优尼科来说无疑是个好消息。
来源：人民网
???-??-??+??=?????????????
???-??-??+??=?????????????石油+中国=政治恐慌？美国怎不在商言商
本报记者 魏红欣
2005年07月01日08:34 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中海油决定斥资185亿美元竞购美国优尼科石油公司，本是一项纯粹的商业交易。不想却引起美国政界一片哗然。在“中国公司”和“美国石油”之间作梗，正勾画出美国“搬起石头砸自己脚”的尴尬相
曾经反复责怪俄罗斯人不向美国石油公司敞开大门的美国国会议员们，如今开始深陷“搬起石头砸自己脚”的尴尬境地。
就在中国第三大石油公司中海油集团以185亿美元的高价把橄榄枝抛向美国老牌石油公司优尼科之际，一直鼓吹“中国威胁论”、“遏制中国崛起”的美国政客们再也坐不住了，6月23日，41名情绪激动的美国国会议员联名向美国总统布什递交了一封公开信，敦促美国政府对中海油的收购要约进行严格审查。
而在此之前，来自美国加州的联邦众议员庞博和亨特，就已经致函布什总统，要求以国家安全为由全面审议这一收购计划。他们在信中写道：“美国日益需要将满足能源需求列入外交政策、国家安全和经济安全的考虑范围。当事涉中国时尤其如此。”这位亨特先生在联想收购IBM-PC业务时就以莫须有的“国家安全”为由要求审查，同时还一手抛出《中国货币法案》。显然，美国一些政府官员对中国经济的迅速发展极端抵触，更不愿看到本土的老牌公司被收归中国旗下。这次收购发生在美国政客们极其敏感的能源市场，更是“一石激起千层浪”。
石油+中国=政治恐慌
中海油斥资185亿美元竞购优尼科的计划刚刚宣布，美国能源部长博德曼便证实：中海油的竞购计划将引发美国政府“复杂的”审议，参与审议的政府部门将包括国务院、财政部、商业部和国防部。博德曼说，为了让政府能确立一个立场，这将完全是一个需要各机构间协商的过程，是一件非常复杂的事情；而试图预测各机构间协商的结果可能只是浪费时间。
本周二，美国财政部长斯诺再次重申，美国政府将从国家安全考虑，对中海油收购优尼科一案进行审查。作为负责审查的美国外国投资委员会的负责人，斯诺在接受媒体采访时表示，美国政府“将关注任何与国家安全有关的问题”。
“政治因素可能成为这桩本应是纯商业行为的越洋收购案的最大‘绊脚石’。”中国人民大学国际能源战略研究中心主任查道炯在接受媒体采访时表示了这种担忧。
中海油收购将威胁到美国安全说法的根据，主要源于三个方面：
其一：国有公司说。一位前白宫顾问表示，中海油的国有公司背景可能是个问题，其185亿美元的收购计划可能因政治因素而受到阻碍。一些国会议员们担心，一旦并购达成，国有公司的资产为国家操纵，将更有利于中国的垄断石油供给，通过破坏美国的能源来源和经济，威胁美国的安全。
其二，技术“窃用”说。部分议员认为，优尼科在印尼和墨西哥沿海附近进行项目时，积累了非常有用的深水勘探技术，这些技术可以应用在军事上，比如进行核试验或掩饰类似试验。美能源专家约翰·戴利称，对中国企业收购美国能源公司，美国政界的最大顾虑是并购过程中的技术转让问题，他们担心中国公司通过收购获取一些美国最先进的海上石油开采技术和油气资源。
其三，国家战略说。优尼科拥有的石油和天然气储量约为17亿桶石油当量，它除了在阿拉斯加和墨西哥湾有大规模的石油和天然气项目外，还在阿塞拜疆、缅甸、泰国和印尼拥有重大开发项目，其石油和天然气蕴藏量的70％都在亚洲地区。优尼科在亚洲地区的能源优势让美国人担心，一旦中国拥有了优尼科，中国面临的能源瓶颈可能迎刃而解。新泽西州民主党参议员约翰·科兹尔说:“外国控制战略资产将成为一个严重问题。”
其实，中海油在收购提案中，早已承诺把优尼科在美国生产的石油和天然气，继续在美国市场上出售，并保留优尼科的员工，同时已经做好了让美国外国投资委员会审查的准备。但这些承诺似乎并未打消国会议员们的担忧和顾虑，在面对中国这个最大的潜在竞争对手时，美国政治家们所担心的或许不是“安全问题”，而是“中国问题”。
但颇具戏剧性的是，就在美国政客对竞购事件说三道四之际，外电报道，有公开文件表明，自2002年以来，出言反对中海油收购优尼科的一些美国国会议员曾收受雪佛龙逾10万美元的政治献金。其中，致函布什总统要求审议中海油收购计划的共和党议员庞博在过去3年里收受了雪佛龙1.35万美元；而联名向布什总统递交公开信的41名国会议员中，有22名议员在过去三轮选举周期中曾接受过雪佛龙的捐助。这不禁让人怀疑：政客们的叫嚣是出自本意还是受人指使？
石油+中国=经济双赢
一项纯粹的商业交易却引起了美国政界的轩然大波，或许华盛顿的政治家们早已忘记美国影片《教父》中的那句经典台词：“Business is business”(在商言商)。
与政客们的敌视和宣泄不同，中海油的竞购行为在美国石油业界却得到了广泛呼应。业界普遍认为，中海油收购优尼科是非常平常的商业交易，无碍于美国的国家利益，应该是一个双赢的收购行为。埃克森美孚公司首席执行官李·雷蒙德在路透社主办的一次能源峰会上更明确表示，美国阻止中海油的竞购将是一大错误，必须推行自由贸易，如果不利于效率的因素被纳入市场，最终美国方面将为此付出代价。
美国公司对发展中美经济关系持积极立场，很大程度上是由于美国公司不希望其在中国的业务和投资受到美国政府阻止收购优尼科的影响。
“对于美国来说……现在突然跳出来声称，由于某种原因我们不赞成这一收购行为，这将是全球经济一体化的倒退。”美国博思管理咨询公司负责全球能源业务的爱利克·斯皮格尔表示。他说，“我们在推动自由贸易的同时，却拒绝中国的参与。”
让人欣慰的是，美联储主席格林斯潘和负责对此收购事件审查的财长斯诺也赞成此次收购。他们警告国会，不要设置对华贸易壁垒。显然他们也意识到，美国政府阻止中海油收购优尼科，将会损害美国石油公司在全球的发展。而从长远看，如果这桩交易搁浅，受损的当首推美国公司、消费者和石油工人的利益。
中海油董事长傅成玉更是态度鲜明地表示：我们完全是按国际通行的商业化操作模式进行这次收购活动的。“美国是个一向倡导自由贸易的国家，美国企业在中国也有大量投资，因此我相信美国政府会鼓励中国企业的国际化举措，会支持这起收购。”傅成玉耐人寻味的话语委婉地将了美国政府一军。
石油+中国=媒体热炒
“石油＋中国”，无疑成了整天盯着中国找新闻的西方媒体最好的炒作题目。在西方媒体诸多描述中海油竞购的报道中，可以体会到一个共同的主题，那就是“中国的崛起”。
《华尔街日报》认为，对于中海油和中国，这个收购要约都具有里程碑式的意义。收购优尼科可以帮助中海油在亚洲进一步奠定不可动摇的实力。
美联社报道说，中国第三大石油生产商中国海洋石油总公司（中海油）宣布出资185亿美元收购美国石油和天然气公司优尼科公司，如果中海油公司成功收购美国第九大石油生产公司（即优尼科公司），那么此次收购将成为中国企业有史以来最大的一次海外收购行动。
同联想收购IBM－PC业务的情景差不多，很多美国媒体对此表现出一种酸溜溜的情绪。美国有线电视新闻网引述了一些观察家的话，担心“高价收购可能会害了中海油”，并预言“中海油是由中国政府控制的企业，因此收购将面临着很多政治上的障碍”。
《洛杉矶时报》则引用西雅图某智库负责人的话说，这很可能在美国国会引发一场“风暴”，加剧某些美国人对中国日益增加的担忧。
《国际金融报》 (2005年07月01日 第五版)
来源：人民网-《国际金融报》 （责任编辑：刘锋）
本报记者 魏红欣
2005年07月01日08:34 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中海油决定斥资185亿美元竞购美国优尼科石油公司，本是一项纯粹的商业交易。不想却引起美国政界一片哗然。在“中国公司”和“美国石油”之间作梗，正勾画出美国“搬起石头砸自己脚”的尴尬相
曾经反复责怪俄罗斯人不向美国石油公司敞开大门的美国国会议员们，如今开始深陷“搬起石头砸自己脚”的尴尬境地。
就在中国第三大石油公司中海油集团以185亿美元的高价把橄榄枝抛向美国老牌石油公司优尼科之际，一直鼓吹“中国威胁论”、“遏制中国崛起”的美国政客们再也坐不住了，6月23日，41名情绪激动的美国国会议员联名向美国总统布什递交了一封公开信，敦促美国政府对中海油的收购要约进行严格审查。
而在此之前，来自美国加州的联邦众议员庞博和亨特，就已经致函布什总统，要求以国家安全为由全面审议这一收购计划。他们在信中写道：“美国日益需要将满足能源需求列入外交政策、国家安全和经济安全的考虑范围。当事涉中国时尤其如此。”这位亨特先生在联想收购IBM-PC业务时就以莫须有的“国家安全”为由要求审查，同时还一手抛出《中国货币法案》。显然，美国一些政府官员对中国经济的迅速发展极端抵触，更不愿看到本土的老牌公司被收归中国旗下。这次收购发生在美国政客们极其敏感的能源市场，更是“一石激起千层浪”。
石油+中国=政治恐慌
中海油斥资185亿美元竞购优尼科的计划刚刚宣布，美国能源部长博德曼便证实：中海油的竞购计划将引发美国政府“复杂的”审议，参与审议的政府部门将包括国务院、财政部、商业部和国防部。博德曼说，为了让政府能确立一个立场，这将完全是一个需要各机构间协商的过程，是一件非常复杂的事情；而试图预测各机构间协商的结果可能只是浪费时间。
本周二，美国财政部长斯诺再次重申，美国政府将从国家安全考虑，对中海油收购优尼科一案进行审查。作为负责审查的美国外国投资委员会的负责人，斯诺在接受媒体采访时表示，美国政府“将关注任何与国家安全有关的问题”。
“政治因素可能成为这桩本应是纯商业行为的越洋收购案的最大‘绊脚石’。”中国人民大学国际能源战略研究中心主任查道炯在接受媒体采访时表示了这种担忧。
中海油收购将威胁到美国安全说法的根据，主要源于三个方面：
其一：国有公司说。一位前白宫顾问表示，中海油的国有公司背景可能是个问题，其185亿美元的收购计划可能因政治因素而受到阻碍。一些国会议员们担心，一旦并购达成，国有公司的资产为国家操纵，将更有利于中国的垄断石油供给，通过破坏美国的能源来源和经济，威胁美国的安全。
其二，技术“窃用”说。部分议员认为，优尼科在印尼和墨西哥沿海附近进行项目时，积累了非常有用的深水勘探技术，这些技术可以应用在军事上，比如进行核试验或掩饰类似试验。美能源专家约翰·戴利称，对中国企业收购美国能源公司，美国政界的最大顾虑是并购过程中的技术转让问题，他们担心中国公司通过收购获取一些美国最先进的海上石油开采技术和油气资源。
其三，国家战略说。优尼科拥有的石油和天然气储量约为17亿桶石油当量，它除了在阿拉斯加和墨西哥湾有大规模的石油和天然气项目外，还在阿塞拜疆、缅甸、泰国和印尼拥有重大开发项目，其石油和天然气蕴藏量的70％都在亚洲地区。优尼科在亚洲地区的能源优势让美国人担心，一旦中国拥有了优尼科，中国面临的能源瓶颈可能迎刃而解。新泽西州民主党参议员约翰·科兹尔说:“外国控制战略资产将成为一个严重问题。”
其实，中海油在收购提案中，早已承诺把优尼科在美国生产的石油和天然气，继续在美国市场上出售，并保留优尼科的员工，同时已经做好了让美国外国投资委员会审查的准备。但这些承诺似乎并未打消国会议员们的担忧和顾虑，在面对中国这个最大的潜在竞争对手时，美国政治家们所担心的或许不是“安全问题”，而是“中国问题”。
但颇具戏剧性的是，就在美国政客对竞购事件说三道四之际，外电报道，有公开文件表明，自2002年以来，出言反对中海油收购优尼科的一些美国国会议员曾收受雪佛龙逾10万美元的政治献金。其中，致函布什总统要求审议中海油收购计划的共和党议员庞博在过去3年里收受了雪佛龙1.35万美元；而联名向布什总统递交公开信的41名国会议员中，有22名议员在过去三轮选举周期中曾接受过雪佛龙的捐助。这不禁让人怀疑：政客们的叫嚣是出自本意还是受人指使？
石油+中国=经济双赢
一项纯粹的商业交易却引起了美国政界的轩然大波，或许华盛顿的政治家们早已忘记美国影片《教父》中的那句经典台词：“Business is business”(在商言商)。
与政客们的敌视和宣泄不同，中海油的竞购行为在美国石油业界却得到了广泛呼应。业界普遍认为，中海油收购优尼科是非常平常的商业交易，无碍于美国的国家利益，应该是一个双赢的收购行为。埃克森美孚公司首席执行官李·雷蒙德在路透社主办的一次能源峰会上更明确表示，美国阻止中海油的竞购将是一大错误，必须推行自由贸易，如果不利于效率的因素被纳入市场，最终美国方面将为此付出代价。
美国公司对发展中美经济关系持积极立场，很大程度上是由于美国公司不希望其在中国的业务和投资受到美国政府阻止收购优尼科的影响。
“对于美国来说……现在突然跳出来声称，由于某种原因我们不赞成这一收购行为，这将是全球经济一体化的倒退。”美国博思管理咨询公司负责全球能源业务的爱利克·斯皮格尔表示。他说，“我们在推动自由贸易的同时，却拒绝中国的参与。”
让人欣慰的是，美联储主席格林斯潘和负责对此收购事件审查的财长斯诺也赞成此次收购。他们警告国会，不要设置对华贸易壁垒。显然他们也意识到，美国政府阻止中海油收购优尼科，将会损害美国石油公司在全球的发展。而从长远看，如果这桩交易搁浅，受损的当首推美国公司、消费者和石油工人的利益。
中海油董事长傅成玉更是态度鲜明地表示：我们完全是按国际通行的商业化操作模式进行这次收购活动的。“美国是个一向倡导自由贸易的国家，美国企业在中国也有大量投资，因此我相信美国政府会鼓励中国企业的国际化举措，会支持这起收购。”傅成玉耐人寻味的话语委婉地将了美国政府一军。
石油+中国=媒体热炒
“石油＋中国”，无疑成了整天盯着中国找新闻的西方媒体最好的炒作题目。在西方媒体诸多描述中海油竞购的报道中，可以体会到一个共同的主题，那就是“中国的崛起”。
《华尔街日报》认为，对于中海油和中国，这个收购要约都具有里程碑式的意义。收购优尼科可以帮助中海油在亚洲进一步奠定不可动摇的实力。
美联社报道说，中国第三大石油生产商中国海洋石油总公司（中海油）宣布出资185亿美元收购美国石油和天然气公司优尼科公司，如果中海油公司成功收购美国第九大石油生产公司（即优尼科公司），那么此次收购将成为中国企业有史以来最大的一次海外收购行动。
同联想收购IBM－PC业务的情景差不多，很多美国媒体对此表现出一种酸溜溜的情绪。美国有线电视新闻网引述了一些观察家的话，担心“高价收购可能会害了中海油”，并预言“中海油是由中国政府控制的企业，因此收购将面临着很多政治上的障碍”。
《洛杉矶时报》则引用西雅图某智库负责人的话说，这很可能在美国国会引发一场“风暴”，加剧某些美国人对中国日益增加的担忧。
《国际金融报》 (2005年07月01日 第五版)
来源：人民网-《国际金融报》 （责任编辑：刘锋）
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???-??-?????????????????????中海油要求美外国投资委员会对并购优尼科审查
2005年07月03日18:45 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
新华社北京7月3日电（记者常志鹏）记者从中国海洋石油集团公司获悉，其所属中国海洋石油有限公司（“中海油”）3日宣布，已向美国外国投资委员会提交通知书，要求对中海油并购优尼科公司提议展开审查。
中海油首席财务官杨华介绍，中海油已向优尼科表明全现金收购方案。一旦有机会获得美国外国投资委员会的审查，中海油有信心对该委员会关注的问题进行解答，以通过埃克森-佛罗里奥条款的审查。中海油期望这一正式审查能够立即展开。
杨华表示，通知书将使中海油有机会以公开透明的方式遵照美国法律法规要求行事，并就这一提议展开充分讨论。一旦中海油的商业意图及交易条款为大家所充分理解，最初的许多不实印象将会被纠正，所有的疑虑和问题都会得到解决。
据介绍，美国外国投资委员会规定，若该委员会向优尼科提出与交易相关的问题，此后7日内优尼科要予以回复。
中国海洋石油集团公司是中国最大的海上石油和天然气生产商，也是世界最大的独立油气勘探及生产企业之一。公司主要业务为勘探、开发、生产和销售海上石油和天然气。中海油于1999年8月在香港注册成立。并于2001年2月27日和28日分别在纽约证券交易所挂牌上市。
来源：新华社 （责任编辑：王新玲）
2005年07月03日18:45 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
新华社北京7月3日电（记者常志鹏）记者从中国海洋石油集团公司获悉，其所属中国海洋石油有限公司（“中海油”）3日宣布，已向美国外国投资委员会提交通知书，要求对中海油并购优尼科公司提议展开审查。
中海油首席财务官杨华介绍，中海油已向优尼科表明全现金收购方案。一旦有机会获得美国外国投资委员会的审查，中海油有信心对该委员会关注的问题进行解答，以通过埃克森-佛罗里奥条款的审查。中海油期望这一正式审查能够立即展开。
杨华表示，通知书将使中海油有机会以公开透明的方式遵照美国法律法规要求行事，并就这一提议展开充分讨论。一旦中海油的商业意图及交易条款为大家所充分理解，最初的许多不实印象将会被纠正，所有的疑虑和问题都会得到解决。
据介绍，美国外国投资委员会规定，若该委员会向优尼科提出与交易相关的问题，此后7日内优尼科要予以回复。
中国海洋石油集团公司是中国最大的海上石油和天然气生产商，也是世界最大的独立油气勘探及生产企业之一。公司主要业务为勘探、开发、生产和销售海上石油和天然气。中海油于1999年8月在香港注册成立。并于2001年2月27日和28日分别在纽约证券交易所挂牌上市。
来源：新华社 （责任编辑：王新玲）
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???-??-???????????????从中海油风波看美意识形态过敏症
许峰
2005年07月05日13:56 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
6月23日，41名情绪激动的美国国会议员联名向美国总统布什递交了一封公开信，敦促美国政府对中海油的收购要约进行严格审查。6月30日美国联邦众议院以333票对92票的压倒性多数，通过禁止政府批准中海油购并美国优尼科决议案。本来收购一家石油公司是一件再普通不过的经济行为，但从美国媒体和政界对此事的反应来看，让人又看到了“中国威胁论”的新版本。如果把美国出于其狭隘意识形态而对中国发展的反应表现出病态的担忧和焦虑称之为“意识形态过敏症”的话，那么可以断定，美国的意识形态过敏症再次发作了。
中国威胁论是典型的美国意识形态过敏症的表现。从1882年和1884年通过的《排华法案》到今天的中海油收购事件，中国威胁论只不过变化了方式，提法不胜枚举，如中国的核武器威胁，人口威胁、经济增长速度威胁、政治地位威胁、环境威胁、科技威胁，现在演变为收购美国排名第九且经营亏损的公司也成为对美国“能源安全”构成威胁了。让人不由想起一前外国驻华大使的一句话：“如果说人口众多，拥有核武器的国家就是一种威胁，那么美国也是人口众多，拥有核武器，为什么不说美国构成了威胁呢？”在能源问题上也是如此， 2004年，美国石油日消费量是中国的三倍，分别是2040万桶和650万桶，这时候美国却很轻易地就把石油价格上涨的责任推到中国身上，还制造出“中国能源威胁论”。
可以说，从其固守的意识形态出发，美国从来没有改变遏制中国的战略企图，以致于对中国的发展始终持小心防备的心理。持威胁论调的人认为中国是共产党国家，只将现代技术和市场经济注入自己的体系中，并以此逐步实现大国地位，形成“非自由民主的崛起”，并视之为对美式“自由民主”的挑战。在舆论上对中国的发展虚张声势，对经济实力和军费肆意夸大，不择手段以达到拖延或阻碍中国继续发展的目的。联系到最近美国一些主流媒体对中国崛起的大幅报道，让人也不得不顿生疑虑，这种“褒奖”背后是否还有什么别的潜台词。
在美国对中国的态度上一直存在着美国版的“中国崛起论”和“中国崩溃论”两种论调，两种论调你方唱罢我登场。这不能不说是美国意识形态在今天对中国惯用的两张牌。中国的崛起对美国构成威胁，中国的崩溃对美国也构成威胁。无论什么论调，本质上还是中国威胁论。对于美国而言，似乎中国的存在就是威胁。
曾有人声称“美国是惟一没有政治意识形态的地方。” 也有人论证“意识形态的终结”，也有人主张“要淡化意识形态”。但事实无时无刻不在告诉我们：一些人想否定、想摆脱、想远离、想掩盖的“即将终结”的意识形态在美国不但没有终结，没有淡化，反而越来越凸现了。从搞垮前苏联东欧国家的和平演变、发动对科索沃战争、发动伊拉克战争到最近在中亚国家频频得手的“颜色革命”，从“邪恶轴心”论、先发制人论到中国威胁论，说明美国不仅是“以意识形态为本的国家”，甚至是一个过于注重意识形态以致于达到对其狂热之地步。事实证明，美国比任何国家都更多地依赖意识形态。在“全球化”时代美国非但没有削弱意识形态的功能，反而强化了其中某些“信条”。比如众所周知的代表新自由主义的“华盛顿共识”，比如“人权高于主权”的新干涉主义，比如最近美国在强力推行的全球“民主化”战略，如此等等不一而足。
其实，美国意识形态过敏症的根子在于美国自己认定的所谓国家利益，即如美国国家安全战略上报告的标题所示——“为了更加安全、更加繁荣的明天，今天必须领导世界”。毫无疑问，任何对这一原则的丝毫妨碍就构成了对美国的“威胁”。
中海油收购事件无疑会触碰到美国意识形态这根敏感神经。因为在部分美国政客看来，中海油收购优尼科只会危及美国“能源安全”，帮助中国进一步崛起，从而妨碍了美国领导世界的“宏伟蓝图”的实现。
来源：国际在线 （责任编辑：赵艳萍）
许峰
2005年07月05日13:56 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
6月23日，41名情绪激动的美国国会议员联名向美国总统布什递交了一封公开信，敦促美国政府对中海油的收购要约进行严格审查。6月30日美国联邦众议院以333票对92票的压倒性多数，通过禁止政府批准中海油购并美国优尼科决议案。本来收购一家石油公司是一件再普通不过的经济行为，但从美国媒体和政界对此事的反应来看，让人又看到了“中国威胁论”的新版本。如果把美国出于其狭隘意识形态而对中国发展的反应表现出病态的担忧和焦虑称之为“意识形态过敏症”的话，那么可以断定，美国的意识形态过敏症再次发作了。
中国威胁论是典型的美国意识形态过敏症的表现。从1882年和1884年通过的《排华法案》到今天的中海油收购事件，中国威胁论只不过变化了方式，提法不胜枚举，如中国的核武器威胁，人口威胁、经济增长速度威胁、政治地位威胁、环境威胁、科技威胁，现在演变为收购美国排名第九且经营亏损的公司也成为对美国“能源安全”构成威胁了。让人不由想起一前外国驻华大使的一句话：“如果说人口众多，拥有核武器的国家就是一种威胁，那么美国也是人口众多，拥有核武器，为什么不说美国构成了威胁呢？”在能源问题上也是如此， 2004年，美国石油日消费量是中国的三倍，分别是2040万桶和650万桶，这时候美国却很轻易地就把石油价格上涨的责任推到中国身上，还制造出“中国能源威胁论”。
可以说，从其固守的意识形态出发，美国从来没有改变遏制中国的战略企图，以致于对中国的发展始终持小心防备的心理。持威胁论调的人认为中国是共产党国家，只将现代技术和市场经济注入自己的体系中，并以此逐步实现大国地位，形成“非自由民主的崛起”，并视之为对美式“自由民主”的挑战。在舆论上对中国的发展虚张声势，对经济实力和军费肆意夸大，不择手段以达到拖延或阻碍中国继续发展的目的。联系到最近美国一些主流媒体对中国崛起的大幅报道，让人也不得不顿生疑虑，这种“褒奖”背后是否还有什么别的潜台词。
在美国对中国的态度上一直存在着美国版的“中国崛起论”和“中国崩溃论”两种论调，两种论调你方唱罢我登场。这不能不说是美国意识形态在今天对中国惯用的两张牌。中国的崛起对美国构成威胁，中国的崩溃对美国也构成威胁。无论什么论调，本质上还是中国威胁论。对于美国而言，似乎中国的存在就是威胁。
曾有人声称“美国是惟一没有政治意识形态的地方。” 也有人论证“意识形态的终结”，也有人主张“要淡化意识形态”。但事实无时无刻不在告诉我们：一些人想否定、想摆脱、想远离、想掩盖的“即将终结”的意识形态在美国不但没有终结，没有淡化，反而越来越凸现了。从搞垮前苏联东欧国家的和平演变、发动对科索沃战争、发动伊拉克战争到最近在中亚国家频频得手的“颜色革命”，从“邪恶轴心”论、先发制人论到中国威胁论，说明美国不仅是“以意识形态为本的国家”，甚至是一个过于注重意识形态以致于达到对其狂热之地步。事实证明，美国比任何国家都更多地依赖意识形态。在“全球化”时代美国非但没有削弱意识形态的功能，反而强化了其中某些“信条”。比如众所周知的代表新自由主义的“华盛顿共识”，比如“人权高于主权”的新干涉主义，比如最近美国在强力推行的全球“民主化”战略，如此等等不一而足。
其实，美国意识形态过敏症的根子在于美国自己认定的所谓国家利益，即如美国国家安全战略上报告的标题所示——“为了更加安全、更加繁荣的明天，今天必须领导世界”。毫无疑问，任何对这一原则的丝毫妨碍就构成了对美国的“威胁”。
中海油收购事件无疑会触碰到美国意识形态这根敏感神经。因为在部分美国政客看来，中海油收购优尼科只会危及美国“能源安全”，帮助中国进一步崛起，从而妨碍了美国领导世界的“宏伟蓝图”的实现。
来源：国际在线 （责任编辑：赵艳萍）
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???-??-????????????�?????????美众院就中海油收购案听证 多数与会者提出质疑
2005年07月14日15:39 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中新社华盛顿七月十三日电 美国众议院军事委员会七月十三日就中海油收购优尼科举行听证会，绝大多数与会专家和美国前政府官员提出质疑，认为这笔价值一百八十五亿美元的企业并购案将危及美国国家安全。但也有专家指出：中海油收购优尼科的风险被有些人故意夸大了。
美国众议院全体大会两星期前曾连续通过两项议案，以国家安全与公平竞争为理由试图阻止中海油对优尼科的收购。
今天的听证会由众议院军事委员会主席、共和党众议员邓肯·亨特(Duncan Hunter)主持。他对这宗收购案抱有相当程度的疑虑。他强调：中国国营的中海油收购优尼科，是一种不祥的威胁，而许多国会议员也持同样观点，“我认为此次交易将无法达成，我们也不应允许其成为现实”。
美中经济安全审议委员会主席里查德·达马托在听证会称：“如果它影响到美国的国家安全，那么政府必须严肃考虑对其进行干涉”。
在出席此次听证会的四名证人中，只有一人反驳了所谓的国家安全威胁论调。自由市场智库负责研究自然资源的主管杰瑞·泰勒(Jerry Taylor)认为：优尼科公司所拥有的能源资产在美国总体能源供应中只占微小的份额，他们所掌握的尖端开采技术也不是这家公司独自掌握的。他认为这种恐慌情绪令人难以理解，中海油收购优尼科的风险已被有些人故意夸大了。杰瑞·泰勒所持的观点是：“中国在美国投资的越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就会越小”。
优尼科的十人董事会将在周四举行的董事会上听取最高管理层的建议并决定是选择中海油公司还是雪佛龙公司。目前中海油和雪佛龙都在美国进行积极游说。
来源：中国新闻社 （责任编辑：赵艳
2005年07月14日15:39 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中新社华盛顿七月十三日电 美国众议院军事委员会七月十三日就中海油收购优尼科举行听证会，绝大多数与会专家和美国前政府官员提出质疑，认为这笔价值一百八十五亿美元的企业并购案将危及美国国家安全。但也有专家指出：中海油收购优尼科的风险被有些人故意夸大了。
美国众议院全体大会两星期前曾连续通过两项议案，以国家安全与公平竞争为理由试图阻止中海油对优尼科的收购。
今天的听证会由众议院军事委员会主席、共和党众议员邓肯·亨特(Duncan Hunter)主持。他对这宗收购案抱有相当程度的疑虑。他强调：中国国营的中海油收购优尼科，是一种不祥的威胁，而许多国会议员也持同样观点，“我认为此次交易将无法达成，我们也不应允许其成为现实”。
美中经济安全审议委员会主席里查德·达马托在听证会称：“如果它影响到美国的国家安全，那么政府必须严肃考虑对其进行干涉”。
在出席此次听证会的四名证人中，只有一人反驳了所谓的国家安全威胁论调。自由市场智库负责研究自然资源的主管杰瑞·泰勒(Jerry Taylor)认为：优尼科公司所拥有的能源资产在美国总体能源供应中只占微小的份额，他们所掌握的尖端开采技术也不是这家公司独自掌握的。他认为这种恐慌情绪令人难以理解，中海油收购优尼科的风险已被有些人故意夸大了。杰瑞·泰勒所持的观点是：“中国在美国投资的越多，两国发生冲突的机会可能就会越小”。
优尼科的十人董事会将在周四举行的董事会上听取最高管理层的建议并决定是选择中海油公司还是雪佛龙公司。目前中海油和雪佛龙都在美国进行积极游说。
来源：中国新闻社 （责任编辑：赵艳
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???-??-?????????�????????美众院卡我石油公司 恐华症在美国蔓延
本报驻美国特派记者 唐勇
2005年07月06日10:11 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中海油并购优尼科案成为美国各界关注的焦点。图为2004年9月拍摄的中海油第931自流井平台。
中海油计划以185亿美元现金竞购美国优尼科石油公司的商业行动，在美国已经被完全政治化了，其影响已经远远超过联想收购IBM个人电脑部门和海尔集团竞购美泰公司的案例。美国国会众议院近日连续通过两项议案，提出中海油的行动“影响美国国家安全”，要求阻止其并购优尼科。得知此事后，中海油迅速作出回应，于7月2日向美国外国投资委员会提交通知书，望其对此并购案进行审查，并表示很有信心。有专家指出，如果中海油竞购成功，而美国政府介入阻止，那将成为中美关系史上一件有深远影响的事。
众议院连夜开会表决
6月30日对美国国会众议院来说是忙碌的一天。到了下班时间，议员们没有一个回家，他们在做一件大事：要将中海油收购美国优尼科扼杀在摇篮中。没完没了的辩论之后，已经到了深夜。议员们开始就两项议案进行投票：第一项议案是一项修正案，实际上是财政部、交通部和其他政府部门本财年的预算案。该议案建议阻止美国财政部主持的外国投资委员会动用联邦资金来审查中海油收购案。该议案以333票赞成、92票反对的表决结果通过。密歇根州民主党联邦众议员吉尔帕特里克是一个60岁的老太太。作为议案的发起人，看到议案得以通过，她毫不掩饰自己的高兴。她说：“眼下根本不是把美国第九大石油公司卖给中国的时候！”
随后，议员们又就另一项与中海油有关的议案进行表决，结果也是一边倒，以398票赞成、15票反对通过。这是一项没有法律约束力的议案，声称石油和天然气是美国的“战略资产”，中海油并购案“将损害美国的国家安全与利益”。议案说，一旦优尼科同意被中海油收购，布什政府应“立即进行审查”。众议院民主党领袖佩洛西是该项议案的发起人之一。这位年届65岁的白发女议员跟吉尔帕特里克一样咄咄逼人。佩洛西说：“中海油竞购优尼科案充分表明，美国的能源战略安全脆弱不堪！这场竞购之所以可能，是由于中国政府控制了中海油，并不是自由市场的力量。相信我的共和党和民主党同事们都明白这一点！”众议院能源委员会主席、共和党人理查德·庞博也对议案投了赞成票，他指责中国“并非市场经济国家”，因此中国国有企业的收购行为不符合自由市场原则，也不符合美国国家安全的最大利益。
美国主流媒体帮中国说话
面对国会对中海油并购优尼科的极大忧虑，布什行政当局已经向国会保证，财政部会按照正常程序对这一并购案进行审查。不过一些议员担心，不允许中海油并购优尼科与自由市场原则不符，而且同样可能损害美国的国家安全。来自弗吉尼亚州的众议员莫兰毫不犹豫地对上述两个议案投了反对票。莫兰情绪激动地说：“这样做简直是要把中国打入另册！”他认为，国会封堵中国公司竞购优尼科是一个“危险的举动”，因为中国“正把握着一柄悬在美国经济脖子上的金融铡刀，如果我们做出这种缺少周密考虑的事，他们将会把它（铡刀）落下来。”他还质问道：“不让他们（中国）收购美国或西方的石油公司，难道要让他们去伊朗买吗？”
国会的两项议案经过媒体的报道迅速传遍了世界，舆论哗然。但中海油保持了平静的态度。7月1日，中海油在美国的公关公司不伦瑞克集团向新闻界发表书面声明，对众议院通过上述议案“表示欢迎”，希望美国政府对此案尽快进行详尽调查。
记者发现，几乎所有美国主流媒体都对中海油竞购案进行了报道，支持中海油的文章比比皆是。《华盛顿邮报》6月28日发表题为《中国的最新“威胁”》的评论文章称，如果想找到阻止中国并购的令人信服的理由，“可能一个也找不到”。《纽约时报》7月1日的文章也为中海油遭到华盛顿种种封杀鸣不平。《基督教科学箴言报》在同一天发表评论文章称，美国人疯狂选购中国商品时，中国人用挣来的数以千亿计的美元来收购美国的能源企业，“这何错之有”？《华尔街日报》中文网络版7月2日刊登文章认为，“无需渲染中海油竞购的资源抢夺色彩”。
中海油提出审查申请
国会下属的美中经济与安全评估委员会委员马洛伊7月1日指出，上述两项议案“没有实质的作用”。“这并不是法律，有点像众议员表达他们的意见，敦促人们加强注意。”或许是认识到这一点，中海油并没太理睬来自国会的声音，而是按部就班地在纽约进行着与优尼科的谈判。中海油首席财务官杨华表示：“现在我们挺忙，我们还是比较有信心，这件事应该是可以做得比较好。”代表团成员透露，谈判目前已取得了进展。至于具体取得了哪些进展、中海油要如何利用公关公司进行游说，以及中海油的一把手傅成玉是否会亲自出马到美国国会进行说明等，杨华均表示目前不便透露。
7月2日，中海油向美国外国投资委员会提交了通知书，期望该委员会开始审查，让优尼科了解中方并购条款优越、时间确定。杨华表示，这将使中海油有机会以公开透明的方式遵照美国法律法规要求行事，并就这一提议展开充分讨论。他们欢迎这一机会，并相信一旦所有的事实为各方所了解，所有的疑虑和问题都会得到完美解决。
按规定，若该委员会向优尼科提出与交易相关的问题，优尼科应在7日内予以回复，但正式的审查须在优尼科向该委员会提出申请后展开。优尼科董事会将于8月10日召开股东特别大会，投票决定是否接纳雪佛龙的收购建议。如果股东大会决定放弃雪佛龙收购案，美国政府才会对中海油并购案展开调查。调查分两个阶段，分别为30天和45天。最后，委员会将向美国总统布什作出是否同意并购的建议。这样下来估计年底会有结果。
马洛伊指出，如果优尼科的股东同意接受雪佛龙的收购，整个案件就不会走到政府审查的阶段。从目前的迹象来看，这种情况出现的可能性在增大。雪佛龙已经做好了全部准备工作。雪佛龙闯过了两道法律关：美国联邦贸易委员会已批准了它与优尼科的并购计划，美国证券交易委员会6月29日又批准雪佛龙对优尼科的竞购。雪佛龙公司总裁兼首席执行官戴维·奥赖利当天表示，雪佛龙成功完成相关法律程序要求，“标志着该公司并购优尼科的计划可能会很快取得成功”。
此间分析人士认为，目前的形势对中海油非常紧迫。在8月10日优尼科召开股东大会前，中海油仅剩下6周时间去争取优尼科的董事会改变初衷，否则收购将会失败。布鲁金斯学会高级研究员、著名华裔学者黄靖认为，中海油很可能会功败垂成。目前优尼科已经感受到了来自政府、国会和舆论的巨大压力，如果再这样无休止地拖下去，优尼科的股东、董事会和股民都受不了。如果优尼科选择中海油而结果未成，雪佛龙到时候可能要压价，优尼科很可能会考虑这些风险。
恐华症在美国蔓延
黄靖认为，美国目前的大气候对中海油并购行动不利。美国目前的大气候对中国不利：美对华贸易逆差问题、人民币汇率问题、纺织品配额问题等都被美国炒得火热，商业问题很容易被政治化。另外，中美之间还存在矛盾。20年前，美国虽也对日本企业进行封堵，但远不能与如今封堵中国企业的力度相比，因为日本和美国毕竟是盟友。
记者一位在美国媒体担任高级编辑的朋友说，虽然美国经济表面上很繁荣，但隐藏着巨大危机，比如房地产市场的泡沫越来越严重，金融市场正面临越来越严重的危机，美国的工业生产能力日益走下坡路，三大汽车公司濒临破产的境地，失业问题等迟迟得不到解决。美国一直倡导自由贸易，并借此在国际贸易中获利，现在美国却为自由贸易设限，这说明美国对自己不自信。
如果中海油的这一商业行为最终因政治原因失利，那将会给华盛顿带来极为不利的政治影响，严重损害其自我标榜的自由贸易的形象。而中海油的竞购无论成功与否都将表明，这是中国企业迈出的具有历史意义的一步。或迟或早，总会有中国企业向前迈出这一步，而每一步都会使中国企业更加接近成功。决定中国企业能否走出去的是在发展中不断强大的中国经济，而不是华盛顿的某些想要遏制中国的人。
美国著名投资银行家罗伯特·库恩对记者说，中海油竞购对美国来说不是威胁而是机遇。“我们应该让中国企业到美国来，与美国企业公平竞争，这对美中两国都有好处。”当记者问，有多少美国人这样想时，库恩说：“大多数美国人对中国的认识非常简单，可能都不会像我这样想。商业界60％以上的人会有我这样的想法。国会议员呢？他们即使心里这样想，嘴上也不会这样说，怕得罪选民。这就是我们这个国家的问题。”▲
《环球时报》 (2005年07月04日 第一版)
本报驻美国特派记者 唐勇
2005年07月06日10:11 【字号 大 中 小】【留言】【论坛】【打印】【关闭】
中海油并购优尼科案成为美国各界关注的焦点。图为2004年9月拍摄的中海油第931自流井平台。
中海油计划以185亿美元现金竞购美国优尼科石油公司的商业行动，在美国已经被完全政治化了，其影响已经远远超过联想收购IBM个人电脑部门和海尔集团竞购美泰公司的案例。美国国会众议院近日连续通过两项议案，提出中海油的行动“影响美国国家安全”，要求阻止其并购优尼科。得知此事后，中海油迅速作出回应，于7月2日向美国外国投资委员会提交通知书，望其对此并购案进行审查，并表示很有信心。有专家指出，如果中海油竞购成功，而美国政府介入阻止，那将成为中美关系史上一件有深远影响的事。
众议院连夜开会表决
6月30日对美国国会众议院来说是忙碌的一天。到了下班时间，议员们没有一个回家，他们在做一件大事：要将中海油收购美国优尼科扼杀在摇篮中。没完没了的辩论之后，已经到了深夜。议员们开始就两项议案进行投票：第一项议案是一项修正案，实际上是财政部、交通部和其他政府部门本财年的预算案。该议案建议阻止美国财政部主持的外国投资委员会动用联邦资金来审查中海油收购案。该议案以333票赞成、92票反对的表决结果通过。密歇根州民主党联邦众议员吉尔帕特里克是一个60岁的老太太。作为议案的发起人，看到议案得以通过，她毫不掩饰自己的高兴。她说：“眼下根本不是把美国第九大石油公司卖给中国的时候！”
随后，议员们又就另一项与中海油有关的议案进行表决，结果也是一边倒，以398票赞成、15票反对通过。这是一项没有法律约束力的议案，声称石油和天然气是美国的“战略资产”，中海油并购案“将损害美国的国家安全与利益”。议案说，一旦优尼科同意被中海油收购，布什政府应“立即进行审查”。众议院民主党领袖佩洛西是该项议案的发起人之一。这位年届65岁的白发女议员跟吉尔帕特里克一样咄咄逼人。佩洛西说：“中海油竞购优尼科案充分表明，美国的能源战略安全脆弱不堪！这场竞购之所以可能，是由于中国政府控制了中海油，并不是自由市场的力量。相信我的共和党和民主党同事们都明白这一点！”众议院能源委员会主席、共和党人理查德·庞博也对议案投了赞成票，他指责中国“并非市场经济国家”，因此中国国有企业的收购行为不符合自由市场原则，也不符合美国国家安全的最大利益。
美国主流媒体帮中国说话
面对国会对中海油并购优尼科的极大忧虑，布什行政当局已经向国会保证，财政部会按照正常程序对这一并购案进行审查。不过一些议员担心，不允许中海油并购优尼科与自由市场原则不符，而且同样可能损害美国的国家安全。来自弗吉尼亚州的众议员莫兰毫不犹豫地对上述两个议案投了反对票。莫兰情绪激动地说：“这样做简直是要把中国打入另册！”他认为，国会封堵中国公司竞购优尼科是一个“危险的举动”，因为中国“正把握着一柄悬在美国经济脖子上的金融铡刀，如果我们做出这种缺少周密考虑的事，他们将会把它（铡刀）落下来。”他还质问道：“不让他们（中国）收购美国或西方的石油公司，难道要让他们去伊朗买吗？”
国会的两项议案经过媒体的报道迅速传遍了世界，舆论哗然。但中海油保持了平静的态度。7月1日，中海油在美国的公关公司不伦瑞克集团向新闻界发表书面声明，对众议院通过上述议案“表示欢迎”，希望美国政府对此案尽快进行详尽调查。
记者发现，几乎所有美国主流媒体都对中海油竞购案进行了报道，支持中海油的文章比比皆是。《华盛顿邮报》6月28日发表题为《中国的最新“威胁”》的评论文章称，如果想找到阻止中国并购的令人信服的理由，“可能一个也找不到”。《纽约时报》7月1日的文章也为中海油遭到华盛顿种种封杀鸣不平。《基督教科学箴言报》在同一天发表评论文章称，美国人疯狂选购中国商品时，中国人用挣来的数以千亿计的美元来收购美国的能源企业，“这何错之有”？《华尔街日报》中文网络版7月2日刊登文章认为，“无需渲染中海油竞购的资源抢夺色彩”。
中海油提出审查申请
国会下属的美中经济与安全评估委员会委员马洛伊7月1日指出，上述两项议案“没有实质的作用”。“这并不是法律，有点像众议员表达他们的意见，敦促人们加强注意。”或许是认识到这一点，中海油并没太理睬来自国会的声音，而是按部就班地在纽约进行着与优尼科的谈判。中海油首席财务官杨华表示：“现在我们挺忙，我们还是比较有信心，这件事应该是可以做得比较好。”代表团成员透露，谈判目前已取得了进展。至于具体取得了哪些进展、中海油要如何利用公关公司进行游说，以及中海油的一把手傅成玉是否会亲自出马到美国国会进行说明等，杨华均表示目前不便透露。
7月2日，中海油向美国外国投资委员会提交了通知书，期望该委员会开始审查，让优尼科了解中方并购条款优越、时间确定。杨华表示，这将使中海油有机会以公开透明的方式遵照美国法律法规要求行事，并就这一提议展开充分讨论。他们欢迎这一机会，并相信一旦所有的事实为各方所了解，所有的疑虑和问题都会得到完美解决。
按规定，若该委员会向优尼科提出与交易相关的问题，优尼科应在7日内予以回复，但正式的审查须在优尼科向该委员会提出申请后展开。优尼科董事会将于8月10日召开股东特别大会，投票决定是否接纳雪佛龙的收购建议。如果股东大会决定放弃雪佛龙收购案，美国政府才会对中海油并购案展开调查。调查分两个阶段，分别为30天和45天。最后，委员会将向美国总统布什作出是否同意并购的建议。这样下来估计年底会有结果。
马洛伊指出，如果优尼科的股东同意接受雪佛龙的收购，整个案件就不会走到政府审查的阶段。从目前的迹象来看，这种情况出现的可能性在增大。雪佛龙已经做好了全部准备工作。雪佛龙闯过了两道法律关：美国联邦贸易委员会已批准了它与优尼科的并购计划，美国证券交易委员会6月29日又批准雪佛龙对优尼科的竞购。雪佛龙公司总裁兼首席执行官戴维·奥赖利当天表示，雪佛龙成功完成相关法律程序要求，“标志着该公司并购优尼科的计划可能会很快取得成功”。
此间分析人士认为，目前的形势对中海油非常紧迫。在8月10日优尼科召开股东大会前，中海油仅剩下6周时间去争取优尼科的董事会改变初衷，否则收购将会失败。布鲁金斯学会高级研究员、著名华裔学者黄靖认为，中海油很可能会功败垂成。目前优尼科已经感受到了来自政府、国会和舆论的巨大压力，如果再这样无休止地拖下去，优尼科的股东、董事会和股民都受不了。如果优尼科选择中海油而结果未成，雪佛龙到时候可能要压价，优尼科很可能会考虑这些风险。
恐华症在美国蔓延
黄靖认为，美国目前的大气候对中海油并购行动不利。美国目前的大气候对中国不利：美对华贸易逆差问题、人民币汇率问题、纺织品配额问题等都被美国炒得火热，商业问题很容易被政治化。另外，中美之间还存在矛盾。20年前，美国虽也对日本企业进行封堵，但远不能与如今封堵中国企业的力度相比，因为日本和美国毕竟是盟友。
记者一位在美国媒体担任高级编辑的朋友说，虽然美国经济表面上很繁荣，但隐藏着巨大危机，比如房地产市场的泡沫越来越严重，金融市场正面临越来越严重的危机，美国的工业生产能力日益走下坡路，三大汽车公司濒临破产的境地，失业问题等迟迟得不到解决。美国一直倡导自由贸易，并借此在国际贸易中获利，现在美国却为自由贸易设限，这说明美国对自己不自信。
如果中海油的这一商业行为最终因政治原因失利，那将会给华盛顿带来极为不利的政治影响，严重损害其自我标榜的自由贸易的形象。而中海油的竞购无论成功与否都将表明，这是中国企业迈出的具有历史意义的一步。或迟或早，总会有中国企业向前迈出这一步，而每一步都会使中国企业更加接近成功。决定中国企业能否走出去的是在发展中不断强大的中国经济，而不是华盛顿的某些想要遏制中国的人。
美国著名投资银行家罗伯特·库恩对记者说，中海油竞购对美国来说不是威胁而是机遇。“我们应该让中国企业到美国来，与美国企业公平竞争，这对美中两国都有好处。”当记者问，有多少美国人这样想时，库恩说：“大多数美国人对中国的认识非常简单，可能都不会像我这样想。商业界60％以上的人会有我这样的想法。国会议员呢？他们即使心里这样想，嘴上也不会这样说，怕得罪选民。这就是我们这个国家的问题。”▲
《环球时报》 (2005年07月04日 第一版)
